

On Realizing There is Only The Virtual Nature of Consciousness

Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi

成唯識論

Source text by Vasubandhu (天親)

Commentaries on it by Dharmapāla (護法) and others

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Dedicated to An Lạc

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The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness

Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi, 成唯識論

Volume Five

3. **The first six evolving manifestations of consciousness** (śaḍ pravṛtti vijñāna, 六轉識):

* **The five sensory projections of consciousness** (pañcā vijñānāni, 五識) &

* **The consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects** (mano vijñāna, 意識)

Question: Having explained this second way that consciousness manifests identity and purpose, there is the third way. What are its characteristics?

Answer: On this, the eighth stanza of verse says:

8a With the second way (dvitīyaḥ pariṇāmo, 二能變) being explained, next there is the third way that consciousness manifests (tṛtīyaḥ pariṇāmo, 三) identity and purpose. It is distinguished in six parts (śaḍ vidhasya, 有六種)

8b Its nature is characterized (upalabdhiḥ, 性相) by the distinction of mental and sensory objects (viśayasya, 了境) as being good (kuśala, 善), bad (akuśalā, 不善), both good and bad, and neither good nor bad (dvayā, 俱非).

8a 次第三能變，差別有六種， dviṭīyaḥ pariṇāmo ayaṁ tṛtīyaḥ śaḍ vidhasya yā

8b 了境為性相，善不善俱非。 viśayasya upalabdhiḥ sā kuśala akuśalā dvayā

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

Following the section on the deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意), there is one on the characteristics of the first six manifestations of consciousness, from vision (cakṣuḥ vijñāna, 眼識) to the distinguishing of imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識).

The names for the first six manifested projections of consciousness

Generally speaking, the first six manifestations of consciousness are differentiated based on the six mental and sensory faculties (śaḍ indriya, 六根) being in alignment (āyatana, 處) with their six objects (śaḍ viśaya, 六根境). These are:

1. **Vision** (cakṣuḥ vijñāna, 眼識) is based on alignment of the eyes (cakṣuḥ indriya, 眼根) with visible forms (rūpa, 色).
2. **Hearing** (śrotra vijñāna, 耳識) is based on alignment of the ears (śrotra indriya, 耳根) with audible sounds (śabda, 音).
3. **Taste** (jihvā vijñāna, 舌識) is based on alignment of the tongue (jihvā indriya, 舌根) with flavors (rasa, 味).
4. **Smell** (ghrāṇa vijñāna, 鼻識) is based on alignment of the nose (ghrāṇa indriya, 鼻根) with odors (gandha, 香).
5. **Touch** (kāya vijñāna, 身識) is based on the alignment of the peripheral nervous system of the body (kāya indriya, 身根) with physical contacts (spraṣṭavya, 觸).
6. **Thought**, the mind distinguishing imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is based on alignment of the thinking mind that is ever deliberating and calculating self-interest (manas, 意) with objective purposes (dharmāḥ, 諸法).

In both Sanskrit (for Vasubandhu) and Chinese (for Xuánzàng), the names for each of these six manifestations of consciousness (vijñāna, 識) are based on the mental or sensory faculties (indriya, 根) with which they are connected, not their objects (viṣaya, 境). There are five reasons for this:

1. The different manifestations of consciousness depend on the respective faculties that serve as their foundations of support (āśraya, 依).
 2. They arise from their respective faculties.
 3. They belong to their respective faculties
 4. They assist their respective faculties
 5. They are like their respective faculties
- * Although all six of these evolving manifestations of consciousness depend on the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 意), none of them shares its name except the consciousness of thought, that is, the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識).
 - * Although the first five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) similarly depend on the deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意), their names come from their respective sense faculties so that they are not confused with each other. Some say this is because consciousness of thought, the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識), only depends on the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 意) as a foundation of support (āśraya, 依) while the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) depend not only on it but also their five respective physical sense faculties (pañca rūpa indriya, 五根).

These first six manifestations of consciousness therefore get their names from their foundations of support while the seventh, the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 意), and the eighth, the subconscious store of memory (citta, 心 or ālaya vijñāna, 藏識), do not. (They get their names respectively from their natures of ‘thinking’ (deliberating and calculating) and ‘accumulating’ (as in a collective storehouse). Because these two serve as foundations of support for each other, as previously explained, the seventh is not called consciousness of the collective mind (citta vijñāna, 心識) and the eighth is not called the consciousness of the thinking mind (mano vijñāna, 意識).)

There are some that name these six after their objects, calling them ‘consciousness of visible forms’ (rūpa vijñāna, 色識) and so forth through ‘consciousness of objective purposes’ (dharma vijñāna, 法識). This is naming the manifestations of consciousness after the different kinds of objects (viṣaya, 境) through which they frame perception (vijñapti, 了別).

The first five are each a consciousness of physical matter (rūpa vijñāna, 色識), with each of them only perceiving their respective kinds of objects (vision perceiving visible forms, hearing perceiving audible sounds, etc.), while the sixth is a consciousness of purpose (dharma vijñāna, 法識), able to perceive the purposes for these objects. Some say that this sixth one gets the name ‘consciousness of purpose’ because it alone is able to perceive the distinct purposes of the others and, this way, it is not confused by them. This naming of these six manifestations of consciousness after the objects that are perceived depends on one having not yet attained full mastery (vaśitā, 自在) over the five physical sense faculties

(pañca rūpa indriya, 五色根). Once full mastery of them has been attained, their functions are interchangeable, with each projection of consciousness arising out of every kind of sense faculty and connecting with all of their objects. At this point, one must only designate these different manifestations of consciousness through the mental or sense faculties that serve as their foundations of support in order to not confuse them with each other.

* When the second volume of The Discourse on the Adornment of the Greater Vehicle Scriptures (Mahāyāna Sūtra Alamkāra Kārikā, 大乘莊嚴經論) speaks about each and every one of the five sensory faculties of an enlightened being that descends into this world (tathāgata, 如來) being connected with their (respective) sense objects, it is only referring to the sense objects in their most explicit sense.

* The Scripture on the Levels of Grounding in Enlightenment (Buddha Bhūmi Sūtra, 佛地經) speaks about the transcendental knowledge of accomplishing life's greater purpose (kṛtya anuṣṭhāna jñāna, 成所作智) ascertaining the different motive forces in the minds of sentient beings that are manifested through their thoughts, words and deeds and which of the four methods to use in responding to their questions.

The four methods of responding to their questions (caturdhā vyākaraṇam, 四記問) were:

- Answering questions categorically (ekāṃśa, 一向記 or 決定記), directly with a yes or no
- Answering questions analytically (vibhaṅga, 分別記) with detailed explanations to reframe questions
- Answering questions with counter-questions (pratiprasna, 反問記 or 詰問記) to prompt self-examination and to clarify the assumptions made in questions.
- Answering questions with silence (niruttara, 默置記 or 止住記), putting questions aside entirely when there is no real answer that can be given in words.

If the sense faculties of enlightened beings (buddhas, 諸佛) did not pervade all sense objects and their purposes, their transcendental knowledge of the nature of purpose would not have these abilities.

Being explicit, the foundations of support (āśraya, 所依) and the objects that are present before (ālambana, 所緣) these six evolving manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ pravṛtti vijñāna, 六轉) have been conclusively established by the teachings from all the different schools of Buddhism and so they will not be explained further here. We have already mentioned their foundations of support and will speak further about the objects present before them later on.

The existential nature (svabhāva, 自性) of the first six manifestations of consciousness & How they imagine through the making of mental images (ākāra, 行相)

Next, Vasubandhu spoke about the nature of these six manifestations of consciousness being characterized by the distinction of objects that virtually frame perception (viśayasya vijñaptiḥ, 了境). This reveals both their existential nature and how they work because:

- * Distinguishing objects that frame perception is their existential nature (svabhāva, 自性).
- * Employing these (different) frames of perception is how it imagines them (ākāra, 行相). Because they get their names from both, they are called the six evolving manifestations of consciousness that distinguish objects and virtually frame perception. In the holy teachings it is said:

“What is vision (cakṣur vijñāna, 眼識)? It is the consciousness that depends on the eyes to distinguish visible forms in the framing of perception.”

It goes though all six this way, finally saying:

“What is thought (mano vijñāna, 意識)? It is the consciousness that depends on the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest to distinguish objective purposes in the framing of perception.”

This citation from the scriptures only speaks about them each being unique and separate foundations of support prior to their spiritual restoration (āśraya parāvṛtti, 轉依), and only as what is being perceived by the imagining portion (darśana bhāga, 見分) of consciousness. The other foundations of support (āśraya, 所依) and frames of perception (vijñapti, 了) are as already explained.

The moral nature (prakṛti, 性) of the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness

Question: What is the moral nature of these first six evolving manifestations of consciousness?

Answer: They can be virtuous (kuśala, 善), unwholesome (akuśala, 不善), both or neither.

Being both or neither is a reference to them being morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記), because that which is neither virtuous nor unwholesome is said to be both or neither.

1. *That which is virtuous* (kuśala, 善) is said to be able to bring benefits to this world as well as that beyond it. Although the pleasant fruits of human existence and the divine heavens of meditation provide benefits to this world, they do not necessarily do so beyond it (as they may bring sorrow to those who must leave this world).
 2. *That which is not virtuous* (akuśala, 不善) is said to bring harm and misfortune to this world as well as that beyond it. Although the fruits of suffering from evil destinies are harmful to this world, they do not bring necessarily harm beyond it where they may no longer bring about evil or suffering.
 3. *That which is morally undefined* (avyākṛta, 無記) is neither virtuous nor evil, bringing neither benefit nor harm, so it is not possible to distinguish its nature as being either.
1. The nature of these first six evolving manifestations of consciousness is considered virtuous when they are directly associated with faith (śraddhā, 信) in a transcendental moral purpose or any of the eleven virtuous mental states (kuśala dharma, 善法).
 2. It is considered to be evil when directly associated with shamelessness (ahrīka, 無慚) or any of the rest of the twenty-six unwholesome kinds of purpose.
 3. It is considered morally undefined when it is not directly associated with any of these (thirty-seven) mental states.

Question: Can these six evolving manifestations of consciousness be endowed with all three of these moral natures at the same time?

Answer: There are two theories about this:

1. *There is a thesis* that these three moral natures cannot be simultaneous in the six evolving manifestations of consciousness because, when they interact together in their perception of external objects, they would be in contradiction to each other. Additionally, the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are innately guided and induced by the mind distinguishing the same imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) and are therefore virtuous or unwholesome by dint of this mental component of consciousness. If it is allowed that the five sensory kinds of consciousness are endowed with all three moral natures at the same time, then the consciousness that distinguishes its imagined objects must also be of these three different natures at the same time. This would contradict reason because virtue and evil are mutually exclusive. Both The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) and Asaṅga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching (Āryadeśanā Vikhyāpana, 顯揚聖教論) say that the conscious mind (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識) arising from the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) can be directly associated

with all three moral natures at the same time, but this depends on there being many different thoughts arising from the subconscious mind. This is similar to speaking about singleness of thought not just referring to the arising and perishing of a single moment of thought but rather many moments of the same thought rising up. Consequently, there is no contradiction between this thesis and that referred to here in these discourses.

2. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that these three different moral natures can indeed co-exist, because vision and the rest of the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) can certainly arise together, either suddenly (aupanipātika, 率爾) or in a flow of similar and consecutive moments (niṣyanda, 等流). Sometimes all the sensory kinds of consciousness arise together while other times it is just one or two. Although these five must arise together with the consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識), their moral natures are not necessarily the same as it and so the argument that they must be is mistaken. Because of this, volume sixty-three in The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) says:

“When one arises from a resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定) upon hearing the sound of a voice, there is a different evolving manifestation of consciousness (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識) arising from one’s hearing (śrotra vijñāna, 耳識) that combines with the mind that has been distinguishing the imagined object (mano vijñāna, 意識) of meditation. It is not this mind that has been distinguishing the imagined object that is perceiving this voice, but hearing, the consciousness of the ears (śrotra vijñāna, 耳識). If this were not so, the sound of the voice would not be experienced and one would not arise from the meditation. It is not the moment at which one hears the voice that one arises from the meditation. It is only after experiencing the sound of the voice and seeking to understand it in the mind distinguishing imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) that one arises from meditation.”

This sudden hearing of a voice during meditation in principle could not be virtuous because, as long as there has not yet been a spiritual restoration (āśraya parāvṛtti, 轉依), any such sudden, unexpected thoughts (aupanipātika, 率爾墮心) are morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記). This demonstrates how the mind distinguishing imagined objects can arise together with the five sensory kinds of consciousness but not necessarily be of the same moral nature as them. (During meditation, the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is virtuous while, at the same time, the hearing (śrotra vijñāna, 耳識) of the voice here is morally undefined. It follows that the same difference of moral nature can apply in non-meditative states.)

Kuṅjī added: *Question:* If this is so, why do The Scripture on Understanding the Deep Mystery (Saṃdhi Nirmocana Sūtra, 解深密經) and the seventy-ninth volume of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) both say that the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) and the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) perceive the same object simultaneously?

Answer: The holy teachings only say that the mind distinguishing imagined objects is simultaneous with the five sensory kinds of consciousness and connects with its five kinds of objects. It does not say that they have the same moral nature.

Kuṅjī added: *Question:* Why does volume seven of The Commentary about The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya Vyākhyā, 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論) say that the five sensory kinds of consciousness are absent when the body and mind are equally composed in meditation (samāhita, 三摩呬多 or 勝定)?

Answer: The Commentary about The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater

Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya Vyākhyā, 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論) speaks here about the five sensory kinds of consciousness being absent when the body and mind are equally composed in meditation (samāhita, 三摩呬多), but it really means that they are mostly absent, not necessarily that they are completely absent.

If the three different kinds of moral natures evolve together in the five sensory kinds of consciousness, the mind that distinguishes imagined objects will be of the same moral nature as the one or the ones drawing the most attention (manaskāra, 作意). If nothing draws its attention, its moral nature will be undefined (avyākṛta, 無記). Consequently, the six evolving manifestations of consciousness can be endowed with all three moral natures at the same time. Upon attaining mastery (vaśitā, 自在) over the five sensory kinds of consciousness, their nature is only virtuous because the physical sense faculties, the mind and the mental states of an enlightened being (buddha, 佛) are all involved in the reality of the noble path (mārga satya, 道諦), having forever transcended and eliminated all the seeds of sophistry found in the discursive mind (prapañca bījaḥ, 戲論種).

The motive forces (mental states) directly associated with (saṃprayukta saṃskāra, 相應行) These first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ pravṛtti vijñāna, 六轉識)

Question: With how many mental states are these six manifestations of consciousness directly associated?

Answer: There are fifty-one in six categories. On this, the ninth stanza of verse says:

9a These six evolving manifestations of consciousness have motive forces directly associated with them (saṃprayuktā saṃskāra, 相應行) in six categories of mental states (caitta, 心所):

- a. Omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraḥ saṃskāra, 遍行)
- b. Motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)
- c. Virtuous mental states (kuśala cetā, 善法)
- d. Primary emotional disturbances (mūla kleśa, 本煩惱)

9b e. Secondary emotional disturbances (upakleśa, 隨煩惱)

- f. Uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行)

All of these mental states are directly associated with three different kinds of emotional feelings (tri vedanā, 三受):

1. The feelings of pleasure found in contentment (sukha, 樂),
2. Feelings of pain found in suffering (duḥkha, 苦) and
3. Feelings that are without either pleasure or pain (dvayā, 俱非).

9a 此心所遍行、別境善煩惱、sarvatrāḥ viniyatāḥ kuśalāś cetasāḥ asau

9b 隨煩惱不定，皆三受相應。saṃprayuktā tathā kleśāḥ upakleśāḥ tri vedanā

On mental states associated with consciousness (saṃprayukta caitta, 心所相應) in general

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

These six evolving manifestations of consciousness are all directly associated with six categories of mental states:

- a. Five omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行)
- b. Five motive forces that distinguish specific objects, or objectives (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)
- c. Eleven virtuous mental states (kuśala caitta, 善法)
- d. Six primary emotional disturbances (mūla kleśa, 本煩惱)
- e. Twenty secondary emotional disturbances (upakleśa, 隨煩惱)
- f. Four uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行)

These direct associations (samprayoga, 相應) always arise with a dependence on the projection of consciousness to which they belong. In belonging to and being subordinate to it, they are called its mental states (caitta, 心所), just as the word ‘mine’ (ātmiya, 我所) refers to things that belong to and are subordinate to ‘me’ (ātma, 我). A projection of consciousness (citta, 心) only apprehends the general characteristics in objects that are before it (ālambana, 所緣) while its mental states (caitta, 心所) apprehend their specific characteristics. These mental states help the mind accomplish its objectives, just as a master artist would draw the outline of a picture and the students would fill in the colors.

a. *Omnipresent motive forces, those found in all projections of consciousness*

(sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行)

On these, the third volume of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) says:

“Consciousness (vijñāna, 識 or citta, 心) is only able to frame the general characteristics of perception.

Attention (manaskāra, 作意) frames these perceptions in terms of characteristics that are not yet perceived by consciousness. These are the more specific characteristics of perception that are apprehended by mental states (caitta, 心所).

Contact (sparśa, 觸) is able to frame these perceptions in terms of characteristics that are agreeable (manojñā, 可意) or disagreeable (amanojñā, 不可意).

Emotional feeling (vedanā, 受) is able to frame these perceptions in terms of characteristics that bring about the pleasure found in contentment (sukha, 樂), the pain found in suffering (duḥkha, 苦) & the neutral feelings of indifference or impartiality (upekṣā, 捨).

Mental association (saṃjñā, 想) is able to frame these perceptions in terms of words, the characteristics that cause verbalization.

The deliberate motive of intent (cetanā, 思) is able to frame these perceptions in terms of characteristics that bring about a proper response to them.

Intent (cetanā, 思) is an ulterior motive in the subconscious mind (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) but becomes a deliberate motive in the manifestations of the conscious mind (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識).

For this reason, attention and the rest of these omnipresent motive forces are said to be mental states (caitta, 心所) that help the mind (citta, 心) accomplish its objectives.”

b. *Motive forces that distinguish specific objects, or objectives* (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)

Those found in the evolving manifestations of the conscious mind

In distinguishing specific mental objects, there is crossing the threshold from the subconscious to the conscious mind.

These are the mental states that are connected with the general characteristics of objects. Elsewhere, such as in The Discourse on Distinguishing Between the Mean & the Extremes (Madhyānta Vibhāga Kārikā, 辯中邊論), it is said that:

“Aspiration (chanda, 欲) is able to further frame perception of things in terms of which characteristics will be agreeable.

Determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解) is able to further frame these perceptions in terms of which characteristics have been decided on with certainty.

The mindfulness of remembrance (smṛti, 念) is able to further frame these perceptions in terms of the characteristics that are learned and kept in mind.

Mental resolve (samādhi, 定) and discernment of purpose (dhī or prajñā, 慧) further frame these perceptions in terms of whether the characteristics are of merit, are harmful or are of no value.

Because of these ten kinds of mental states (caitta, 心所), the five that are found in all eight projections of consciousness (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行) (including the subconscious mind) and the five that are found in mental states that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) (including all conscious states), there arise the forty-one other motive forces, including:

1. Eleven found in virtuous purposes (kuśala dharma, 善法)
 2. Twenty-six found in corrupted purposes (saṃkleśa dharma, 染法), which includes:
 - a. Six primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱)
 - b. Twenty secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) and
 3. Four uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行).
- All of these mental states apprehend both the general (shared) and specific (unique) characteristics found in the objects that are before them (ālambana, 所緣).

The six categories of these mental states (caitta, 心所)

Although they are all called mental states (caitta, 心所) and in this regard they are not different, they are differentiated into six different categories, which are:

- a. The five omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行)
- b. The five motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)
- c. The eleven kinds of virtuous purposes (kuśala dharma, 善法)
- d. The six primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱)
- e. The twenty secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱)
- f. The four uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行)

These six categories together constitute the fifty-one kinds of mental states.

They are given these names because:

1. Omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行) are necessarily found in all eight projections of consciousness.
2. Motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) arise whenever there is connection with any specific object or objective in the conscious mind.
3. Virtuous purposes (kuśala dharma, 善法) arise only when the mind is virtuous.
4. Primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) are by nature the root source of all emotional disturbances.
5. Secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) are similar to the primary kinds and flow forth from them (niṣyandika, 等流).
6. Uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行) are equally found in both virtuous and corrupted purposes but are not determined to be one or the other.

Volume three of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) combines these six categories into five by combining the primary and secondary kinds of emotional disturbances into a single

group because they are both categorized as corrupted purposes (saṃkleśa, 染). It also explains the different distinctions between these five categories through the four ways that they appear in all projections of consciousness:

- a. Those that exist in all moral natures (sarva prakṛti, 一切性)
- b. Those that exist at all levels of meditation (sarva bhūmi, 一切地)⁹
- c. Those that exist at all times (sarva kāla, 一切時)
- d. Those that all arise together whenever any one of them arises (sarva sahabhū, 一切俱)
1. The omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraḡa saṃskāra, 遍行) are endowed with all four of these universal qualities.
 - a. *They exist in all moral natures*, whether virtuous, unwholesome or morally undefined.
 - b. *They exist at all nine levels of meditations on sentient existence* (nava bhūmayāḡ, 九地)⁹:
One in the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界), four in the sphere of objective reality as form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) and four in the sphere of existential principles beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界)
 - c. *They exist at all times*, continuously since the very beginning of time, presently in conscious manifestation and whenever arising to connect with an object.
 - d. *They all arise together whenever any one of them arises*.
2. The motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) are only endowed with the first two:
 - a. *They exist in all moral natures*, whether virtuous, unwholesome or morally undefined.
 - b. *They exist at all nine levels of meditation on sentient existence* (nava bhūmayāḡ, 九地)⁹:
The one in its sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界), the four in the sphere of its objective reality as form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) and the four in its sphere of existential principles beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界)
 - c. *They do not exist at all times*, continuously since the beginning of time, whenever the mind is consciously manifested or whenever connecting with an object.
 - d. *They do not all arise together whenever any one of them arises*.
3. Virtuous purposes (kuśala dharma, 善法) only exist in all of one category.
 - a. *They do not exist in all moral natures*, whether virtuous, unwholesome or undefined.
 - b. *They do not exist in all times*, continuously since the beginning of time, whenever the mind is consciously manifested or whenever arising to connect with an object.
 - c. *They do arise at all nine levels of meditation* (nava bhūmayāḡ, 九地)⁹.
 - d. *They do not all arise together whenever any one of them arises*.
4. Corrupted purposes (saṃkleśa, 染) do not all arise in any of these four categories.
 - a. *They do not exist in all moral natures*, whether virtuous, unwholesome or undefined.
 - b. *They do not exist at all times*, continuously since the beginning of time, whenever the mind is consciously manifested and whenever arising to connect with an object.
 - c. *They do not arise at all levels of meditation*.
 - d. *They do not all arise together whenever any one of them arises*.
5. The four uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行) exist in all of only one:
 - a. *They do exist in all moral natures*, whether virtuous, unwholesome or undefined.
 - b. *They do not exist at all times*, continuously since the beginning of time, whenever the mind is consciously manifested and whenever arising to connect with an object.
 - c. *They do not arise at all levels of meditation*.
 - d. *They do not all arise together whenever any one of them arises*.

The five categories of mental states are distinguished like this in volume three of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論).

The first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ pravṛtti vijñāna, 六轉識) &
The three kinds of emotional feeling (tri vedanā, 三受):

Being subject to change, interruption, detachment as well as moral uncertainty, these six evolving manifestations of consciousness are all directly associated with the three emotional feelings of pleasure, displeasure and indifference because they all experience characteristics that are desirable, undesirable or neutral (neither desirable nor undesirable).

- a. Listing the three kinds of emotional feelings:
 1. Upon experiencing objects with desirable characteristics, the body is comforted, the mind is pleased and there are *feelings of pleasure* (sukha vedanā, 樂受).
 2. Upon experiencing objects with undesirable characteristics, the body is tormented, the mind is stressed and there are *feelings of pain* (duḥkha vedanā, 苦受).
 3. Upon experiencing objects with neutral characteristics, the body is neither contented of tormented, the mind is neither pleased nor stressed and there are *feelings that are neutral, bringing neither pain nor pleasure* (aduḥkha asukha vedanā, 不苦樂受).
- b. Each of these three kinds of emotional feelings can be of two kinds:
 1. Those directly associated with the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are said to involve physical feelings (kāya vedanā, 身受) because they distinctly depend on the physical body.
 2. Those directly associated with the consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) are said to be mental feelings (citta vedanā, 心受) because they distinctly depend on the mind.
- c. All three of these emotional feelings can be either with affliction (sa āsrava, 有漏)⁷ or without affliction (anāsrava, 無漏) because painful feelings can also arise in those who are without affliction.
- d. There are some who say that emotional feelings can also be of three kinds based on becoming detached from them:
 1. Those severed through vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷)
 2. Those severed through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷)
 3. Those that are not severed through either of them (aheya, 非所斷).There can also be said to be three kinds this way:
 1. Those severed by those still in training on the noble path (śaikṣas, 有學)
 2. Those only severed by those beyond further need for training on it (aśaikṣas, 無學)
 3. Those that are not severed by either of them
- e. Some speak of emotional feelings generally being divided into four moral natures:
 1. Those that are wholesome and virtuous (kuśala, 善)
 2. Those that are unwholesome and evil (akuśala, 不善)
 3. Those morally undefined but shrouding the cognitive processes of consciousness (vyākṛta nivṛta, 有覆無記)
 4. Those morally undefined but not shrouding the cognitive processes of consciousness (avyākṛta anivṛta, 無覆無記)

There is a thesis that these three kinds of emotional feeling are each found in all four of these moral categories. If greed (lobha, 貪) and delusion (moha, 癡) spontaneously arise in the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) or emotional disturbances spontaneously arise from painful destinies, including those only in the distinguishing of imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識), but they do not bring about the committing of

actions that will have consequences (karma samutthāna, 發業), they will remain morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記). All of these are directly associated with a capacity for the suffering of pain (duḥkha indriya, 苦根). On this, volume fifty-nine of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) says that any of the different kinds of emotional disturbance can lead to any of the three kinds of emotional feelings when they arise with spontaneity in one's manifested behavior (samudācāra, 現行).

- * When they pervade the consciousness of the body, they can be directly associated with any of the six kinds of (sensory and mental) faculties (indriya, 根).
- * When they do not pervade the consciousness of the body, they are only directly associated with the faculties found in the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地).

This environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) consists of three elements:

1. The subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 阿賴耶識)
2. The deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意) and
3. The distinguishing of imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識)

On this, Sthiramati's Commentary about The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya Vyākhyā, 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論) says that, when spontaneous emotional disturbances attached to the sphere of desire bring about the committing of unwholesome actions (akuśala karma samutthāna, 發業), the consequences will also be unwholesome. All other kinds of emotional feelings are morally undefined but shroud the cognitive processes of consciousness (avyākṛta nivṛta, 有覆無記). Therefore, one should understand that the three kinds of emotional feelings can each be found in all four kinds of moral nature.

The first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ pravṛtti vijñāna, 六轉識) &

The five kinds of emotional feeling (pañca vedanā, 五受):

Some generally divide emotional feelings into five categories. These are:

1. Suffering (duḥkha, 苦) - a physical feeling of pain or displeasure
2. Contentment (sukha, 樂) - a physical feeling of bliss or pleasure
3. Sorrow, or Grief (daurmanasya, 憂) - sadness, a mental feeling of loss or dissatisfaction
4. Rejoicing (saumanasya, 喜) - gladness, a mental feeling of gain or satisfaction
5. Impartiality (upekṣā, 捨), a neutral feeling of indifference or equanimity

In these, suffering and contentment are each divided into two categories because the torments and happiness of the body and the mind are differentiated. This is dependent on:

1. Whether or not they involve mental speculations about distinctions (vikalpa, 分別):
 - a. In being without these speculations, there is suffering or contentment.
 - b. In having them, there is sorrow or rejoicing.
2. Whether they have weight or buoyancy:
 - a. Feelings with weight include suffering and contentment.
 - b. Feelings with buoyancy include sorrow and rejoicing.
3. Whether they are agreeable or disagreeable:
 - a. Agreeable feelings include contentment and rejoicing.
 - b. Disagreeable feelings include suffering and sorrow.

The feelings of impartiality regarding suffering and contentment are not divided into two parts because:

1. They are without the different characteristics of torment and happiness.

2. They are without mental speculations about distinctions (nirvikalpa, 無分別).
3. They evolve impartially with regards to weight or buoyancy as well as agreeability or disagreeability.

On rejoicing (saumanasya, 喜) and contentment (sukha, 樂):

1. *In the five sensory kinds of consciousness* (pañca vijñāna, 五識) there are emotional feelings of contentment (sukha, 樂) that are constantly associated with comfort and happiness.
2. *In the mind that distinguishes imagined objects* (mano vijñāna, 意識):
 - a. While in the preparatory stages for the first two levels of meditation⁹ on sentient existence (sāmantaka prathama dvitīya dhyāna, 初二靜慮近分) in the sphere of form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) there are said to be feelings of rejoicing (saumanasya, 喜) because they only delight the mind.
 - b. While actually in these first two levels of meditation (maula prathama dvitīya dhyāna, 初二靜慮根本) there are said to be feelings of both contentment (sukha, 樂) and rejoicing (saumanasya, 喜) because both the body and the mind are delighted.
 - c. While in the preparatory stages for and actually in the third level of meditation, there are only feelings of contentment (sukha, 樂) because there is a serenity of stillness that has weight (gravitas) and there are no longer speculations about distinctions.
 - d. In the fourth level, there is an impartiality transcending these emotional feelings, combined with perfect resolve (samādhi, 定) & singleness of mind (ekāgratā, 一心).

On sorrow (daurmanasya, 憂) and suffering (duḥkha, 苦):

1. *In the five sensory kinds of consciousness* (pañca vijñāna, 五識) there are emotional feelings of suffering (duḥkha, 苦) that are constantly associated with torment and stress.
2. *In the mind distinguishing imagined objects* (mano vijñāna, 意識) there are two theories:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that there is only sorrow (daurmanasya, 憂) in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects because it is tormented and stressed by them. The holy teachings speak of the feelings of sadness coming from the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) that are said to be ‘the capacity for sorrow’ (daurmanasya indriya, 憂根). On this, the sixty-sixth volume of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says: “The different ripening seeds in the subconscious mind (vipāka vijñāna, 異熟) of those sentient beings reborn in hell arise as an uninterrupted continuity of suffering in the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) and as sorrow in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識). Also, on this, the fifty-fifth volume of the same discourse says: “For beings in hell (naraka, 地獄) there is sorrow in both what they seek out (vitarka, 尋) and what they discover (vicāra, 伺). This is also true in part for the destinies of beasts (tiryaṅgyoni, 傍生) and the demons of hunger (pretas, 鬼).” And so one should understand that, in addition to the more buoyant feelings of sorrow, the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) can be heavily weighed down with emotional feelings of sadness that are also said to be sorrow. As described before, this environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) has three elements:
 1. The subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 阿賴耶識)
 2. The deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意) and
 3. The distinguishing of imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識)

- b. *There is a thesis* from Dharmapāla (deemed correct) that there is both suffering (duḥkha, 苦) and sorrow (daurmanasya, 憂) in this environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地). In the human sphere and the heavens of meditation there is said to be sorrow but it is not heavily weighted. In the realms of beasts and the demons of hunger there are said to be both sorrow and suffering, because mixed feelings are more buoyant while unadulterated feelings of suffering are heavier. In hell (naraka, 捺落迦) there is only said to be suffering because its unadulterated feelings are heavier, being without any speculations about their distinctions (nirvikalpa, 無分別). On this, the fifty-ninth volume of *The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation* says: “All three kinds of emotional feeling can be acquired when any kind of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) is spontaneously arising in one’s manifested behavior (samudācāra, 現行).”

This was already explained before in detail. Also, on this, volume fifty-eight of the same discourse says:

“Beliefs about the reality of one’s self-centered existence (satkāya dṛṣṭi, 薩迦耶見) that are innate (sahaja, 俱生) only have a nature that is morally undefined (avyākṛtātā, 無記性). One should understand that attachments to the extremes of duality (antagrāha dṛṣṭi, 邊執見) that arise together with this belief in the reality of one’s self-centered existence are also like this.”

These innate feelings of suffering are not included in the capacity for sorrow (daurmanasya indriya, 憂根) because, as this discourse says, the capacity for sorrow is never morally undefined. Volume fifty-seven of the same discourse also says: “When in hell, the three other kinds of emotional feelings are definitely not in active manifestation (samudācāra, 現行). This is also the case for the demons of hunger and the lives of beasts when there are unadulterated feelings of suffering.”

The ‘three others’ being referred to here are the capacities for rejoicing, contentment and sorrow, because in their manifest behavior (samudācāra, 現行) there necessarily remains a capacity for indifference (upekṣā indriya, 捨根).

Kuṇḍī added: The three other kinds referenced here must be the capacities for rejoicing, contentment and sorrow because, through the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 第七識) and the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 第八識) that are continuous and uninterrupted, there certainly must always be feelings of indifference.

Question: Is it not so that these feelings of indifference are only incidentally intruding (āgantū, 客), only occasionally appearing externally in the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness, and so not expressed in the manifested behavior of those sentient beings suffering in hell?

Answer: What makes you think that this passage only refers to the *incidentally intruding* feelings of indifference? If one does not allow for the continuous and uninterrupted feelings of indifference that are found in the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest and the subconscious store of memory, one could not say with certainty that beings in hell possess the mental capacity to deliberate on and calculate their self-interest (mano indriya, 意根), as sometimes these incidentally intruding feelings of indifference in the first six manifestations of consciousness are in fact absent.

- a. One should not think that this discourse is only talking about the incidentally intruding feelings (āgantū vedanā, 客受) found in these first six evolving

manifestations of consciousness because, in generally explaining the mental capacity to deliberate on and calculate self-interest (mano indriya, 意根) for beings in hell, there is no reason to treat these feelings differently.

- b. And if this discourse was only speaking about depending on incidental feelings that intrude, why does it speak of beings in hell having eight of the twenty-two capacities (dvā vimśati indriyāni, 二十二根) found in sentient beings⁶?

These eight are:

1. The capacity for survival (jīvita indriya 命根): The vital organs, metabolism and the autonomic nervous system; the need for air, water, food, sleep, relief, etc.
 - 2-6. The five sensory capacities;
 2. The eyes (cakṣur indriya, 眼根); organs of vision
 3. The ears (śrotra indriya, 耳根); organs of hearing
 4. The nose (ghrāṇa indriya, 鼻根); organ of smell
 5. The tongue (jihvā indriya, 舌根); organ of taste
 6. The body's peripheral nervous system (kāya indriya, 身根); organ of touch
 7. The capacity for deliberation and calculation (mano indriya, 意根); the mental capacity that is the organ of thought
 8. The capacity for indifference (upekṣā indriya, 捨根).
- c. If one claims that the eighth capacity is that for sorrow (daurmanasya Indriya, 憂根) rather than the impartiality of indifference, one is mistaken. How can there be the capacity for sorrow between death and rebirth, upon losing consciousness, when the sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are interrupted or when the distinguishing of imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is absent?
- d. Those who hold that the eighth capacity is that for suffering (duḥkha indriya, 苦根) are also wrong for the same reason.
- e. Those who suppose that the male and female sex drives (puruṣa indriya 男根 & sthṛī indriya, 女根) serve as this eighth capacity are also wrong because these capacities are uncertain in hell and the evil actions (akuśala karma, 惡業) that lead sentient beings into hell can cause them to be without a sex drive. Because of their evil actions, those in hell must be made to constantly feel suffering through their eyes, ears and the rest of their sensory capacities. Of what use would their sexual capacity be in this? In the great unrelenting hell of incessant suffering (mahā avīci naraka, 無間大地獄) how can there possibly be any desire for sexual intercourse?
- f. Consequently, the eighth capacity found in hell must be that of indifference (upekṣā indriya 捨根) because it is directly associated with the feelings of indifference that are found in seventh and eight projections of consciousness, the deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意 or 末那) and the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識)

Similarly, grounding in the bliss of ultimate contentment (sukha, 極樂) such as is found in the third level of meditation pleases the deliberating and calculating mind (manas, 意) and is said to be the contentment in which there is no longer any further capacity for the rejoicing (saumanasya indriya, 喜根) found in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識). Likewise, when there is the ultimate pain of suffering, the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest is tormented and there is said to be no further capacity for sorrow (daurmanasya indriya, 憂根) in the consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects. Therefore, the three capacities said to be absent in this hell must be sorrow, rejoicing and

contentment. In other places such as The Summary of the Greater Vehicle Doctrine (Mahāyāna Saṃgraha, 攝大乘論) it is said that (those in hell) have feelings that flow from contentment and are similar to it (niṣyanda sukha, 等流樂). One should understand that this is said in either responding to the teachings found in other schools such as that on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) or making a general reference to those realms where there are beings with mixed feelings (such as beasts and the demons of hunger). This is because it is said that when there is pure, unadulterated suffering there are no longer any seeds of contentment ripening up from the subconscious mind.

Kuījī added: This understanding comes from The Summary of the Greater Vehicle Doctrine. In stating this, it is responding to a teaching from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes based on the lesser track of attaining freedom from affliction at the individual level. This teaching on the greater track of spiritual awakening (Mahāyāna, 大乘) explains how there are mixed emotional feelings flowing from and similar to contentment (niṣyanda sukha vedanā, 等流樂受), even in beasts (tiryagyoni, 傍生) and demons of hunger (pretas, 鬼). In being without the ultimate pain of suffering, they still have feelings flowing from and similar to contentment. Only when there are no more ripening seeds of contentment arising from the subconscious is there said to be the pure unadulterated suffering of hell. In fact, in the holy teachings it is said that within feelings of sadness there is a mental capacity for sorrow (daurmanasya indriya, 憂根) found in the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地), which involves the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識). This is said to be so in most cases (in the sphere of human existence and the heavens of meditation and partially so for the demons of hunger and lives of beasts.) In some cases, this is said just to adapt the greater vehicle teachings to those focused on the lesser track of attaining freedom from affliction at the individual level, such as those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部). There is no contradiction in this. The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that, in those sentient beings who are reborn in hell, there are the different ripenings of seeds from the subconscious mind that are unrelenting, producing fruits of suffering and sorrow that are continuous. It also says that in hell there is the seeking out (vitarka, 尋) and discovery (vitarka, 尋) of sorrow through the distinguishing of imagined objects. This is also partially so in the realm where there are demons of hunger and the lives of beasts. This is said in order to respond to other teachings only focused on attaining freedom from affliction at the individual level such as those from The School of the Majority (Mahā Saṃghika, 大眾部), The School of the Elders (Sthaviravāda, 上坐部), The School Based on the Authority of the Scriptures (Sautrāntika, 經量部), Followers of the Teacher Who Transformed His Land (Mahīśāsaka, 化地部) and others. And with this capacity for suffering (from those in hell) arising together with the mind distinguishing imagined objects, it is like the sorrow found in other destinies, so it is only hypothetically (and incorrectly) said to be sorrow. Some say that this capacity for suffering harms the body (which is associated with suffering) and the mind (which is associated with sorrow) and so, although it is said to really be the capacity for suffering, it is also hypothetically said to be the capacity for sorrow. Similarly, there are feelings of rejoicing in the approach to (the first two levels of) meditation (sāmantaka samādhi, 近分定) that benefits both the body and mind. Although in these there is the capacity for rejoicing, there is also said to be contentment. Asaṅga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching (Āryadeśanā Vikhyāpana, 顯揚聖教論) and the fifty-seventh volume of The Discourse of the

Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation both demonstrate the meaning of this. In fact, the first preparatory stage for meditation (anāgamyā samādhi bhūmi, 未至地定) is without the capacity for contentment (sukha indriya, 樂根) because, as it is said here in The Discourse of the Masters, it only possesses eleven of the twenty-two capacities of sentient existence⁶.

Kuījī added: The eleven capacities found in the first preparatory stage for meditation include:

- a. Mental capacity; the cognitive capacity for deliberation and calculation (mano indriya, 意根)
- b. The five moral capacities
 1. The capacity for faith (śraddhā indriya, 信根) in life's transcendent moral purpose
 2. The capacity for continuous remembrance (smṛti indriya, 念根) of it
 3. The capacity for diligence of effort (vīrya indriya, 精進根) in its observation
 4. The capacity for mental resolve (samādhi indriya, 定根) in realizing it
 5. The capacity for transcendental discernment (prajñā indriya, 慧根) of it
- c. Two of the five emotional capacities:
 1. The capacity for rejoicing (saumanasya indriya, 喜根)
 2. The capacity for impartiality (upekṣā indriya, 捨根) as equanimity of mind
- d. The three unafflicted mental capacities
 1. The capacity to learn about the transcendental nature (anājñātājñāsyāma indriya, 未知當知根)
 2. The capacity to know of it (ājñā indriya, 已知根) in particular cases
 3. The capacity to perfect knowledge of it (ājñā, 具知根) in all cases

Because of this, one should understand that the feelings of sadness & unadulterated suffering found in the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) are included in the capacity for suffering (duḥkha indriya, 苦根). In the holy teachings, the subject of emotional feelings is treated in many different ways. Lest we get side-tracked, we will not deal with it any further here.

Kuījī added: In the holy teachings, emotional feelings are distinguished in many different ways. Here we have clarified there being three kinds and five kinds. Elsewhere they are analyzed in other ways: in terms of them being with or without consequences, in terms of the three spheres of meditation on sentient existence (those on its desires, its forms & its existential principles beyond form)⁴, in terms of the nine levels of grounding in this meditation⁹, in terms of being attached to them or the stages of severing attachments to them, etc., etc.

On the simultaneity of (different) emotional feelings in

The first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ pravṛtti vijñāna, 六轉識)

1. *There is a thesis* that the three different kinds of emotional feelings do not occur simultaneously in the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness because:
 - a. They would contradict each other upon manifesting externally at the same time.
 - b. The five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) have the same objects (ālambana, 所緣) as the mind distinguishing imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識). If the five kinds of emotional feeling are combined into three, they should also be like this as well. Because it is not logical that emotional feelings would be in contradiction with each other, these different kinds of emotional feelings cannot occur simultaneously in the six evolving manifestations of consciousness.

In The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) and elsewhere it is said that the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) can be directly associated with the arising of all three different kinds of emotional feelings at the same time as they are manifested in the evolving permutations of consciousness (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識). However, according to this thesis, this depends on there being many moments of thought occurring, just as speaking about being a single moment of thought does not

just refer to the arising and perishing of a single moment (but rather those of many consecutive occurrences of the same moment of thought). And so, according to this thesis, there is no contradiction here with these discourses.

2. *There is another thesis* (from Dharmapāla, deemed to be correct) that these three different kinds of emotional feelings can occur at the same time in the six evolving manifestations of consciousness because:
 - a. It is possible for agreeable, disagreeable and neutral objects to appear simultaneously and result in bringing about the three different kinds of emotional feelings.
 - b. The mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) does not necessarily have the same emotional feelings as those arising in each of the sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) at any given moment.

Kuṣī added: For example, in meditation, the mind distinguishing imagined objects can arise with rejoicing or contentment at the same time that the body is taxed and stressed, and the mind may have feelings of complete impartiality (in meditation) at the same time that pleasing sounds are suddenly being heard. When the mind that distinguishes imagined objects is specifically focused on an object from one of the five sensory kinds of consciousness, it will raise up the same kind of emotional feelings. If not, it will raise up feelings of indifference towards these sense objects. Because of this, the three kinds of emotional feelings can occur simultaneously. However, upon attaining mastery (vaśitā, 自在) of emotional feelings, enlightened beings (buddhas, 諸佛) only have emotional feelings of contentment, rejoicing and impartiality because they have already severed (the cause of) suffering and sorrow.

On the mental states (caitta, 心所) or motive forces directly associated (samprayukta saṃskāra, 相應行) with the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識)

a - b. Omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraṃ saṃskāra, 五遍行) **& *motive forces distinguishing specific objects*** (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) **directly associated with the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness** (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識)

The six categories of mental states directly associated with the six evolving manifestations of consciousness have already been generally explained. Now there will be an elaboration of their different specific characteristics.

Question: What are the first two categories and what are their characteristics?

Answer: On this, Vasubandhu's tenth stanza of verse says:

10a a. First (ādyāḥ, 初), there are the omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraṃ saṃskāra, 遍行):

1. Contact (sparśa, 觸),
2. Attention (manaskāra, 作意)
3. Emotional feeling (vedanā, 受),
4. Mental association (saṃjñā, 想) and
5. The motive of intent (cetanā, 思)

b. Next there are the motive forces that distinguish specific objects, or objectives: (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行):

1. Aspiration (chanda, 欲)
- 10b 2. Determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解)
3. Remembrance (smṛti, 念)
4. Mental resolve (samādhi, 定) and
5. Discernment of purpose (dhībhyāṃ, 慧)

These motive forces connect to the various different (niyatāḥ, 事不同) objects that are before them (ā lambana, 所緣).

10a 初遍行觸等，次別境謂欲、 ādyāḥ sparśādayaś chanda adhimokṣa smṛtayaḥ saha

10b 勝解念定慧，所緣事不同。 samādhi dhībhyāṃ niyatāḥ sraddhātha hrīr apatrapā

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

a. *The five omnipresent motive forces* (pañca sarvatraga saṃskāra, 五遍行):

In the first of these six categories, there are contact (sparśa, 觸) and other omnipresent motive forces that are found in all mental states. These were already explained in detail in the sections on the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) and the mind that deliberates and calculates self-interest (manas, 末那).

Again, these five are #1 contact (sparśa, 觸), #2 attention (manaskāra, 作意), #3 emotional feeling (vedanā, 受), #4 mental association (saṃjñā, 想) and #5 the ulterior (subconscious) or deliberate (conscious) motive of intent (cetanā, 思).

Evidence for the existence of omnipresent motive forces

Question: How can we recognize the characteristics of these omnipresent motive forces?

Answer: There are two ways - literary evidence through the words of the scriptures and evidence through logical reasoning:

1. *Literary evidence for existence of the five omnipresent motive forces from scripture* (āgama, 阿含)

On this, The Scripture on Arising and Perishing (Samudaya Nirodha Sūtra, 起盡經) from the earliest canon of scriptures (Āgama Sūtras, 阿含經) says:

“When the eyes (cakṣuḥ indriya, 眼根) connect with visible form (rūpa, 色) there is vision (cakṣuḥ vijñāna, 眼識). When these three are blended together there is contact (sparśa, 觸).

Upon arising together through contact there are emotional feeling (vedanā, 受), mental association (saṃjñā, 想) as well as the motive forces (saṃskāra, 行) of intent (cetanā, 思) ...” Because of this, contact and the rest of these four are shown to be omnipresent motive forces. The Scripture on the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint (Hasti Pada Upama Sūtra, 象跡喻經), also from the earliest canon of scriptures, says:

“If the mental and sensory faculties (indriya, 根) have not been damaged or destroyed and the objective sphere (viśaya dhātu, 境界) is present before them, attention (manaskāra, 作意) will arise and produce consciousness (vijñāna, 識).”

The Scripture on the Arising and Perishing of Conditions (Samudaya Nirodha Sūtra, 起盡經) also says:

“When there is attention directed towards an object, there will be framing of perception (vijñapti, 了別). When there is this framing of perception, attention will be drawn towards its object. Because of this, attention and framing of perception are always connected with each other. And because of this, attention (manaskāra, 作意) is also said to be an omnipresent motive force.”

There are many such citations from the holy teachings that can be offered as literary evidence.

2. Evidence for existence of the five omnipresent motive forces through logical reasoning (yukti, 正理)
1. Evidence for contact (sparśa, 觸): For there to be the arising of consciousness, there must be a blending of three things (trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ, 三和):
 - a. A mental or sensory faculty (indriya, 根),
 - b. A mental or sensory object (viṣaya, 境) and
 - c. Consciousness (vijñāna, 識)
 In being combined, these three directly produce contact and prove that contact exists. If they did not, the mind and its states would not establish contact with an object.
 2. Evidence for attention (manaskāra, 作意): Through attention, the mind is drawn towards its object. If attention did not exist, there could not be a conscious mind.
 3. Evidence for emotional feeling (vedanā, 受): Through emotional feelings, one is able to experience the agreeability, disagreeability or neutrality of objects and cause the mind to bring about the characteristics of satisfaction, dissatisfaction or indifference. No conscious mind can arise without one of these kinds of emotional feelings.
 4. Evidence for mental association (saṃjñā, 想): Through the making of mental associations, one is able to analyze and define objects and their context in the scheme of all things. If there were no mental associations when the conscious mind arose, there would not be the ability to grasp the characteristics of objects or their context in terms of anything else.
 5. Evidence for the (ulterior or deliberate) motive of intent (cetanā, 思): Through the motive of intent, the mind apprehends the reason for things and makes judgments about what is right, wrong or morally undefined. If this motive of intent did not arise, one would have no idea what to do. Because of this, there certainly must be a motive of intent.
In crossing the threshold from the subconscious to the conscious mind, the motive of intent is transformed from being an ulterior motive to a deliberate one.
- Through this evidence, one should recognize that contact and the rest of these five must be found in all states of mind. Consequently, they are called omnipresent motive forces. None of the other mental states we will discuss have this quality of omnipresence

- b. The five motive forces that distinguish specific objects (pañca viniyata saṃskāra, 五別境行)
- This refers to the mental states that connected to the specific objects (viṣaya, 境) that are found before them (ālambana, 所緣).
- They include:
1. Aspiration (chanda, 欲)
 2. Determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解)
 3. Remembrance (smṛti, 念)
 4. Mental resolve (saṃādhi, 定) and
 5. Discernment of purpose (dhībhyāṃ, 慧)
- Among the six categories, they are said to be next after the omnipresent motive forces.

1. Aspiration (chanda, 欲) is the *nature* (svabhāva, 性) of longing for a desired object or objective. Its *action* (karma, 業) serves as the foundation for tireless effort (vīrya āśraya, 勤依). There are three theories on what is meant by a desired object:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that this refers to an object that is enjoyed because there is aspiration in longing for things that are enjoyable to see or hear, etc.
Question: What about something loathsome from which one longs to be separated?
 Is there not an aspiration with regards to this longing?
Answer: According to this thesis, seeking to only be separated from something that is loathsome is not of the same nature as longing for something enjoyable.

Therefore, there is no aspiration towards things that are loathsome and things that are neither loathsome nor desirable. There is also no aspiration if there is no longing for connection with something desirable.

- b. *There is another thesis* that aspiration refers to both longing to seek out and be united with a desired object as well as longing to be separated from an object that is loathsome. However, there is no aspiration towards an object in which there are feelings of indifference, as there is no aspiration if there is no longing for either union with an enjoyable object or separation from a loathsome one.
- c. *There is yet another thesis* (deemed correct) that something desired refers to an object that one aspires to examine, because in all things one aspires to examine there is a longing. If there is no aspiration to examine something, there will be a lack of strength in the connection between longing and the object, and examination will just be spontaneous, without any aspiration. Through this reasoning, it is conclusively established that aspiration (chanda, 欲) is not one of the omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行) as it is not found in all projections of consciousness and their mental states.

Some from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) claim that aspiration is an omnipresent motive force, asserting that it is through the power of longing for objects that the mind and its states apprehend the objects (and objectives) before them (ālambana, 所緣) and that, because of this, the holy teachings speak about the mind being the source of all purposes. However, this is not correct because:

- * It is really by dint of attention (manaskāra, 作意) that the mind and its states apprehend objects.
- * The holy teachings say it is the attention directed towards that which is before one that produces consciousness.
- * It is not said anywhere in the scriptures that the mind and their states arise due to aspiration (chanda, 欲).

It would be like saying that craving (tṛṣṇā, 愛) was the source of all purposes. How could it be that the mind and its states all arise because of craving? Therefore, when it is said that aspiration is the cause of all purposes, what is really meant is that all actions that have consequences (karmas, 諸業) arise through aspiration. Some say this refers to the virtuous aspirations that are able to inspire proper efforts and so assist in the accomplishment of all good works. This is why it is taught that all actions having consequences depend on the efforts arising from aspiration.

2. Determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解) is the *nature* of judgment (adhyavasāya, 解) and decisiveness (niścaya, 定) about an object or objective that establishes a confirmation and certainty about it. Its *action* makes it unnecessary for there to be any further changing of the mind about it. This is a reference to reaching a judgment and decision in the apprehension of an object, regardless of whether it is through the power of correct or incorrect instruction, logic or evidence. Through this decisiveness, one cannot be influenced to change one's mind by any different circumstances (whether right or wrong). Therefore, decisiveness is entirely absent when there is no certainty about an object or when the mind is still deciding about it. And, because of this absence, the decisiveness of determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解) is not one of the omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行).

Some in The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部), as expressed in volume ten of The Principles Underlying the Spiritual Science (Abhidharma Nyāyānusāra Śāstra, 阿毘達磨順正理論) by Saṃghabhadra (眾賢), claim that when the mind and its states apprehend their own objects or objectives, it is only through the decisiveness found in determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解) that they are without any obstacles in doing so. This is not really correct because:

- * Nothing but the mind (citta, 心) and its states (caittas, 心所) are able to obstruct the apprehension of its objects.
- * Nothing but the mind and its states are obstructed.
- * The mind and its states prevail because of their attention (manaskāra, 作意) and mental and sensory capacities (indriya, 根), not because of the making of a determination.

If it could be said that the mind prevails because of determination, it would also have to be said that it depends on all its other mental states to do so and there would be the error of falling into an infinite regression of causes.

3. Remembrance (smṛti 念) is the *nature* of mindfulness, the clear recording an object in the mind that has been learned from the past so that it is kept there and never forgotten. Its *action* serves as the foundation for the mental resolve of meditation (samādhi āśraya, 定依). Because it repeatedly remembers and keeps the experience of an object in mind, it never forgets it and it is able to induce the mental resolve of meditation. Yet, without having the existential nature of experience, there is no arising of remembrance and there is no ability to clearly record or keep anything in mind. Because of this, the mindfulness of remembrance is definitely not one of the omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行).

Some from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes such as Saṃghabhadra asserted that the mind directly arises together with the mindfulness of remembrance because it is the cause for the ability to remember things in the future. This is incorrect because:

- * Proper faith, delusions and other wholesome and unwholesome mental states that arise later cannot necessarily be said to have also existed in the past.
- * The ability to remember things in the future can be attributed to the mind and its mental states from the past being combined with the power of mental associations (saṃjñā, 想) that are made later. (When the mind and its states perceive an object, they imprint the subconscious store of memory with seeds (potentialities) that will serve as the cause for future remembrances. However, there is no reason to assume, as Saṃghabhadra and others do here, that there is a remembrance that co-exists immediately with an experience that will necessarily be the cause of a future recollection.)

4. Mental Resolve (samādhi, 定) is the *nature* of mental concentration that makes the mind focus its observation on an object or objective without being diverted. Its *action* serves as the foundation for transcendental knowledge of the nature of purpose (jñāna āśraya, 智依). This means that, in observing the virtues, deficiencies and other (neutral) qualities of an object, mental resolve makes the mind remain focused on it without being distracted. In depending on this as a means to penetrate its true nature with resolution (nairvedhika, 決擇), there is the arising of transcendental knowledge (jñāna, 智).

The expression ‘focus of the mind’ (citta ekāntikatā, 心專注) demonstrates that the mind has the ability and the means to abide anywhere it wants to, not only that it abides in a single

object. If this were not so, there would not be a sustaining of mental resolve upon having a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana mārga, 見道) through meditation on the four truths about the nature of life's purpose, while at the same time distinguishing a succession of different objects or objectives. Because mental resolve (samādhi, 定) does not arise if it is not firmly focused on an object, it is not one of the omnipresent motive forces found in all projections of consciousness (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行). Some from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes such as Saṃghabhadra asserted that mental resolve also arises when there is distraction but it is just weak and concealed. They should explain what they mean by this more clearly:

- a. If they mean that mental resolve is an omnipresent motive force because it is able to make the mind and its states connect with a single object, they are wrong because that is the function of contact (sparśa, 觸).
- b. If they mean that mental resolve is an omnipresent motive force because it makes the mind focus on an object for even just a moment (kṣaṇa, 剎那) without changing, they are wrong again because the mind does not change the object before it (ālambana, 所緣) during any single moment (of the here and now).
- c. If they mean that mental resolve is an omnipresent motive force because it makes the mind apprehend the objective conditions before it, they are wrong again because it is attention (manaskāra, 作意) that makes the mind apprehend them.

There are those from The School Based on the Authority of the Scriptures (Sautrāntika, 經量部) who say that mental resolve is the essential nature of the mind because, as it is said in the holy teachings, among the three kinds of spiritual training (trīṇi śikṣāṇi, 三學), the training of the mind is the nature of focusing on a single object or objective. This is not testimony that proves the point of it being an omnipresent motive force because this just means that mental resolve involves making the mind focus on a single object. Mental resolve (samādhi, 定) is included among the five spiritual capacities (pañca indriya, 五根), the five spiritual powers, (pañca bala, 五力), the seven branches of spiritual awakening (sapta bodhy aṅga, 七覺支) and the eight steps of noble path (aṣṭa ārya mārga aṅga, 八正道支), just as are remembrance (smṛti, 念) and the discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧). However, like them, it does not constitute an omnipresent nature.

5. Discernment of Purpose (dhī or prajñā, 慧) is the *nature* of examining an object or objective that is being observed while its *action* severs doubts about it (vicikitsā, 疑).

Dhī is a more general reference to discernment (intelligence) while prajñā refers to transcendental discernment. This means that, in the examination of the virtues, deficiencies and other (neutral) qualities of an object, discernment seeks out, examines and discovers its true purpose with certainty (viniścaya, 決定). Because there is no discernment when there is no examination of an object or the mind is benighted by ignorance, discernment (dhī or prajñā, 慧) is not considered to be one of the omnipresent motive forces found in all projections of consciousness (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行). Some from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes such as Saṃghabhadra asserted that even in the darkness of ignorance there is the arising of discernment, only it is weak and concealed.

Question: How could a beloved innocent born in the divine bliss (devānām priya, 天愛) (of ignorance) possibly know this?

Answer: Because various texts on the spiritual science (abhidharma, 對法) (particularly those of Commentators (Vaibhāṣikas, 毘婆沙論師) from the School on the Real Existence

of All Purposes) speak of it being one of the *ten* universal kinds of purpose (mahā bhūmika dharma, 遍大地法) that are found in all kinds of consciousness.

Reply: There are contradictions in the texts on spiritual science from different schools about this. How can you hold any one of them as authoritative? The scriptures (sutras, 經) say that there are only five omnipresent motive forces (pañca sarvatraga saṃskāra, 五遍行):

1. Contact (sparśa, 觸),
2. Attention (manaskāra, 作意) and
3. Emotional feeling (vedanā, 受),
4. Mental association (saṃjñā, 想) and
5. Intention (cetanā, 思)

The teaching from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes about there being ten universal kinds of purpose found in all kinds of consciousness is not from the scriptures themselves, so you should not hold to this incorrect belief. In fact, aspiration (chanda, 欲) and the rest of the motive forces that distinguish specific objects (pañca viniyata saṃskāra, 五別境行) are unlike contact and the others that are omnipresent, just as proper faith, greed and the rest of the mental states are by definition not omnipresent.

On the mutual interaction (anyonya, 互相) between

The five motive forces that distinguish specific objects (pañca viniyata saṃskāra, 五別境行)

- a. *There is a thesis from Sthiramati* that these five motive forces distinguishing specific objects interact and mutually depend on one another and that, when any one of them arise, the other four are certain to do so as well.
- b. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that they do not necessarily arise together because:
 1. As The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) says, of the four ways that mental states appear in all projections of consciousness, the motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) are found in first two but not in the last two (as explained before):
 - a. They exist in all moral natures, whether virtuous, unwholesome or morally undefined.
 - b. They exist at all nine levels of meditation (nava bhūmayāḥ, 九地)⁹.
 - c. They do not exist at all times.
 - d. They do not all arise together whenever any one of them arises.
 2. In volume fifty-five of the same discourse it is also said that the five motive forces distinguishing specific objects arise upon being connected with four kinds of objects (catvāro viṣayāḥ, 四境), but that these motive forces and these objective conditions are not necessarily simultaneous.
 - a. Sometimes these five motive forces arise in these four objects one at a time.
 1. The longing of aspiration (chanda, 欲) only arises if there is a desired object.
 2. The certainty of determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解) only arises when there is understanding of an object that has been confirmed.
 3. The mindfulness of remembrance (smṛti, 念) only arises if there is an object that has been learned about in the past.
 4. The concentrated focus of mental resolve (samādhi, 定) only arises if there is an object that has been thoroughly examined (through meditation).

This means that, even if those who are in the darkness of ignorance calm their scattered minds and focus on the objects before them (ālambana, 所緣), they are still not able to properly examine them. Even those of this world generally recognize that there can be mental resolve (samādhi, 定) without discernment of purpose (dhī or prajñā, 慧).

Question: If this is so, how can the object that they focus their minds on be said to be under examination?

Answer: For those in the preparatory stages of intensified motivation (prayoga avasthā, 加行位) that lead to meditation, there is only said to be a limited amount that listening (śruta, 聞) and deliberation (cintā, 思) can do. Because of this, it is said that, with regards to the objective conditions before them, it is only the focus of mental resolve (samādhi, 定) that thoroughly examines an object. This is true in many cases. However, there are exceptions:

- a. Those in the heavens of bliss who forget their true purpose (krīḍa pradhūṣika devaloka, 戲忘天) may focus on a single object but still have greed for cravings, hatred for adverse feelings, etc. These are examples of those who have mental resolve but are still without discernment of purpose. There are many other cases like this.
- b. Sometimes only discernment (dhī or prajñā, 慧) arises during examination of an object, without mental resolve. This refers to the mind being without focus and roaming about, making scattered examinations of different objects. In this case, there is discernment that is without mental resolve.
- b. Sometimes only two of these five motive forces will arise at the same time.
 1. Aspiration and determination arise together when there is certainty about an object being desired.
 2. Aspiration and remembrance arise together in an object when its desirability is clearly recollected and kept in mind.

All of these pairs can be described, up to mental resolve and discernment of purpose both arising when an object is being examined. Altogether, there are ten such pairings.

- c. Sometimes three of them arise at the same time. Aspiration, certainty of determination and remembrance arise together when one recollects with certainty that a desirable object has been experienced in the past. All of these threesomes can be described up to remembrance of an object with mental resolve and discernment of purpose. Altogether, there are ten such threesomes.
- d. Sometimes four of them arise at the same time. When the first four kinds arise, there is a remembrance with certainty that a desirable object has been examined in the past. All of these combinations of four can be described up to remembrance of an object with certainty while discerning its purpose with mental resolve, when the last four kinds arise together. Altogether, there are five such combinations of four.
- e. Sometimes all five of them arise at the same time. This is remembrance of a desirable object with certainty and discerning its purpose with mental resolve.

Like this, the five motive forces distinguishing specific objects can arise individually or in any combination with regards to these four kinds of objects. Altogether, there are thirty-one such variations (the five arising separately, ten combinations of two, ten combinations of three, five combinations of four and one combination of all five). However, there are some mental states in which none of these five arise. For example,

these four objects are absent when:

- * One of the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness appears suddenly and unexpectedly (aupanipātika, 率爾墮心)
- * In states in which there is only the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 阿賴耶識): These five motive forces that distinguish specific objects do not exist in the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 末那) and the subconscious store of memory, as already explained. However, whether or not there has been a restoration of its spiritual foundation (āśraya parāvṛtti, 轉依), the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) can arise together with any of the five motive forces that distinguishes specific objects.

On the mutual interaction between the five motive forces that distinguish specific objects & The five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識):

1. *There is a thesis from Sthiramati* that aspiration and the other motive forces distinguishing specific objects are not found in the five sensory kinds of consciousness because:
 - a. The longings of aspiration are absent because they are already connected with their objects (prior to any such longing).
 - b. The decisiveness of determination is absent because, being spontaneous, they have no ability to make determinations (and so be decisive).
 - c. The mindfulness of remembrance is absent because they are constantly taking on new objects.
 - d. The focus of mental resolve is absent because their existential natures are scattered and unstable (volatile).
 - e. The examination of discernment is absent because they are incapable of investigation (on their own, without the mind that distinguishes imagined objects).
2. *There is another thesis from Dharmapāla* (deemed to be correct) that these five motive forces that distinguish specific objects can be found in all five sensory kinds of consciousness.
 - a. Although the five sensory kinds of consciousness are without a prevalence of longing for their objects, they do have weak desires for them.
 - b. Although they are without a prevalence of decisiveness about their objects, they do make weak determinations about them.
 - c. Although they do not have a clear record of the past or learn about their objects, they do have weak remembrances of (vague familiarities with) them.
 - d. Although their attention (manaskāra, 不作) does not bind their thoughts to a single object, they do have a weak focus of concentration. Their nature is said to be scattered and unstable, preventing them from inducing mental resolve by themselves. However, this does not prevent them from having some mental resolve, even if it is distracted. Therefore, they do have some incidental mental resolve.
 - e. Although they are not able to thoroughly investigate the objective conditions before them, they do have some weak power to seek and discover. Because of this, the sixty-ninth volume of *The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論)* says that the eyes and ears have powers of vision and hearing that are directly associated with the nature of transcendental knowledge (jñāna, 智性). This also applies to smell, taste and touch. Because of this, discernment of purpose is not entirely absent in the five sensory kinds of consciousness.

Furthermore, in the stages of spiritual development prior to their mastery (vaśitā, 自在), these five motive forces that distinguish specific objects may be absent in some of the

five sensory kinds of consciousness. However, upon attaining mastery of them, by definition they do exist in them. This is because in enlightened beings (buddhas, 諸佛):

- a. The aspiration that examines desirable objects and objectives never wanes.
- b. The decisiveness of determination that makes judgments about objects never wanes.
- c. The remembrance that learns from past experiences never wanes. Also, the five sensory kinds of consciousness in an enlightened being that has descended into this world (tathāgata, 如來) can perceive the objects of the past, present and future.
- d. The mind of such an enlightened being is never without mental resolve.
- e. All five sensory kinds of consciousness are endowed with transcendental knowledge of accomplishing life's greater purpose (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna jñāna, 成所作智).

On the direct associations (samprayoga, 相應) between emotional feelings (vedanā, 受) & The five motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)

Question: With which of the emotional feelings are these five motive forces distinguishing specific objects directly associated?

Answer: There are two theories on this:

1. *There is a thesis from Sthiramati* that aspiration is directly associated with rejoicing, contentment and impartiality but not sorrow or suffering because the objects causing these latter two are never desirable. In this thesis, the other four motive forces that distinguish specific objects are directly associated with four kinds of feelings, all of them except suffering, because determination, remembrance, resolve and discernment are not found in the five sensory kinds of consciousness. With these four kinds of motive forces not being directly associated with the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識), they are said to be without the physical feeling of suffering. Therefore, these four are said to only be directly associated with the four other kinds of emotional feeling in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識).
2. *There is a thesis from Dharmapāla* (deemed correct) that all motive forces that distinguish specific objects can be directly associated with all five kinds of emotional feelings.
 - a. With regards to aspiration, volume fifty-seven of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that the capacity for sorrow is directly associated with aspiration because practitioners who have a fervent aspiration to realize the nature of life's supreme purpose (anuttara dharma, 無上法) grieve in their inability to do so. In the places where there is unadulterated suffering (the hells, sometimes among the demons of hunger and lives of beasts) there is an aspiration for emancipation from these destinies. As explained before, the mind that deliberates and calculates self-interest (manas, 意) also has the capacity for suffering. Volume fifty-nine of the same discourse says that cravings (tṛṣṇā, 愛) and the greed of attachment to appetites (lobha, 貪) are directly associated with sorrow and suffering and, in both of them, there definitely exist the longings of aspiration.
 - b. With regards to the other four motive forces that distinguish specific objects, the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is directly associated with the capacity for suffering as has already been explained. With this being so, what is wrong with assuming that it also arises together with the other four motive forces of determination, remembrance, resolve and discernment? Furthermore, as previously explained, the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) can also be weakly associated with these four motive forces.

Therefore, aspiration and the rest of the five motive forces that distinguish specific objects can be directly associated with the five sensory kinds of consciousness. These five motive forces are also directly associated with the different moral natures, spheres of meditation on sentient existence, levels of spiritual training, etc., and these avenues of deliberation should all be considered in accordance with logical reasoning.

The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness,
Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi, 成唯識論
End of Volume Five

The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness

Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi, 成唯識論

Beginning of Volume Six

d. The eleven virtuous kinds of purpose (kuśala dharma, 善法)

Question: We have already explained two of the categories of directly associated mental states, those of omnipresent motive forces and motive forces that distinguish specific objects. What are the characteristics of virtuous mental states (kuśala caitta, 善位心所)?

Answer: On this, the eleventh stanza of verse (and part of the tenth in the Sanskrit version) says:

11a c. Wholesome mental states (kuśala cetas, 善法) include:

1. Faith (śraddhā, 信) in a transcendent moral purpose
2. Shame (hrī, 慚)
3. Humility (apatrāpya, 愧)
4. Absence of the greed (alobha, 無貪) found in cravings and appetites
5. Absence of the hatred (adveṣa, 無瞋) found in aversion and disgust
6. Absence of the delusion (amoha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference
7. Diligence of effort (vīrya, 精進)
- 11b 8. The confidence (praśrabdhi, 輕安) arising from a higher sense of purpose
9. Vigilance (apramāda, 不放逸)
10. Non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害), as well as
11. Impartiality of mind (upekṣā, 捨)

10b ... śraddhātha hrīr apatrapā

11a 善謂信慚愧、無貪等三根, alobha adi trayam vīryam praśrabdhiḥ sa apramādikā

11b 勤安不放逸、行捨及不害。 ahiṃsā kuśalāḥ ...

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

By definition, only the virtuous mind is said to be directly associated with virtuous mental states. There are eleven of them.

1. Faith in a transcendental moral purpose (śraddhā, 信) is the nature of real virtue that is capable of finding deep and enduring contentment with a pure heart (śuddha citta, 淨心). Its action counteracts the lack of such a proper faith that does not find contentment in virtue. In fact, there are three kinds of proper faith that can be distinguished:
 - a. *Faith in the real existence of a transcendental nature of purpose* (sat bhūta, 實有): This is a reference to a deep enduring faith in there being a real moral purpose for all things, both in principle and in actual practice.
 - b. *Faith in the real existence of transcendental virtue* (śrīmat, 有德): This is a reference to having a deep longing for and faith in the transcendently pure virtues of The Three Treasures (Tri Ratna, 三寶):
 1. The Enlightened Being (Buddha, 佛): The teacher
 2. The True Nature of Life's Purpose (Dharma, 法): That taught
 3. The Community of Faith (Saṃgha, 僧): Those who are taught

- c. *Faith in the real existence of one's potential capacity* (śakta, 有能): This is a reference to having a deep faith in one's power and ability to accomplish all the virtuous objectives one aspires to, both in this world and beyond it.

Because of this, proper faith serves as an antidote to the faithless mind in these three ways and produces a longing and aspiration to cultivate and realize virtuous purposes, both in this world and beyond it. In this definition:

- * The endurance of this faith is the cause of its decisiveness and certainty of determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解) .
- * The longing of this faith is the fruit of its aspiration (chanda, 欲).

Question: Can you explain the essential character of this proper faith?

Answer: Have we not already explained that it is the nature of a pure heart?

Question: We still do not yet thoroughly understand what is meant by 'a pure heart'.

- * If it is purity of the mind itself (citta, 心), it should not be considered to be one of the mental states that arises (caitta, 心所).
- * If it is what makes the mind pure, then how is it distinguished from the sense of shame and the other ten virtuous mental states?

This problem also occurs with the mind arising together with a purity of purpose.

Answer: The nature of proper faith is a clarity that purifies both the mind and its states. It is only said to purify the mind here because the mind itself is most important, and there is less need to also mention the purification of the mental states associated with it. Faith is like the magic gem that, once added to polluted water, is able to purify it. Although the sense of shame and the other virtuous mental states are also wholesome and pure, they do not have this unique characteristic of clarifying and cleansing (viśuddha, 淨). In having this characteristic, proper faith is not confused with other virtuous mental states.

Corrupted purposes also each have their own distinct characteristics. Only the unique characteristic (sva lakṣaṇa, 自相) known as lack of faith (āsraddhā, 不信) is able to corrupt and pollute the mind and its mental states, just as the filthiest things not only defile themselves but also everything else around them they come in contact with. Proper faith is exactly the opposite of this because it is characterized by a purification of the mind.

- a. There are those among The School of the Elders (Sthaviravāda, 上座部) and even some from the greater vehicle schools (Mahāyāna, 大乘) who say that the longing of *aspiration* (chanda, 欲) is the main characteristic of proper faith. Based on this:
 1. It should have all three moral natures, virtuous, evil and undefined, in accordance with one's aspirations.
 2. The reality of suffering (duḥkha, 苦) and its origination (samudaya, 集) should not be considered the true object of faith (śraddhā ālambana, 信所緣).
- b. There are also those among The School of the Majority (Mahā Saṃghika, 大眾部) and even some from the greater vehicle schools who hold that *obedience* (Anukūla, 順) is the main characteristic of proper faith. Based on this:
 1. It should also have all three moral natures in accordance with that with which one is obedient, because it should be identical with the judgments made through one's determinations (adhimokṣa, 勝解).
 2. If it was just obedience to one's own desires, it should be identical with the longings of one's aspiration (chanda, 欲). This is because, apart from the longings of one's aspiration and the decisiveness of one's determination, there is no obedience.

And so one should know that proper faith is really characterized by *purification of the mind*.

2. A sense of shame (hrī, 慚) is the *nature* that has reverence and respect for virtuous purposes by dint of one's own power being in accordance with the transcendental nature of life's purpose. Its *action* counteracts shamelessness (ahrīka, 無慚), putting a stop to unwholesome actions in one's thoughts, words and deeds. This means that, through a prevalence of self-respect and reverence for the nature of life's transcendental moral purpose, one honors that which is virtuous and is ashamed of one's transgressions and immoral acts, countering one's lack of shame and putting an end to one's unwholesome thoughts, words and deeds.
3. Humility (apatrāpya, 愧) is the *nature* that resists evil and the condemnation of this world. Its *action* counteracts lack of humility, putting an end to one's unwholesome actions in thoughts, words and deeds. This means that, through a prevalence of loathing the condemnation of this world, one resists and condemns evil and is ashamed of one's transgressions and immoral acts, countering one's lack of humility and putting an end to one's unwholesome thoughts, words and deeds.

2. - 3. Shame vs. Humility: Shame about one's transgressions is the shared characteristic of both the sense of shame and the sense of humility. And so The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya, 大乘阿毘達磨集論) and The Exposition of the Holy Teaching (Āryadeśanā Vikhyāpana 顯揚聖教論) hypothetically speak about them both having an existential nature.

Kuījī added: Although there is the apparent distinction made between the prevalence of self-censure in shame and the censure of the world in humility, in fact the essential nature of shame is a reverence for virtue while that of humility is a resistance of evil.

- * If one holds that the sense of shame is the distinct characteristic of both shame and humility, one should allow that their existential natures are not different. With this being so, they necessarily cannot be directly associated with each other, because things with the same existential nature are not in a relationship of direct association with each other. For example, emotional feelings (vedanā, 受) and mental associations (saṃjñā, 想) have different existential natures but they are directly associated with each other.
- * If one depends on establishing a distinction between shame and humility in terms of the prevalence of self-censure in shame and the censure of the world in humility, then these two by definition would not have a real (vs. a hypothetical) existence. However, this would be in contradiction with the holy teachings such as volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation that says that eight of the eleven virtuous purposes have a real existential nature (dravyasat, 實有) - all except for non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害), impartiality (upekṣā, 捨) and vigilance (apramāda, 不放逸).

Kuījī added: This is on the issue of whether or not shame and humility each have their own existential nature. If one says that their differences only arise due to the distinctions made between oneself and another, their existence should only be hypothetical, not real, being relative to each other like long and short, etc., and they should be without their own distinct existential natures. If they only depend on the dualities of self and other, how could they not only have a hypothetical existence? However, if it is allowed that these two are just hypothetical, there is a contradiction with the holy teachings. In volume fifty-five and elsewhere it is taught that, among the eleven virtuous mental states, these two are among the eight with real existential natures.

- * If one allows that shame and humility have real existential natures but arise separately from each other, it is also in contradiction with volume sixty-nine of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation that says that ten of the virtuous states of mind (including these two) are found in all virtuous

purposes (all those except the confidence that arises from a higher sense of purpose).

Question: If reverence and respect (for virtue) and censure and resistance (of evil) are the special characteristics of shame and humility respectively, then because the objective conditions for them are different, these two should not arise together. In this case both sides of this debate are wrong, so why only criticize one side?

Answer: Who spoke of the objective conditions for both of these being different?

Question: How can it be that they are not different?

Answer: No matter what the objective conditions are for meditation (the four truths, the Three Treasures, etc.), when the virtuous mind arises, there is always a reverence and respect for virtue and a censure and resistance of evil. Therefore, these two are always found together in a virtuous mind and their objective conditions are not distinguished as being different.

Question: Is it not so that what I am saying has the same meaning?

Answer: If you hold that the distinct characteristics of shame and humility are the same, how can you dispute my objection to the idea that the two cannot arise in the same moment?

When the holy teachings explain shame and humility in terms of oneself and others:

- * Oneself is a reference to one's own purpose, and
- * Others is a reference to those of the world (that contains it).

Others interpret this to mean:

- * In terms of oneself, there is reverence and respect for virtue because it brings benefits to oneself
- * In terms of others, there is the resistance and condemnation of evil because it can bring harm to oneself.

4. - 6. *The next three are called 'the three roots of virtue'* (trīṇi kuśala mūlāni, 三不善根)

Vasubandhu's eleventh stanza of verse literally says the "the absence of greed and the other two of the three roots (of evil)" (alobha adi trayam, 無貪等三根) in referring to:

4. Absence of the greed (alobha, 無貪) found in cravings and appetites
5. Absence of the hatred (adveṣa, 無瞋) found in aversion and disgust
6. Absence of the delusion (amoha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference

These three are called the roots of virtue because they make it prevail and they most directly and immediately oppose generation of the three roots of evil, which are:

- a. The greed (lobha, 貪) found in cravings and appetites (rāga, 貪欲),
- b. The hatred (dveṣa, 瞋) found in aversions and disgust (pratigha, 瞋恚),
- c. The delusion (moha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference (mūḍha, 愚),

4. *Absence of the greed* (alobha, 無貪) *found in cravings and appetites* (rāga, 貪欲) is the *nature* of being endowed with non-attachment to the various mental states found in the three-fold sphere of sentient existence - the spheres of its desires, the objective realities of its form and its existential principles that are beyond form⁴. Its *action* counteracts greedy attachments while producing virtue.

5. *Absence of the hatred* (adveṣa, 無瞋) *found in aversion and disgust* (pratigha, 瞋恚) is the *nature* of being without any hatred upon facing all the various kinds of pain and suffering found in sentient existence. Its *action* counteracts hatred and malice while producing virtue.

4-5. When these two virtuous states of mind (absence of greed and absence of hatred) arise, they adapt to whatever the conditions are before them without any attachments to their existence and without any hatred regarding the suffering they bring. However, there is no need to examine their existence or the suffering they bring in order to manifest greed or hatred. As explained before with regards to shame and humility, they are established in relation to good and evil but there is no need to actually experience good and evil conditions for these two mental states to arise. Because of this, the absence of greed and hatred are found in all virtuous states of mind.

6. Absence of the delusion (amoha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference (mūḍha, 愚) is the *nature* of clearly understanding the nature of purpose in all things, both in principle and practical application. Its *action* counteracts stupidity and delusion while producing virtue.

a. *There is a thesis* that the absence of delusion is the nature of discerning purpose (prajñā, 慧). The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya, 大乘阿毘達磨集論) says that the nature of the absence of delusion is penetration (nairvedhika, 決擇) and it is the result of:

1. Instruction (sāśana, 教)
2. Realization (adhigama, 證) &
3. Transcendental knowledge (jñāna, 智).

Sthiramati's Commentary on this Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle says that these are attained respectively through:

1. Listening (śruta, 聞)
2. Deliberation (cintā, 思) &
3. Cultivation (bhāvanā, 修).

All of these in their turn have the penetration of discernment as their essential nature.

Question: Kuṅjī added: If this is so, why is it said to be a virtuous state of mind instead of one of the states of mind that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)?

Answer: According to this thesis, although the absence of delusion (amoha, 無癡) involves discernment of purpose, it is endowed with a special potential to elicit virtue, just as flawed beliefs (kudṛṣṭi, 見) are said to be a special kind of discernment that elicits emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱).

b. *There is another thesis* from Dharmapāla (deemed correct) that the absence of delusion is not a discernment of purpose but rather has its own existential nature (svabhāva, 自性). In being opposed to ignorance (avidyā, 無明), it is like the absence of greed and hate because it involves the roots of virtue (kuśala mūla, 善根). Volume fifty-seven of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says greatness of compassion (mahā karuṇa, 大悲) involves the absence of hate and delusion, not the twenty-two capacities of sentient existence.⁶ If the nature of the absence of delusion (amoha, 無癡) was the transcendental discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧), then greatness of compassion, like the ten spiritual powers¹⁷, would just involve the three capacities for unafflicted knowledge (anāsrava indriya, 無漏根) that constitute transcendental discernment.

These three are:

#15 The capacity to learn about the transcendental nature (anājñātājñāsyāma indriya, 未知當知根)

#16 The capacity to know of it (ājñā indriya, 已知根) (in a particular case)

#17 The capacity to perfect knowledge of it (ājñā 具知根) (in all cases)

And if the absence of delusion was not endowed with its own distinct existential nature (svabhāva, 自性) like non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害), impartiality (upekṣā, 捨) and vigilance (apramāda, 不放逸), it would be in contradiction to volume fifty-five of the same discourse which says that, among the eleven virtuous mental states, only these latter three merely have a hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat, 假有)² while the rest of them (the other eight) have a real existence (dravyasat, 實物)².

Kuījī added: The essential nature of non-violence, for example, is the absence of hate (more on these later) The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya, 大乘阿毘達磨集論) does say that the absence of delusion is endowed with the nature of discernment. However, it reveals this nature in order to bring up its cause (discernment) and effect (more discernment), just as it explains the essential nature of proper faith in terms of its cause (the decisiveness of determination) and effect (endurance in the longing of aspiration). Because greed (lobha, 貪), hate (dveṣa, 瞋) and delusion (moha, 癡) are directly associated with the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (pravṛtti vijñāna, 識) and are included among the primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 正煩惱), they are the prevailing factors in the arising of evil and establishment of its roots. In severing them, it is necessary to oppose them generally through the discernment of virtuous purposes and specifically through the three roots of virtue - the absence of greed, the absence of hate and the absence of delusion. Because of this, the absence of delusion (amoha, 無癡) is a specific mental state distinguished from transcendental discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧).

7. *Diligence of effort* (vīrya, 勤) is a reference to continuity of exertion (prayatna, 精進). It is the nature of courage and tenacity that cultivates virtue and eliminates evil. Its action counteracts negligence (kausīdya, 懈怠) in the fulfillment of virtuous purposes. The term ‘courage’ (vira, 勇) refers to advancing in the face of corruption and prevailing against it while ‘tenacity’ (abhyutsāha, 悍) refers to a pure, unadulterated vitality of spirit that cannot be repressed or held back. This demonstrates that diligence of effort only has a virtuous nature. Diligence of effort (vīrya, 精進) is distinguished by five characteristics:

1. Wearing a coat of armor (kavacahara, 被甲)
2. Having an intensified motivation (abhisamṣkāra, 加行)
3. Never cowering or hiding in the face of adversity (anavalīna, 無下)
4. Never giving up or turning back (aparihanīya, 無退)
5. Never being satisfied with a compromise to one’s objective (atṛptitā, 無足)

In the scriptures, this is expressed in the words:

“Endowed with spiritual strength, diligence of effort, bravery, indomitable boldness and an unwillingness to give up bearing the yoke of virtue (kuśala dhura, 善轡).”

In distinguishing these five:

- a. The first interpretation:

1. The strength from wearing a coat of armor is the very first inspiration of the awakened mind (prathama bodhi citta utpada, 初發心)
2. The diligence of effort from having an intensified motivation is ever advancing to higher levels of realization (bhūmi, 地)
- 3.-5. The last three, the bravery of never cowering or hiding, the indomitable boldness of never retreating or giving up and the unwillingness to ever be satisfied, are the three phases of progress in the cultivation the one’s own practice at any of these levels.

- b. The second interpretation:
1. The strength from wearing a coat of armor is the very first inspiration of the awakened mind (prathama bodhi cittotpada, 初發心).
 2. The diligence of effort from an intensified motivation is cultivating one's practice over an extended period of time (dīrgha kāla, 長時).
 3. The bravery of never cowering or retreating is cultivating it without interruption (anantara, 無間).
 4. The indomitable boldness of never giving up is cultivating it with zealous devotion (satkr̥tya, 慳重).
 5. The unwillingness to ever be satisfied is cultivating nothing else (nirvṛti, 無餘).

- c. The third interpretation is in terms of the five stages on the noble path:
1. The strength comes from wearing a coat of armor during the stage of moral provisioning (sambhāra avasthā, 資糧位).
 2. The diligence of effort comes from intensified motivation during the stage of preparation (prayoga avasthā, 加行位).
 3. The bravery of never cowering or hiding comes from the transcendental vision acquired during the stage of unimpeded penetration (prativedha avasthā, 通達位).
 4. The indomitable boldness of never giving up comes from the stage of transcendental cultivation (bhāvanā avasthā, 修習位):
 5. The unwillingness to ever be satisfied comes from the stage of ultimate realization (niṣṭha avasthā, 究竟位).

Question: Kuṇḍī added: Having penetrated the three tracks (vehicles) of spiritual awakening and being beyond any further need for training (āśaikṣa, 無學), why is it that they are never satisfied and they do not give up the burden of maintaining virtuous purposes even when the fruit of realization has been fulfilled?

Answer: It is because:

- * Those on the lesser track of attaining freedom from affliction on the individual level must still enjoy the great spiritual awakening (mahā bodhi, 大菩提) while on the path to realization of the great spiritual freedom (mahā nirvāṇa, 大涅槃).
 - * The buddhas on the path of ultimate realization ever wish to provide meaningful benefits and the bliss of contentment to others.
- d. Some speak of diligence in terms of:
1. There being two kinds of preparation through intensified motivation (prayoga, 加行)
 - a. The proximate kind (the strength from wearing a coat of armor)
 - b. The remote kind (the diligence from having an intensified motivation)
 2. Uninterrupted cultivation (the bravery of never cowering or hiding)
 3. Emancipation (vimokṣa, 解脫) (the indomitable boldness that never gives up)
 4. Advancement with distinction (the unwillingness to ever be satisfied)

8. *The confidence* (praśrabdhi, 輕安) *that comes from a higher sense of purpose* is a reference to having peace of mind. It is the *nature* of complete freedom from coarseness and heaviness that enables the body and mind to engage in meditation. Its *action* counteracts apathy (styāna, 惛沈) and restores the spiritual foundation (āśraya parāvṛtti, 轉依) of consciousness. This means that the quiet confidence arising from a higher sense of purpose is able to subdue and eliminate obstacles to the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定) and bring about the serenity and calm of this foundation.

9. - 11. The last three are only hypothetical (prajñaptisat, 假有) and do not have a real existential nature (dravyasat, 實有)²:

9. Vigilance (apramāda, 不放逸) is having a diligence of effort in terms of the three roots of virtue - the absence of greed, hatred and delusion. It is the *nature* that uproots the evils that need to be severed and cultivates the roots of virtue that need to be cultivated. Its *action* counteracts the idleness found in lack of self-restraint (pramāda, 放逸) so that the accomplishments attained through these three roots can be realized and fulfilled, both in this world and beyond it. Vigilance therefore also refers to a combination of four things, diligence combined with the three roots of virtue (the absence of greed, hatred & delusion). In being combined together the roots of evil are severed while the roots of virtue are cultivated. This vigilance does not have a distinct existential nature of its own (svabhāva, 體) that is apart from the combination of these four because it has no characteristics that are different from them (hence it is said to be just hypothetical). In preventing evil and cultivating virtue, it has no distinct function apart from the power and abilities of these four. Although proper faith, a sense of shame and the other virtuous mental states have these abilities, the strength of their functions are comparatively weaker than those arising from the combined power of these four. Without the roots of virtue and the multi-faceted powers of diligence, they do not serve as the foundation for vigilance.

Question: Are not the prevention of evil and cultivation of virtue the characteristic functions of vigilance, and so does it not have its own distinct existential nature (svabhāva, 體)?

Answer: How are its characteristics of prevention and cultivation any different from those of diligence of effort and the three roots of virtue?

Question: Is it not through dependence on vigilance that these four virtuous mental states have this special functionality of prevention and cultivation?

Answer: If the existence of one state (in this case, vigilance) must only depend on the further existence of other states in order to have its own existential nature, it would devolve into the existence of an infinite regression of mental states.

Question: Diligence of effort (vīrya, 勤) by itself is only a multi-faceted capacity (samanta mukha indriya, 遍策) and these three roots by themselves are only the foundations of virtue. How can you say that these four have the functionality of preventing evil and cultivating virtue?

Answer: How do you characterize the functionality of prevention and cultivation?

- * If it is the universal foundation of support for virtue, then it is the absence of greed, hate and delusion.
- * If it is the multi-faceted capacity that encourages it, then it is nothing other than diligence of effort.

Generally speaking, in putting an end to evil and promoting virtue, there are these four mental states.

- * What prevents the mind from becoming scattered is not vigilance but maintaining the impartiality (upekṣā, 等) found in the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定).
 - * What makes it apprehend an object or objective is contact (sparśa, 觸), not vigilance.
 - * What makes it never forget its purpose is not vigilance but remembrance (smṛti, 念).
- Through these lines of deliberation, we can conclude that there are no functions of vigilance that are acquired apart from those found in diligence of effort combined with the absence of greed, hatred and delusion. Because of this, it is determined that it is without its own distinct existential nature (asvabhāva, 無別體).

10. *Impartiality* (upekṣā, 行捨) is the *nature* that makes the mind abide in equanimity (samatā, 平等) and be effortlessly straight and true (ārjava, 正直) through diligence and the absence of greed, hatred and delusion. Its *action* counteracts restlessness (auddhatya, 掉舉) while abiding in stillness of mind (śamatha, 靜). This refers to impartiality being freedom from restlessness and the other obstacles that prevent one from abiding in stillness of mind. It is brought about through the four mental states of vigilance; diligent effort and the absence of greed, hatred & delusion. In abiding in an equanimity of mind that is effortlessly straight and true, there are the three different stages of impartiality that are distinguished from the beginning to the middle to the end (prathama madhyama paścāt, 初中後位).

- * Vigilance begins the elimination of corruption (saṃkleśa, 雜染)
- * Impartiality follows its elimination
- * Finally, the mind abides in a serene stillness.

Like vigilance, impartiality is without its own distinct existential nature because:

- * Apart from these four same mental states (diligence and the absence of greed, hatred and delusion), it has no characteristic function of its own.
- * These four mental states are that which is able to still the mind.
- * The mind and its mental states are that which is stilled.

11. *Non-violence* (ahiṃsā, 不害) is a *nature* that is without hate and never harms or distresses sentient beings. Its *action* counteracts the cruelty of violence (vihiṃsā, 害) and brings about sympathy (dayā, 愍) and compassion (karuṇa, 悲) for others. This means that the absence of hatred (adveṣa, 無瞋) that never harms or distresses sentient beings is hypothetically said to be non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害).

- * The absence of hatred counters the hatred that harms or distresses living beings.
- * Non-violence opposes the cruelty that brings about their harm and distress.
- * The absence of hatred provides them with the benefits of contentment.
- * With non-violence there is the compassion that uproots their suffering.

This describes the difference between the explicit characteristics of these two, non-violence and the absence of hatred. However, the absence of hatred (adveṣa, 無瞋) does have a real existential nature (svabhāva, 自體) while non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害) is only hypothetically established based on the portion of the absence of hatred that relieves suffering. The two aspects of loving kindness (maitrī, 慈) and compassion (karuṇā, 悲) are distinguished because they respectively reveal the meaningful benefits (hitārtham, 利) and bliss of contentment (sukha, 樂) that are provided to sentient beings.

There are some from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) who say that non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害) is different from the absence of hatred and it has its own distinct existential nature called 'the blessed nature' (bhadratā, 賢善性). It is said to be characterized by causing no harm or distress. However, the absence of hatred is also said to cause no harm or distress, so how does non-violence have a distinct existential nature of its own apart from it? In truth, mercy and compassion, the blessings of virtue and the causing of no harm or distress to sentient beings are all a result of the absence of hatred.

Issues related to these virtuous mental states

The expression 'as well as' (及) inserted by Xuánzàng into his translation of the eleventh stanza demonstrates that there are other virtuous mental states in addition to the eleven already described, including delight in virtue, disgust in vice and others. Although they are said to have various meanings in accordance with their names, their essential natures are not different from these eleven and so they are not established separately as virtuous purposes.

1. *Delight in virtue* (prāmodya, 欣) refers to an aspiration or longing (chanda, 欲) that has been combined with a portion of the absence of hatred (adveṣa, 無瞋), because there is no hatred or loathing towards delightful objects.
2. *Lack of anger, lack of resentment, lack of hostility, lack of jealousy* and the like are also like this in respectively opposing the secondary emotional disturbances (upakleśas, 隨煩惱) of anger (krodha, 忿), resentment (upanāha, 恨), hostility (pradāsa, 惱) and jealousy (īrṣya, 嫉), etc., because they are partially an opposition to hatred (but not directly associated with greed).
3. *Disgust in vice* (nirveda, 厭) refers to a discernment of purpose that is combined with a portion of the absence of greed (alobha, 無貪) because there are no corrupted attachments to objects of disgust. One should also understand that *lack of stinginess, lack of arrogance* and the like are similar in respectively opposing the secondary emotional disturbances (upakleśas, 隨煩惱) such as stinginess (mātsarya, 慳) and arrogance (mada, 憍) because they are partially an opposition to the greed for cravings and appetites.
4. *Lack of concealment, lack of deceit* and *lack of dishonesty* are part of the absence of greed (alobha, 無貪) and part of the absence of delusion (amoha, 無癡). There is a thesis that lack of concealment is only a part of the absence of delusion because nowhere in the holy teachings is it said that concealment is also a part of greed.
5. On the *lack of vanity* there are three theories:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that lack of vanity is a part of faith in a transcendent moral purpose because one does not have vanity towards that in which one has such a proper faith.
 - b. *There is another thesis* that lack of vanity is a part of impartiality because there is no vanity, conceit or arrogance when the mind is impartial.
 - c. *There is yet another thesis* that lack of vanity is a part of the sense of shame because there is no vanity towards that in which one has reverence and respect.
6. On the *lack of doubt* there are three theories:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that lack of doubt is included in faith because there is no hesitation (saṃśaya, 猶豫) when there is faith.
 - b. *There is a thesis* that lack of doubt is proper determination (samyak adhimokṣa, 正勝解) because there is no hesitation when there is certainty (niścaya, 決定).
 - c. *There is a thesis* that lack of doubt is a proper discernment of purpose (samyak prajñā, 正慧) because there is no hesitation when there is a proper vision (samyag dṛṣṭi, 正見).
7. The nature of the *lack of distraction* is found in proper resolve (samyak samādhi, 正定)
8. *Proper vision* and *proper knowledge* are found in the discernment of virtuous purposes.
9. *Lack of forgetfulness* is found in proper remembrance (samyak smṛti, 正念).
10. With regards to the four uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行), *regret* (kaukrtya, 惡念), *fatigue* (middha, 眠), *seeking* (vitarka, 尋) and *discovery* (vicāra, 伺) may or may not be corrupted like those that are omnipresent (sarvatraṅga saṃskāra, 遍行) (contact, etc.), and those that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) (aspiration, etc.). Because of this, there are no virtuous mental states that directly counteract them.

Why are there exactly eleven listed?

Question: Why is it that some of the virtuous mental states that counteract the corrupt conditions found in the primary and secondary kinds of emotional disturbances are included among these eleven while some are not?

Answer: Only those that have functions with unique characteristics are included among the eleven. Other virtuous mental states that do not are not included among them. Furthermore, these eleven virtuous purposes are distinguished because they counteract the corrupt purposes that are prevalent in all of the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness. Primary emotional disturbances such as pride and secondary disturbances such as anger are only directly associated with the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) and so their countervailing virtues are not included among the eleven.

Kuṅjī added: Listed above, there are seven primary kinds of emotional disturbance (mūla kleśa, 根本煩惱) beginning with pride (vanity) and nine secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) beginning with anger that are only directly associated with the consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) but have little impact on the other projections of consciousness. Because of this, their countervailing virtues are not included among these eleven virtuous purposes. (The seven include all primary emotional disturbances except greed, hatred and stupidity. The nine secondary emotional disturbances include anger, resentment, hostility, stinginess, arrogance, concealment, deceit, dishonesty & distraction.)

- * Although *the cruelty of violence* is also like this, it repeatedly arises to harm and distress others and prevents the prevalence of compassion that is found on the supreme track (vehicle) of perfect enlightenment. Therefore, to reveal the great damage it does, the virtuous mental state of non-violence counteracting it is established as one of the eleven.
- * *Forgetfulness, distraction & lack of self-awareness* only hamper mental states that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) (specifically remembrance, mental resolve & discernment of purpose) and so they are also not included among them.

Comparing the number of virtuous states to the number of corrupted states

Question: If corrupted and pure purposes counteract each other, why are there more corrupted purposes than pure ones?

Answer: Because pure purposes are stronger than corrupted ones, not as many are needed to counteract them.

On the real vs. purely hypothetical existence of these virtuous mental states

As explained before, of these eleven virtuous purposes, three only have a hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat, 假有)²:

1. Vigilance
2. Impartiality, and
3. Non-violence

The other eight each have a real existence (dravyasat, 實有)² because they are characterized by distinct functions that are not shared by other virtuous mental states.

On virtuous mental states arising together in concert

a. *There is a thesis* that, of these eleven, four are found in all virtuous mental states:

1. Diligence of effort
2. Absence of greed
3. Absence of hatred
4. Absence of delusion

According to this thesis, the other seven are said to not necessarily be found in all virtuous mental states because:

1. In seeking to understand something and the principle underlying it, one does not bear proper faith (śraddhā, 信) before making a moral determination about it.
2. Shame (hrī, 慚) and humility (apatrāpya, 愧) are similar and directly associated with each other but they are distinguished in terms of oneself and others as well as in terms of reverence and respect for virtue vs. the censure of and resistance to evil. Therefore, according to this thesis, when one arises the other does not.
3. It is necessary to sever the emotional disturbances arising in this world in order to attain the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安).
4. Vigilance (apramāda, 不放逸) and impartiality (upekṣā, 捨) only arise on the path that is without affliction (anāsrava mārga, 無漏道).
5. There is only non-violence (ahiṃsā, 不害) through having sympathy and compassion for sentient beings.

In support of this thesis, volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) is cited in saying that these eleven virtuous mental states arise in six situations:

1. The stage of making a moral determination is directly associated with having faith in a transcendent moral purpose.
 2. With the arising of shame and humility, there is a putting of an end to corruption. Shame is reverence and respect for virtue in one's own mind while humility is a condemnation and resistance of corruption before others.
 3. In all virtuous mental states there are various levels of diligence in terms of the three roots of virtue - the absence of greed, hatred and delusion.
 4. The confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose occurs while one is on the path of this world.
 5. Impartiality and vigilance occur on the path transcending this world.
 6. Non-violence has to do with one's involvement with other sentient beings.
- b. *There is a second thesis* that this explanation is not entirely correct because:
1. When one has not yet made a determination upon examining moral principles and faith has not yet arisen in one's mind, one should not yet be deemed to be in a virtuous state, just as corrupted and morally undefined states of mind are without purity of faith.
 2. Shame and humility have different natures and foundations of support but they share the same objective. Because of this, they are found in all virtuous states of mind, as previously explained.
 3. If one does not transcend attachments to this world, the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose will not arise because otherwise this limb of spiritual awakening (bodhy aṅga, 覺支)¹⁶ could not be without affliction.
 4. If impartiality and vigilance were completely absent on the path of this world, there would be no serenity and stillness of mind when preventing evil and cultivating virtue in it. There also would be no subduing of the idleness found in the lack of self-restraint or the restlessness of worry.
 5. The virtuous but afflicted mind is already endowed with diligence and the three roots of virtue (the absence of greed, hatred and delusion), just like those who are on the path that transcends this world.
 6. When the virtuous mind arises, it does not cause any damage because it is opposed to harmful purposes. As a consequence, it is always directly associated with non-violence.

In listing these six situations in which these eleven virtuous states of mind arise, the discourse is saying that the various virtuous states arise only when certain circumstances exist. This means that the explanation of the first thesis must not be entirely correct. It

should therefore be concluded that, of the eleven listed, ten are found in all virtuous states of mind. Only the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安) is not found in all virtuous states of mind. This is because it is necessary to have the mental resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定) to attain this comfort and stability of body and mind. This does not necessarily exist in other virtuous mental states. Volume sixty-nine of The Discourse of the Masters on Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation, in the section On the Settling of Doctrinal Differences (Vinīścaya, 攝決擇分), says that ten of these eleven mental states are found in all virtuous states of mind, whether or not any levels in the resolve of meditation have been attained. This is because the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose is only found in the mind during the various levels of composure in meditation (samāhita bhūmika, 定地).

- c. *There is a third thesis* that the reference here to the levels of composure in meditation (samāhita bhūmika, 定地) on sentient existence also includes the stage of intensified motivation in preparation for entry into the resolve of meditation (samādhi prayoga, 定加行) because there is also a subtle feeling of comfort and ease in this state. Because of this, it is claimed that the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界) can also contain the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose. If this were not so, there would be a contradiction with the assertion in the first section of this Discourse of the Masters, On the Various Levels of Meditation (Bahu Bhūmika, 本地分), that says that the eleven virtuous states of mind are found in all levels of meditation⁹ (even in the preparatory stages).
- d. *There is a fourth thesis* (deemed correct) that the confidence coming from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安) only exists in the mental resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定) on the two higher spheres of sentient existence - those on the objective reality of its form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) & its existential principles that are beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界). This feeling of comfort and ease exists because of the nourishment that comes from the mental resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定). The sixty-third volume of this same discourse says the mind and its states in the sphere of desire do not realize any levels of meditation because they lack the confidence that comes from this higher sense of purpose. It only says that the eleven virtuous states of mind are found in all levels of meditation because they exist in the first three levels of meditation, not because they exist in the sphere of desire. These first three levels of meditation are a reference to:
 1. The level of seeking and discovery (savitarkā savicarā bhūmi, 有尋有伺地)
 2. The level of discovery beyond any further seeking (avitarka savicarā bhūmi, 無尋唯伺地)
 3. The level beyond both seeking and discovery (avitarka avicārā bhūmi, 無尋無伺地)

The other direct associations (samprayoga, 相應) of these eleven virtuous mental states

- a. *Their direct associations with the eight projections of consciousness:*
 1. We have already explained that the direct associations or lack of them between the eleven virtuous states of mind and the seventh and eight projections of consciousness - the *deliberation and calculation of self-interest* (manas, 末那) and the *subconscious store of memory* (ālaya vijñāna, 阿賴耶識) - all depend on one's spiritual development.
 2. With regards to the sixth projection, the *consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects* (mano vijñāna, 意識), all eleven virtuous mental states exist during the mental resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定), but the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安) is lacking in non-meditative states.
 3. With regards to the *five sensory kinds of consciousness*, there are two theories:

- a. *There is a thesis* that there are only ten virtuous mental states here because the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose is lacking. This is due to distraction being an essential nature of these five sensory kinds of consciousness.
- b. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that these five can be directly associated with the peace of mind from a higher sense of purpose because:
 1. It is induced in them through the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定).
 2. When the five sensory kinds of consciousness (of an enlightened being) are pervaded with the transcendental knowledge of accomplishing life's greater purpose (kṛtya anuṣṭhāna jñāna, 成所作智), they are necessarily endowed with the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose.
- b. *Their direct associations with emotional feelings* (vedanā, 受): Ten of the virtuous mental states are directly associated with all five kinds of emotional feelings. However, the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安) is not directly associated with sorrow (daurmanasya, 憂) or suffering (duḥkha, 苦) because feelings of torment and distress are without the comfort or peace of mind that come from this confidence.
- c. *Their direct associations with motive forces distinguishing objects* (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行): Proper faith and other virtuous states are directly associated with aspiration and the other motive forces distinguishing specific objects because there is no contradiction with them.
- d. *Their direct associations with the three moral natures* (prakṛti traya, 三性): The moral nature of all eleven is only wholesome and virtuous.
- e. *Their direct associations with meditations on the threefold sphere of sentient existence* (trayo dhātavaḥ, 三界): The confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安) is not found in its sphere of desire. The other ten virtuous states of mind pervade all of the three-fold sphere of sentient existence - its desires, its objective realities of form and its existential principles that are beyond form⁴.
- f. *Their direct associations with the three kinds of spiritual training* (trīṇi śikṣāṇi, 三學): All eleven virtuous mental states are directly associated with the three kinds of spiritual training in:
 1. Moral commitment (adhiśīla, 增戒學)
 2. Mental resolve (adhicitta, 增心學)
 3. Transcendental discernment of purpose (adhiprajñā, 增慧學)
- g. *Their direct associations with the three means of severing attachments* (prahātavya traya, 三所斷): Attachments directly associated with these virtuous mental states are not all eliminated through a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷). In volume fifty-seven of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation it is said that the attachments directly associated with six of the twenty-two capacities of sentient existence⁶ are only eliminated through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷). These six are the attachments directly associated with:
 - #15 The capacity for learning about the transcendental nature of purpose that is without affliction (anājñātājñāsyāma indriya, 未知當知根)
 - #18 The capacity for proper faith in it (śraddhā indriya, 信根)
 - #19 The capacity for diligence of effort on this noble path (vīrya indriya, 精進根)
 - #20 The capacity for remembrance of it (smṛti indriya, 念根)
 - #21 The capacity for mental resolve on it (samādhi indriya, 定根)
 - #22 The capacity for transcendental discernment of it (prajñā indriya, 慧根)

Other avenues of speculating about the direct associations of virtuous mental states should be considered in accordance with logical reasoning.

e. The primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱)⁷:

Question: Having explained the virtuous mental states (kuśala caitta, 善心所), what are the characteristics of the primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱)?

Answer: On this, the first line of the twelfth stanza in Xuánzàng's translation (parts of the eleventh and twelfth stanzas in Vasubandhu's original Sanskrit) says:

12a d. Primary emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱) include:

1. The greed (lobha, 貪) found in cravings and appetites (rāga, 貪欲),
2. The hatred (dveṣa, 瞋) found in aversions and disgust (pratigha, 瞋恚),
3. The delusion (moha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference (mūḍha, 愚),
4. Pride (māna, 慢),
5. Doubt (vicikitsā, 疑) and
6. Flawed beliefs (dṛṣṭi or kudṛṣṭi, 惡見).

11b ... kleśā rāga pratigha mūḍhayah

12a 煩惱謂貪瞋、癡慢疑惡見。 māna dṛṣṭi vicikitsāś ca ...

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

There are six natures that are simply called emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱) in this stanza because they are the primary kinds. They are:

1. The greed (lobha, 無貪) found in cravings and appetites (rāga, 貪欲) is the *nature* of corrupted attachments to the various aspects of existence. Its *action* counteracts the absence of greed (alobha, 無貪) and results in the arising of suffering. This is the power of craving (tṛṣṇā bala, 愛力) that produces attachments to the (five) projections of one's purpose (upadāna skandha, 取蘊).¹
2. The hatred (dveṣa, 瞋) found in aversions and disgust (pratigha, 瞋) is the *nature* of animus and rage against all kinds of suffering. Its *action* counteracts the absence of hatred (adveṣa, 無瞋) and promotes the discontent (akṣema, 不安隱) that is the foundation of unvirtuous behavior.
3. The delusion (moha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference (mūḍha, 愚) is the *nature* of ignorance and confusion about transcendental reality and its principles. Its *action* counteracts the absence of delusion (amoha, 無癡) and is the foundation for the corruption of purpose (saṃkleśa, 雜染). Because of delusion, there are the actions that arise from false beliefs (kudṛṣṭi, 邪見), the greed found in cravings and all the other primary and secondary kinds of emotional disturbance that are able to lead to the subsequent re-arising (rebirth or reappearance) of corrupted purposes.
4. Pride (māna, 慢) is the *nature* of elevating oneself above others. Its *action* counteracts absence of the conceits that inevitably result in falling into suffering. When there is pride there is a vanity about the existence of one's virtues in one's own mind as well as a lack of humility before others. Because of this, the wheel of life and death turns ceaselessly and countless kinds of suffering are experienced. There are seven kinds and nine facets of pride that can be distinguished.

The seven kinds of pride are:

- a. *Vanity* (māna, 慢) is the nature of pride in which one imagines how one is superior to those whose virtues are inferior to one's own.
- b. *Conceit* (ati māna, 過慢) is the nature of pride in which one imagines how one is superior to those whose virtues are equal to one's own.
- c. *Hubris* (mānāti māna or abhi māna, 慢過慢) is the nature of pride in which one imagines how one is superior to those whose virtues are greater than one's own.
- d. *Presumption* (adhi māna, 增上慢) is the nature of pride in which one imagines one has already attained virtues one has not yet realized or is still endowed with virtues that one no longer retains.
- e. *False pride* (mithyā māna, 邪慢) is the nature of pride in which one imagines oneself being endowed with virtues when one is really without them.
- f. *An inferiority complex* (ūna māna, 卑慢) is the nature of pride in which one's virtues are perceived to be only slightly less than those whose virtues are in fact vastly superior (In seeking praise and fearing humiliation, one may overcompensate through either social withdrawal and self-abasement or aggression and domination).
- g. *Egotism* (ātma māna, 我慢 or asmi māna, 我所慢) is the nature of pride in which one clings to the five projections of one's own purpose (one's physical form, consciousness, emotional feelings, mental associations and the prejudices and predispositions of other motive forces), imagining all things in terms of me and mine, one's own self-centered existence and possessions.

Of these seven kinds:

- a. Four are in terms of oneself being superior, equal or inferior in relation to others (vanity, conceit, hubris & an inferiority complex)
- b. Two are in terms of delusions about one's own virtues (presumption & false pride), and
- c. One is in terms of the projections (skandha, 蘊) of one's own purpose (egotism)

The nine facets of pride are:

1. I am superior to another
2. I am equal to another
3. I am inferior to another
4. Another is superior to me
5. Another is equal to me
6. Another is inferior to me
7. Another is not superior to me
8. Another is not equal to me
9. Another is not inferior to me

All the different kinds of pride are severed (prahāṇa, 斷) through either a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana mārga, 見道) or cultivation of motives on the noble path (bhāvanā mārga, 修道). There are manifestations of egotism (ātma māna, 我慢) even in the ranks of the saints and it is also not wrong to admit that all of its various kinds and facets can arise while training on the noble path.

5. *Doubt* (vicikitsā, 疑) is the nature of hesitation and uncertainty (saṃśaya, 猶豫) in accepting reality and its principles. Its action prevents the decisiveness of determination about what is right. This means there are virtues that do not arise because of the hesitation of uncertainty.
 - a. *There is a thesis* that the essential nature of doubt is a discernment of purpose because:
 1. As The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, doubt is the hesitation of uncertainty needed in the initial examining of objective conditions.
 2. In this thesis, doubt is a necessary precursor to the resolving of different opinions (vimati, 毘助末底) that ultimately results in the transcendental understanding (mati, 末底) attained through the dialectical process. (The prefix 'vi' in Sanskrit is a reference to 'being split into differences'). There is no difference between the transcendental understanding (mati, 末底) attained through the dialectical process and discernment of purpose (prajñā, 般若).

- b. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that doubt has its own distinct existential nature that causes discernment to be uncertain and, because of this, it is not a discernment of purpose. In fact, The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that, among the six kinds of emotional disturbance, flawed beliefs (dṛṣṭi, 見) only have a hypothetical existence for the sake of the conventions of this world (prajñaptisat, 世俗有)² because they are only a partial discernment of purpose, while the five other kinds have a real existence (dravyasat, 實有)² because they each have their own distinct nature.

Flawed beliefs contain a measure of truth and a measure of illusion. At first, they can seem completely true, especially when backed by desire and emotion. After some honest reflection they are seen to be only a partial explanation of a greater reality. Ultimately there is realization that they are just illusions, distortions of reality that reveal only a thin slice of truth.

If one holds that different opinions (vimati, 毘助末底) subject to doubt are precursors to transcendental understanding (mati, 末底) and are discernments of purpose (prajñā, 慧), one should similarly hold that different projections of consciousness (vijñāna, 識) are precursors to transcendental knowledge (jñāna, 智). The prefix 'vi' in Sanskrit is used to transform the words 'understanding' (mati, 末底) and 'knowledge' (jñāna, 智) to mean 'different kinds of partial understanding' and 'different kinds of partial knowledge'.

Consequently, the essential nature of doubt (vicikitsā, 疑) is not really discernment.

6. *Flawed belief* (kudṛṣṭi, 惡見) is the *nature* of corrupted discernment that mistakenly examines and ascertains principles of truth through the lens of illusion (viparyāsa, 顛倒) and perverts them so that they appear to be contrary to what they really are. Its *action* prevents a transcendental vision of what is ultimately true and inevitably leads to suffering. This is a reference to the false belief systems that are the cause of so many kinds of suffering. The imagining (ākāra, 行相) of these flawed beliefs is distinguished in five different ways:

- a. *Flawed beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence* (satkāya dṛṣṭi, 有身見 or 薩迦耶見): This is a reference to one's own existential attachments to:
1. Clinging to the projections of one's own purpose (upadāna skandha, 取蘊):
 - a. The projections of its physical form (rūpa skandha, 色蘊)
 - b. The projections of consciousness (vijñāna skandha, 識蘊)
 - c. The projections of emotional feeling (vedanā skandha, 受蘊),
 - d. The projections of mental association (saṃjñā skandha, 想蘊),
 - e. The projections of other motive forces (saṃskāra skandha, 行蘊), prejudices and predispositions
 2. Views of me and mine, that is, beliefs in the reality of identity (ātma dṛṣṭi, 我見) and possession (ātmiya dṛṣṭi, 我所見).

The *actions* of these false beliefs serve as a foundation of support for all false views.

They are then further distinguished into twenty, sixty-five and other numbers of improper kinds of speculations (vikalpa, 分別) about the five projections of purpose in terms of me & mine (I am a physical form, I possess a physical form, I am within a physical form, a physical form is within me, etc., etc.)

- b. *Flawed beliefs attached to either of the extremes of duality* (antagrāha dṛṣṭi, 邊執見): This refers to clinging to dualistic views about identity or purpose such as life being eternal (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見) or being transient, ending forever upon death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見). The actions from these beliefs prevent escape from these dualities through the dialectical principle of the middle way (madhyama pratipad, 中行). There are variations such as:

1. *Clinging to belief in the eternal existence of the past*, such as beliefs about the eternity of #1 the mind #2 physical existence #3 the identity of a soul or #4 that which neither arise nor perishes, or beliefs in existence of an eternal oneness (ekatya śāśvatika, 一分常論)
2. *Clinging to belief in the eternal existence of the future* and speculations about it such as the sixteen views about it being conscious, the eight views of it being unconscious, the eight views of it being neither conscious nor unconscious and the seven views about its eternal state of extinction or non-existence.

Some of these are detailed in volume one, on the different beliefs constituting attachment to purpose.

c. *Flawed beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose* (mithyā dr̥ṣṭi, 邪見):

This is a reference to nihilism, a repudiation of any cause and effect (karma and retribution) in transcendental reality, as well as attachment to other false beliefs not included among the four other kinds of false beliefs, just as how prevailing conditions (adhipati pratyaya, 增上緣) include all conditions of consciousness not covered by the three other kinds.

These three other kinds include those that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣), those present before one (ālambana pratyaya, 所緣緣) & those similar to conditions immediately preceding them (samanantara pratyaya, 等無間緣). The four conditions of consciousness are described on p. 391-405. Different variations of these false beliefs include:

1. *In terms of the past*, there are many confusing arguments such as the two theories about there being no causality, four about there being set bounds to the universe and four about there being no death, etc.
2. *In terms of the future*, there are five theories about the manifestation of spiritual freedom (nirvāṇa, 涅槃) that are derived from belief in the real existence outside the mind of a soul or a self-centered existence (ātma dr̥ṣṭi, 我見), a god that rules over the universe (Īśvara, 自在世主) or an almighty lord god that rules over living beings (Śakra, 釋), a creator of the universe (Brahma, 梵) or another being of this type that is eternal and unchanging. Some believe that one of these beings is the cause of all things or brings about a spiritual deliverance apart from one's own mind. There are many who falsely speak about erroneous paths being the true path.

There are many beliefs like this that are included in this category of false views about the transcendental nature of life's purpose.

Again, some of these are detailed in volume one, on the different beliefs constituting attachment to purpose.

d. *Exaggerating the importance of beliefs, confusing subjective belief with objective reality, opinion with facts* (dr̥ṣṭi paramārśa, 見取見): This is a reference to beliefs that are combined with and supported by the projections of one's own purposes (skandha, 蘊) - one's physical form, consciousness, emotional feelings, mental associations and other motivations. In clinging to these views, their importance can become exaggerated (paramārśa, 取), making one over-righteous and serving as a foundation for arguments and disputes.

e. *Exaggerating the importance of formalized moral rules & ritual practices, confusing the means & ends of the noble path* (śīla vrata paramārśa, 戒禁取見): This is a reference to the acceptance of beliefs about moral rules and ritual practices that are combined and supported by the projections of one's own purposes (skandha, 蘊). In clinging to them, their importance can become exaggerated (paramārśa, 取) and make one over-righteous or superstitious, serving as the foundation for efforts that are of no real benefit.

d. - e. *On exaggerated beliefs* (paramārśa, 取見) *generally*:

It is also said that:

- * Holding certain beliefs (opinions) as superior to all others is said to be exaggerating their importance (dṛṣṭi paramārśa, 見取見).
- * Holding formalized moral rules and ritual practices literally or over-righteously is said to be exaggerating their importance (śīla vrata paramārśa, 戒禁取見).

However, by themselves these explanations are ambiguous, overly terse or are just responding to the errors of those on the lesser track that only emphasizes attaining freedom from affliction on the individual level. If this were not the case, why would The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation say that speculations about transcendental reality and confusing the wrong path with the noble path involve false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose (mithyā dṛṣṭi, 邪見), not just the two ways that the importance of beliefs are exaggerated (paramārśa, 取)?

Primary emotional disturbances that are innate (sahaja kleśa, 俱生煩惱) *vs.*

Primary emotional disturbances that are speculative (vikalpa kleśa, 分別煩惱)

Among these ten kinds of emotional disturbance:

- a. There are six that arise both innately (sahaja, 俱生) and through speculations (vikalpa, 分別) because they can (respectively) be produced both spontaneously and through deliberation. These six include *greed, hatred, delusion, pride, false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence & false beliefs in the extremes of duality*.
- b. *Doubt, false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose, exaggerating the importance of beliefs & exaggerating the importance of formalized moral rules and ritual practices* only arise through speculations (vikalpa, 分別). This is because they only arise through the influence of the false teachings suggested by acquaintances and one's own deliberations on them.

- * *There is a thesis* about false beliefs in the extremes of duality (antagrāha dṛṣṭi, 邊執見) that says only views about life being transient, ending forever upon death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見) can arise both innately and through speculations while the explicit characteristics of the beliefs about life being eternal (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見) only arise through speculations because they are induced through the influence of false teachings suggested by acquaintances. This is supported by a citation from The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation and other discourses that says:

"Question: Which of these beliefs about the extremes of duality (antagrāha dṛṣṭi, 邊執見) arise innately?

Answer: Those of life being transient, ending forever at death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見)."

Those who train in a direct and immediate comprehension of the transcendental nature of life's purpose in which observation and knowledge are simultaneous (abhisamaya, 現觀) have a moment of existential fear (upon attaining a transcendental vision of the noble path) in which they think 'Where am I now (in the grand scheme of things)?' In similar moments of existential crisis upon encountering life-threatening situations, beings in hell, demons of hunger, beasts and other mortal beings in the lower spiritual destinies abandon themselves to the fear of losing their lives forever.

- * *There is another thesis* saying that this discourse is only referring here to the most obvious and explicit aspects of this duality. The innate principle of transcendental reality also

pervades false beliefs about life being eternal (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見). Beings in hell, demons of hunger, beasts and other mortal beings in the lower spiritual destinies also cling to their identity as being eternal, instinctively gathering up provisions so they may live for a long time (presumably forever). And so Aśaṅga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching (Āryadeśanā Vikhyāpana 顯揚聖教論) and other discourses say that, whether holding that the five projections of life's purpose are eternal (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見) or transient, ending forever upon death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見), sometimes these views are innate (sahaja, 俱生) and sometimes they are just speculations (vikalpa, 分別).

The interactions between the ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance

Question: Which of these ten kinds of emotional disturbance are directly associated with each other?

Answer:

Regarding the greed (lobha, 貪) found in cravings and appetites (rāga, 貪欲):

1. Greed does not arise together with *hatred* or *doubt* because the objects of craving and disgust are necessarily not the same and because there are no corrupted attachments to objects about which one is undecided.
2. Greed can sometimes arise together with *pride* and *the five flawed kinds of belief*.
 - a. That which is craved and that which is belittled are not identical so in this case greed and pride do not arise together.
 - b. Objects can be corrupted (by greed) and inflated (by pride) at the same time so it is said that pride can also be directly associated with greed.
 - c. There can be craving for any of the five flawed kinds of belief so there is no problem for them to be directly associated with greed.

Regarding the hatred (dveṣa, 瞋) found in aversions and disgust (pratigha, 瞋恚):

1. Hatred sometimes arises together with *pride* and *doubt*. Objects that are hated and those relied on for self-esteem are not identical and so hatred and inner pride are not directly associated with each other. However, an external object can be both belittled and despised so it can also be said that hatred and pride can arise together. Before there is disgust for something there is uncertainty, and so it is said that doubt and hatred do not arise at the same time. However, if after a long period of deliberation there is still uncertainty about something, it may become the means for the arising of frustration, so in this case, doubt and hatred can arise together. Doubts about whether something or someone is beneficial or not (for or against one) can also be like this.
2. Hatred is definitely not directly associated with *exaggerating the importance of beliefs & exaggerating the importance of formalized moral rules and ritual practices* because one does not hate that which one holds as being of paramount importance.
3. However, hatred can sometimes be directly associated with the first three kinds of false beliefs - *false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence, false belief in either of the extremes of duality & false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose*. There is no hatred when beliefs about eternal life (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見) are directly associated with feelings about eternal contentment but there is when they are directly associated with feelings about eternal suffering. The opposite is the case when they are about life being transient, ending forever on death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見). One is happy about the ending of suffering but there is sorrow over the loss of happiness. As nihilism and other false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose repudiate both good and bad things, they may or may not be directly associated with hatred, depending on the case.

Regarding pride (māna, 慢):

- * Pride is certain about its object and so is not directly associated with *doubt*.
- * Pride can be directly associated incidentally with *all five kinds of flawed beliefs* because their workings are not contradictory. However, pride does not arise together with beliefs about life being transient, ending forever upon death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見) because in holding beliefs about the end of identity, there is neither the belittling of others (avamānya, 陵蔑) nor the inflating of own one's ego (mada, 恃). Pride also does not arise together with certain parts of the false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence and the transcendental nature of life's purpose.

Kuṇḍī added: Pride is mostly connected with projecting feelings of contentment and only partially connected with mitigating feelings of suffering through self-centered beliefs about identity (ātma dṛṣṭi, 我見) and false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose (mithyā dṛṣṭi, 邪見). However, a portion of the truth about the origination of suffering (samudaya satya, 集諦) is not directly associated with pride.

Regarding doubt (vicikitsā, 疑):

Doubt is without certainty and so is in contradiction to *beliefs*. Because of this, they do not arise together.

Regarding flawed beliefs (kudṛṣṭi, 見):

The five different kinds of false beliefs are not directly associated with each other because there cannot be multiple kinds of discernment in a single mind at the same time.

Regarding the delusions (moha, 癡) found in the stupidity of selfish indifference (mūḍha, 愚):

The delusions found in the indifference of self-interest are by necessity directly associated with all nine other kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) as they all arise from them.

The other direct associations of these ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance

- a. The direct associations between the ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance and the eight projections of consciousness (vijñāna, 識):

Question: How are these ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) directly associated with the eight projections of consciousness?

Answer:

- a. *The subconscious store of memory* (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) is not directly associated with any of them.
- b. *The consciousness that deliberates and calculated self-interest* (manas, 末那) is only directly associated with four - delusion, greed, pride & false belief about the reality of one's self-centered existence (as the four primordial emotional disturbances).
- c. *The consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects* (mano vijñāna, 意識) is endowed with all ten.
- d. *The five sensory kinds of consciousness* (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are only directly associated with greed, hatred and delusion because, by themselves, these five are devoid of any speculations (nirvikalpa, 無分別). Because of this, they are without any pride, doubt or beliefs that can make any comparisons (tulya, 稱量) between objects.

- b. Direct associations between the ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance & emotional feelings (vedanā, 受)

Question: How are these ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) directly associated with the five kinds of emotional feelings (vedanā, 受)?

Answer:

1-3. Regarding greed, hatred and delusion:

Whether innately (sahaja, 俱生) or through speculations (vikalpa, 分別), greed, hatred and delusion can all incidentally be directly associated with all five kinds of emotional feelings because:

- a. Upon encountering circumstances that oppose its objectives, greed can be combined with sorrow and suffering.
- b. Upon encountering circumstances that satisfy its objectives (such as overcoming obstacles or defeating one's enemies), hatred can be combined with rejoicing and contentment.

4. Regarding pride:

- a. *There is a thesis* that, whether innately or through speculations, the incidental arising of pride is directly associated with four emotional feelings (rejoicing, contentment, sorrow and indifference) but not suffering because, when there is pride, feelings of suffering are directly associated with the lesser projections of sorrow.
- b. *There is another thesis* that pride which is innate can also arise together with feelings of suffering because, as already explained, the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 意) can have feelings of suffering. When just arising through speculations, pride and all of the other kinds of emotional disturbance are without the unadulterated kind of suffering that is encountered in hell and the other lower spiritual destinies because there are no teachers making false suggestions or faulty deliberations being made in that case. In fact, no actions are produced then that induce further evil destinies because speculations (vikalpa, 分別) must arise for them to be produced.

5-10. Regarding doubt and flawed beliefs:

Doubt and the last three kinds of flawed beliefs (those about the transcendental nature of life's purpose, exaggerating the importance of beliefs (opinions) & exaggerating the importance of moral rules & ritual practices) are all incidentally associated with four kinds of emotional feeling (rejoicing, contentment, sorrow and indifference) but not suffering because there are no speculations in hell and, in the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界), doubts about the existence or non-existence of suffering, its origination, and the like (the four truths) can also be combined with feelings of rejoicing. When facing unfortunate circumstances, the two exaggerated kinds of beliefs (about the importance of beliefs and the importance of formalized moral rules or ritual practices) are also said to be directly associated with sorrow.

- a. *There is a thesis* that two kinds of flawed beliefs (those about the reality of one's self-centered existence and those attached to the extremes of duality) are only directly associated with feelings of rejoicing, contentment and indifference (but not suffering or sorrow) when they are innate (sahaja, 俱生) because:

1. They are not directly associated with the five sensory kinds of consciousness (so that suffering is absent).
2. They are only morally undefined (so that sorrow is absent).

According to this thesis, when arising from speculations (vikalpa, 分別), these two kinds of flawed beliefs are incidentally associated with four kinds of feelings because they also can experience sorrow (but not suffering). This is because:

1. Views of eternal life (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見) as identity with and possession of the projections of suffering are directly associated with sorrow.

2. Views of transience (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見) as the end of happiness forever upon death are similarly associated with sorrow, only the opposite extreme.
- b. *There is another thesis* that these two flawed beliefs can also be directly associated with suffering when they are innate (sahaja, 俱生) because, where there are conditions of unadulterated suffering connected with projections of extreme pain, there is direct association with the characteristics of suffering. Volume fifty-nine of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that all innate emotional disturbances can be manifested as behavior (samudācāra, 現行) from the three kinds of emotional feelings - those that are pleasant, painful and neutral, as elaborated before in the section on the three kinds of emotional feelings. The rest is as explained in the preceding thesis and is correct in terms of the holy teachings.

In terms of their most explicitly apparent characteristics:

- a. *Greed, pride, false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence, false beliefs attached to either of the extremes of duality, exaggeration of the importance of beliefs & exaggeration of the importance of formalized moral rules & ritual practices*, are all directly associated with feelings of contentment, rejoicing and indifference.
- b. *Hatred* only arises together with feelings of suffering, sorrow and indifference.
- c. *Delusion* can be directly associated with any of the five kinds of emotional feeling.
- d. *Doubt & false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose* are directly associated with rejoicing, contentment, sorrow and indifference but not suffering.

In terms of the feelings found in meditation:

- a. The contentment (sukha, 樂) found in *greed* and *delusion* can pervade the four lowest of the nine levels of meditation on sentient existence⁹.
This refers to those on its sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界) and the first three levels of meditation on its objective reality in the sphere of its form (rūpa dhātu, 色界).
- b. The contentment found in seven other kinds of emotional disturbance (*pride, doubt & the five kinds of flawed beliefs*) can pervade the first three levels of meditation on sentient existence in its sphere of form but not its sphere of desire
- c. (*Hatred* is not found in the two higher spheres of meditation).
- d. *Doubt and the special kind of ignorance that is unique* (āveṇiki avidyā, 獨行癡) to the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界) are only directly associated with sorrow and indifference. Other associations between emotional disturbances and feelings should be understood in accordance with logical reasoning.

- c. The direct associations between the ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance and the five kinds of motive force that distinguish specific objects (pañca viniyata saṃskāra, 五別境行)
Question: How are the primary emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱) directly associated with the five kinds of motive force that distinguish specific objects?

Answer:

- * *Greed, hatred, delusion and pride* arise incidentally with all five of them because, when the mind is focused on a single object, there can still be mental resolve (samādhi, 定).
- * *Doubt and the five flawed belief systems* are each incidentally associated with four of them because doubt is without the certainty found in the decisiveness of determination and false beliefs lack some discernment of purpose because their different discernments exclude each other and so cannot be simultaneous.

d. The direct associations between the ten kinds of emotional disturbance and the three moral natures (prakṛti, 性)

Question: How are the primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) involved with the three moral natures?

Answer: Hatred is only unwholesome (akuśala, 不善) because it harms both oneself and others. The other nine are either unwholesome or morally undefined. In the two higher spheres of meditation on sentient existence, on its form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) and its existential principles that are beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界), they are only morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記) because they are subdued through the resolve of meditation. When they are speculations (vikalpa, 分別) that are only bound to the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界), they are only unwholesome because they bring about evil actions. When they are innate (sahaja, 俱生), they can also be unwholesome, bringing about evil actions that harm both oneself and others. Otherwise, they are morally undefined because they are weak and inconsequential, not preventing virtue and ultimately not doing any harm to oneself or others. One should also understand that innate beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence and either of the extremes of duality are only morally undefined and do not bring about evil actions because, although they may arise and be manifested repeatedly, they do not themselves prevent virtue.

e. The direct associations between the ten kinds of emotional disturbance and the nine levels of meditation found in three-fold sphere of sentient existence⁴

Question: How are the ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱) bound to the three-fold sphere of sentient existence (trayo dhātavaḥ, 三界)⁴ and the nine levels of meditation (nava bhūmayāḥ, 九地)⁹ found in them?

Answer:

1. Hatred is only found in the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界) while the other nine kinds of emotional disturbance are found in all three spheres.
2. The emotional disturbances in the two higher spheres of meditation do not manifest themselves before those born in the lower sphere of desire who have not yet eliminated its basest corruptions. This is because it is necessary to attain the fundamental resolve of meditation (mūla samādhi, 根本定) found in meditations on the higher spheres of sentient existence, on its form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) and on its existential principles beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界), in order for these emotional disturbances to occur before one. Those still on the worldly path saddled with afflictions (āsrava mārga, 有漏道) are unable to subdue:
 - a. Emotional disturbances from speculations (vikalpa kleśa, 分別惑) that are severed through a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana mārga, 見道).
 - b. Subtle (sūkṣma, 細), innate emotional disturbances (sahaja kleśa, 俱生) (such as some false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence and some false beliefs clinging to the extremes of duality) that are severed through transcendental cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷).However, they are able to subdue and sever innate emotional disturbances (sahaja kleśa, 俱生) that are coarse, explicit and volatile, and so gradually realize attainment of the fundamental resolve of meditation (mūla samādhi, 根本定) that is found in the

two higher spheres. These coarse and explicit emotional disturbances consist of greed, hatred and delusion. They evolve externally and are only confusions about things rather than the principles underlying them. Because they are coarse, volatile and distracting, they directly prevent the resolve of meditation. Upon attaining this resolve, all of the emotional disturbances from the higher spheres are manifested before one (so they can be overcome). Some of these are speculative (vikalpa, 分別) while some of them are innate (sahaja, 俱生).

3. Whether they are speculative or innate, all of the emotional disturbances from the lower levels of meditation in the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界) can occur before those who are in the higher levels of meditation on sentient existence, those in its spheres of form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) and existential principles beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界).

- a. Even those who have entered into an intermediate existence (antarā bhava, 中有) (between death and rebirth) at the fourth and highest levels of meditation (in both of the higher spheres) can fall back into hell if they forsake emancipation.
- b. When those living in a higher sphere are reborn into a lower one, they produce an innate craving (sahaja tṛṣṇā, 俱生愛) that moistens and fertilizes this rebirth.

Question: Is it not said that those reborn into the higher spheres do not produce the emotional disturbances that arise from the lower ones?

Answer: Yes, but this is just a generalization that does not apply in all cases and sometimes it is only said in the context of the teachings on the lesser track of only attaining freedom from affliction on the individual level.

4. Emotional disturbances in the lower sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界) can connect with the higher spheres of meditation on sentient existence as their object - those on its form (rūpa dhātu, 色界) and its existential principles beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界):

- a. Volume sixty-two of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation and other texts say that even those with greedy attachments to the sphere of desire seek to be reborn into the higher spheres and taste the higher resolves of meditation.
- b. In volume fifty-eight of this, it says that even those filled with hatred are envious of those who are on the noble path (ārya mārga, 聖道) and have realized the truth about both the origination (samudaya, 集) and transcendence (nirodha, 滅) of suffering (duḥkha, 苦), because they are jealous of anyone who has entered into the higher levels of meditation and become free from the sphere of desire.
- c. Generally speaking, the motive forces of pride (mana, 慢), the attachments to identity (ātma grāha, 執我) and possessions (ātmiya grāha, 執我所) found in false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence (satkāya dṛṣṭi, 有身見) and false beliefs about eternal life (śāśvata dṛṣṭi, 常見) or existence ending forever upon death (uccheda dṛṣṭi, 斷見) found in attachment to the extremes of duality (antagrāha dṛṣṭi, 邊執見) can all connect to the higher spheres as their object of meditation.
- d. It is logical to conclude that the other five kinds (delusion, doubt, flawed beliefs about the transcendental nature of purpose, exaggerating the importance of beliefs and exaggerating the importance of formalized moral rules and ritual practices) are also connected with these higher spheres.

Question: Don't volumes six and fifty-eight of this discourse speak about greed, hatred, pride and false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence not being connected to the higher spheres?

Answer: Yes, but this is only in describing the most explicit characteristics of these beliefs and in the special context of false views about the reality of one's self-centered existence (satkāya dṛṣṭi, 有身見) and false views about identity (ātma dṛṣṭi, 我見) preventing vision of a greater, transcendental nature of purpose. Because of these false views, one does not see how connecting to another, higher level of purpose can transform one's own worldly purpose or how the arising of attachments to the extremes of duality is directly dependent on false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence.

5. The emotional disturbances found in the higher levels of meditation are also connected to those at the lower levels because:

- a. As volume fifty-nine of this same discourse says, in having esteem for their own virtues, those at the higher levels of meditation can look down on and have contempt for sentient beings who are at lower levels.
- b. Generally speaking, the motive forces of craving and attachment to me and mine as well as beliefs about the eternity and extinction of existential identity are all connected to lower levels of meditation as their object.

One should consider doubt, false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose, exaggeration of the importance of beliefs & exaggeration of the importance of formalized moral rules & ritual practices according to the same logic (although they all arise through speculation rather than innately). However, in volume fifty-eight of the same discourse, it is said that sometimes those at the higher levels of meditation do not connect with these lower levels. Again, this is only in discussion about the majority of cases and in terms of the specific context of false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence preventing vision of a greater, transcendental nature of purpose.

f. Direct associations between the ten kinds of emotional disturbance and the three kinds of spiritual training (trīṇi śikṣāṇi, 三學)

Question: How are these ten kinds of emotional disturbance involved in the three kinds of spiritual training?

Answer: They are not directly associated with being in training (śaikṣa, 有學) or being beyond any further need for training (aśaikṣa, 無學), because these stages of spiritual development only involve virtuous purposes.

On severance (praheya, 所斷) of these ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance

Question: How are these ten primary kinds of emotional disturbances severed?

Answer: In terms of severing them, there are three kinds of emotional disturbances (prahātavya traya, 三所斷):

1. Emotional disturbances that do not need to be severed (aheya, 非所斷) are those that are not corrupting and are severed spontaneously as soon as they arise.
2. Emotional disturbances arising from speculations (vikalpa, 分別) are only severed through attaining a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷) because they are explicit and easier to sever.
3. Emotional disturbances that are innate (sahaja, 俱生) are only severed through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷) because they are subtle and more difficult to sever.

1. The first kind do not need to be severed (aheya, 非所斷)

2. On the ten primary kinds of emotional disturbances being severed through acquiring a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷) :

Parts of all ten of the primary kinds of emotional disturbance are suddenly severed together through acquiring a transcendental vision of the noble path because, being

transcendental, this vision generally connects with all four truths about life's purpose at the same time. However, confusions about the characteristics of these truths can be either general or specific.

- a. 'General confusions' here is a reference to all ten kinds of emotional disturbances having shared confusions about these four truths generally. This is because:
 1. Suffering (duḥkha, 苦) and its origination (samudaya, 集) are the foundation that serves as the cause for all emotional disturbances
 2. Transcendence (nirodha, 滅) and the noble path (ārya mārga, 聖道) are that which is feared by emotional disturbances.
- b. 'Specific confusions' is a reference to distinct emotional disturbances that arise from confusion about certain of the four truths specifically.
 1. In terms of the truth of suffering (duḥkha satya, 苦諦)
 - a. *False beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence & false beliefs that are attached to the extremes of duality only confuse the truth of suffering while the other eight kinds of emotional disturbance are general confusions about all four truths. This is because these two false beliefs only arise with regards to the fruits of suffering that are attained upon distinguishing the nature of emptiness and selflessness.*
 - b. *Doubt and false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence, about the transcendental nature of life's purpose and attached to the extremes of duality are all a direct result of confusions about the truth of suffering in principle.*
 - c. *Exaggeration of the importance of beliefs & exaggeration of the importance of formalized moral rules & ritual practices is a reference to clinging to the three previous kinds of false beliefs as well as rules and rituals as the foundation of support for the projections of one's purpose in prevailing in righteousness. These projections can arise as greed, hatred and pride respectively, in accord with whether one is seeing this righteousness in terms of oneself, others or those who follow one (parivāra, 眷屬).*
 - d. With regards to *delusion*, the kinds of ignorance directly associated with other emotional disturbances (kleśa samprayukta avidyā, 煩惱相應無明) are the same in all nine kinds while there is a special kind of ignorance (āveṇiki avidyā, 不共無明) unique to the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 末那) that is a direct result of confusions about the truth of suffering in principle (see the explanation of this unique kind of ignorance in the section on the deliberations and calculation of self-interest).
 2. In terms of the other three truths - #2 the truth of the origination of suffering, #3 the truth of the transcendence of suffering and #4 the truth of the noble path:
 - e. *Doubt & false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose are a direct result of confusing the truths about the origination of suffering, the transcendence of suffering and the noble path. One should understand that exaggeration of the importance of beliefs & exaggeration of the importance of formalized moral rules & ritual practices, greed and the other primary kinds of emotional disturbance have the same kinds of confusions about these three other truths as they do about the truth of suffering. However, hatred can also be a direct result of confusion about the truths of transcendence and the noble path because, in fearing them, there can be the arising of hatred or jealousy. Such are the confusions that can arise about the explicit aspects of noble truths that can be either direct (proximate) or indirect (remote).*

3. On the ten kinds of primary emotional disturbances being severed through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷): Emotional disturbances that are innate (sahaja, 俱生) are only severed through cultivation of the noble path because they are subtle and difficult to sever. In explaining the subtle kinds of emotional disturbances, greed, hatred, pride, doubt and the first three kinds of false beliefs (*false beliefs about the reality of one's self-centered existence, false beliefs attached to the extremes of duality & false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose*) innately adapt to the errors about the four truths in accordance with the situation.
 - a. Although the cravings of greed, the delusions of stupidity and the pride directly associated with the two innate kinds of false belief (*those about the reality of one's self-centered existence & attachment to extremes*) involve confusions about the truth of suffering (in principle), they are subtle and difficult to eliminate. Because of this, they can only be severed through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā mārga, 修道).
 - b. Hatred and other kinds of greed, stupidity and pride (not directly associated with these two innate kinds of false beliefs) involve confusions about distinct objects (as opposed to principles of truth) and so are not in contradiction with observations about the four truths in principle. Because of this, they also need to be severed through cultivation of the noble path.

Emotional disturbances based on objects of meditation that have a real karmic function

(sa vastuka, 有事) & ***those that do not*** (avastuka, 無事)

Objects with real karmic functions (sa vastuka, 有事) are the very substance of sentient existence, like the projections of purpose (skandhas, 蘊), alignments of subject & object (āyatanas, 處) & spheres of consciousness (dhātus, 界).

- a. Although emotional disturbances have an imagined component (nimitta bhāga, 相分), some are based on real objects (bimba, 本質) while some are not, with the latter just based on reflected images (pratibimba, 影像). Thus, it is said there are emotional disturbances based on objects with a real karmic function (sa vastuka, 有事) and those that are not (avastuka, 無事) (the latter just based on speculations of the imagination).
- b. Although the immediate object of consciousness (jñāti ālambana, 親所緣) may be endowed with affliction (sa āsrava, 有漏)⁷, there is an original object (bimba, 本質) only indirectly perceived (vidūra ālambana, 疎所緣) that is beyond any affliction (anāsrava, 無漏) (and only perceived upon attaining a transcendental vision). Thus, it is said emotional disturbances connect to objects that may be with or without affliction.
 1. When there are emotional disturbances about what one perceives within one's own mind (sva bhūmi, 自地), the imagined portion (nimitta bhāga, 相分) is a simulation of this original object (bimba, 本質), with emotional disturbances raising speculations (vikalpa, 分別) about an object that has a real karmic function (vastuka, 事境).
 2. When there are emotional disturbances about one's perception of the truth of transcendence (nirodha satya, 滅諦), the noble path (ārya mārga satya, 道諦) or the thoughts of others (para bhūmika, 他地), the imagined portion of the mind (nimitta bhāga, 相分) does not even simulate the original object but rather just a reflected image of it (pratibimba, 影像). It is therefore said these emotional disturbances raise up speculations of objects that are mere verbalizations (nāman, 名境).

Deliberations on other direct associations of emotional disturbances should be distinguished in accordance with these principles.

f. The Secondary Kinds of Emotional Disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱)

Question: Having already explained the characteristics of the primary kinds of emotional disturbances, what are the characteristics of the secondary kinds?

Answer: On this, the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth stanzas of Vasubandhu's verse say:

12b e. Secondary emotional disturbances (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) include:

1. Anger (krodha, 忿),
2. Resentment (upanāha, 恨),
3. Concealment (mrakṣa, 覆),
4. Hostility (pradāsa, 惱),
5. Jealousy (īrṣya, 嫉),
6. Stinginess (mātsarya, 慳),
- 13a 7. Deceit (śāṭhya, 誑),
8. Dishonesty (māyā, 諂),
9. Cruelty (vihiṃsā, 害) and
10. Arrogance (mada, 憍);
- They also include
11. Lack of shame (ahrīkya, 無慚) and
12. Lack of humility (anapatrāpya, 無愧);
- 13b There are also:
13. The restlessness of worry (auddhatya, 掉舉), together with
14. Apathy (styāna, 惛沈),
15. Lack of faith (aśraddhā, 無信) in a transcendent moral purpose,
16. Negligence (kausīdya, 懈怠),
- 14a 17. The idleness found in lack of self-restraint (pramāda, 放逸),
18. Forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā, 失念),
19. Distraction (vikṣepa, 散亂) and
20. Lack of self-awareness (asamprajanya, 不正知)

12a	...	krodha upanahane punaḥ
12b	隨煩惱謂忿、恨覆惱嫉慳、	mrakṣaḥ pradāsa īrṣyātha mātsaryaṃ saha māyayā
13a	誑諂與害憍、無慚及無愧、	śāṭhyaṃ mado vihiṃsā ahrīr atrapā styāna muddhavaḥ
13b	掉舉與惛沈、不信并懈怠、	āśraddhyamatha kausīdyaṃ pramādo muṣitāsmṛtiḥ
14a	放逸及失念、散亂不正知。	vikṣepo asamprajanyaṃ ca

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

These are called secondary kinds of emotional disturbances (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) because:

1. Either they are only distinct and explicit manifestations that are found in the different phases of primary emotional disturbances.
Kujī added: Among those described in this verse, this includes the first ten as well as the idleness found in lack of self-restraint, forgetfulness, and lack of self-awareness. These thirteen do not have their own existential nature.
2. Or they have a nature that is similar to the primary kinds and flow forth from them (naiṣyandika, 等流性).

Kuījī added: This is a reference to the other seven kinds. Although they do have their own distinct existential nature, they are similar to and flow from primary emotional disturbances. These include lack of shame, lack of humility, the restlessness of worry, apathy, lack of proper faith, negligence and distraction.

These twenty secondary kinds of emotional disturbances are distinguished in three categories:

- a. *The more narrowly defined kinds* are said to arise by themselves and consist of the first ten:
 1. Anger (krodha, 忿)
 2. Resentment (upanāha, 恨)
 3. Concealment (mrakṣa, 覆)
 4. Hostility (pradāsa, 惱)
 5. Stinginess (mātsarya, 慳)
 6. Jealousy (īrṣya, 嫉)
 7. Deceit (śāṭhya, 誑)
 8. Dishonesty (māyā, 諂)
 9. Cruelty (vihimsā, 害)
 10. Arrogance (mada, 憍).
- b. *The intermediate kinds* are said to be found in all unwholesome (corrupting) purposes. (akuśala dharma, 不善法). There are two of these:
 11. Lack of shame (ahrīkya, 無慚)
 12. Lack of humility (anapatrāpya, 無愧)
- c. *The more broadly defined kinds* are said to be found in all corrupted states of mind (saṃkleśa citta, 染心). There are eight of these:
 13. The restlessness of worry (auddhatya, 掉舉)
 14. Apathy (styāna, 惛沈)
 15. Lack of faith (āsraddhā, 無信) in a transcendent moral purpose
 16. Negligence (kausīdya, 懈怠)
 17. The idleness found in lack of self-restraint (pramāda, 放逸)
 18. Forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā, 失念)
 19. Distraction (vikṣepa, 散亂)
 20. Lack of self-awareness (asamprajanya, 不正知)

a. *The ten more narrowly defined kinds that arise by themselves*

1. *Anger* (krodha, 忿) is the *nature* that brings about animus (vikṣobhya, 憤發) upon facing the disagreeable objects that are present before one, while its *action* consists of wielding weapons and preventing the absence of this animus. This is a reference to how many deeds of cruelty and violence are brought about by those who harbor anger in their hearts. Anger is part of the existential nature (svabhāva, 體) of hatred (dveṣa, 瞋恚) because, apart from hatred, it has no distinct characteristic function of its own.
2. *Resentment* (upanāha, 恨) is the *nature* that does not let go of attachments to grievances and is a result of holding onto past anger. Its *action* consists of preventing the absence of resentment and fueling hostility (pradāsa, 惱). Resentment is also a part of the existential nature of hatred because, apart from hatred, it does not have any characteristic function of its own.

3. Concealment (mrakṣa, 覆) is the *nature* of hiding one's flaws and fearing the loss of benefits that will result from the exposure of one's failings and shortcomings. Its *action* consists of preventing this disclosure and paving the way for both regret (kaukr̥tya, 悔) and hostility (pradāsa, 惱). This is a reference to how those who conceal their moral transgressions later feel regret, hostility and the absence of confidence.
In concealing one's flaws from oneself, there is *denial*.
In concealing one's flaws while revealing those of others, there is *hypocrisy*.
 - a. *There is a thesis* that this concealment is a part of delusion (moha, 癡) because, as volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, one does not fear future suffering as long as one's transgressions remain concealed.
 - b. *There is another thesis* (deemed to be correct) that this concealment is partially greed (lobha, 貪) and partially delusion (moha, 癡) because, in concealing one's moral failings and shortcomings, one fears the loss of benefits as well as damage to one's reputation. Concealment is said to be partially delusion because, through it, one does not fear future suffering as long as one's transgressions remain concealed. In the explanation of the first thesis, The Discourse of the Masters is only revealing its most explicit and obvious aspect, just as how it explains that the restlessness of worry is a part of greed. In fact, the discourse says that the restlessness of worry (auddhatya, 掉舉) is found in all corrupted states of mind, so it is impossible to maintain that it is only a part of greed.
4. Hostility (pradāsa, 惱) is the *nature* of slow-burning rage that follows hatred and resentment and can explode suddenly and violently on being triggered. Its *action* consists of preventing the loss of hostility and inflaming its sting. This is a reference to the fact that, whether the object of one's anger is in the past or the present, it serves as the means for the building of this rage until it explodes in vicious cruelty and coarsely abusive words that are meant to sting others. This hostility is also part of the existential nature of hatred (dveṣa, 瞋恚) because, apart from hatred, it does not have any characteristic function of its own.
5. Jealousy (īrṣya, 嫉) is the *nature* of envy that is unable to accept the exaltation of others in comparison to one's own reputation. Its *action* consists of preventing the absence of jealousy and results in worry and discouragement. This is a reference to how those who are envious upon hearing the praise or seeing the exaltation of others deeply worry about it and are discouraged in such a way that they cannot have confidence. Jealousy is also part of the existential nature of hatred (dveṣa, 瞋恚) because, apart from hatred, it does not have any characteristic function of its own.
6. Stinginess (mātsarya, 慳) is the *nature* that hoards in secret. It is attracted to wealth but unable to let go of it, and it is attracted to purpose but incapable of discerning it. Its *action* consists of preventing a lack of miserliness and results in being churlish and hard-hearted. This is a reference to the hard-heartedness of misers who amass much wealth and purpose but are incapable of letting any of it go. Stinginess is part of the nature of greed (lobha, 貪) because, apart from greed, it is without any distinct characteristic function of its own.
7. Deceit (śāṭhya, 誑) the *nature* of misrepresentation that feigns truth, gallantry or virtue in order to take advantage of others. Its *action* consists of preventing the lack of deceit and leads to the pursuit of a fraudulent livelihood. This is a reference to those who calculate

how to give the impression of being true or sincere while really exaggerating, equivocating, misleading or manipulating others. Deceit is part of the natures of greed (lobha, 貪) and delusion (moha, 癡) because, apart from these two, it is without any distinct characteristic function of its own.

8. Dishonesty (māyā, 諂) is the *nature* of outright fraud that ensnares others through swindles, treachery and other unethical behavior. Its *action* consists of preventing honesty and moral instruction. This is a reference to those who ensnare others through cunning arguments, outright lies and intentionally crooked designs. Understanding the wishes of others, they gain their confidence while concealing their true intentions, acting as if they were their teachers or friends when in fact they are exactly the opposite. This outright dishonesty is also part of the natures of greed (lobha, 貪) and delusion (moha, 癡) because, apart from these two, it is without any distinct characteristic function of its own.
9. Cruelty (vihiṃsā, 害) is the *nature* that does harm and injury to sentient beings while lacking any compassion or empathy for them. Its *action* consists of preventing non-violence and results in torment and oppression. This is a reference to violent beings who torment and oppress others. Cruelty is also a part of the nature of hatred (dveṣa, 瞋恚) because, apart from hatred, it does not have any characteristic function of its own.
Kuijī added: Hatred prevents the absence of hatred but it also directly counteracts compassion (karuṇā, 悲). Cruelty prevents the absence of cruelty but also directly counteracts the mercy of loving kindness (maitrī, 慈).
10. Arrogance (mada, 憍) is the *nature* of being intoxicated by a self-glorification that produces deeply corrupt attachments to one's own accomplishments. Its *action* consists of preventing the humility that is found in the absence of arrogance and serves as a foundation for corruption of the mind. This is a reference to those who nurture the growth of every kind of corrupt purpose because they are intoxicated by arrogance. It is also part of the nature of greed (lobha, 貪) because, apart from greed, it is without any distinct characteristic function of its own.
- b. *The two intermediate kinds found in all unwholesome purposes* (akuśala dharma, 不善法)
 11. Lack of shame (ahrīkya, 無慚) is the *nature* that is unconcerned about the moral compass of one's own purpose, making light of or rejecting that which is wholesome and virtuous. Its *action* consists of preventing a sense of shame and nurturing the growth of evil motive forces. This is a reference to those who belittle or spurn that which is wholesome and virtuous and feel no disgrace in their wrong-doing because they have no concern about the moral consequences of their actions. In preventing a sense of shame, it nurtures the growth of motive forces that result in unwholesome behavior.
 12. Lack of humility (anapatrāpya, 無愧) is the *nature* that has contempt for those of this world and a reverence and respect for the savagery and evil that is the law of the jungle. Its *action* consists of preventing humility and nurturing the growth of evil motive forces. This is a reference to those who feel no disgrace for their wrong-doing because they have contempt for this world and only respect for savagery and evil of 'might makes right'. In preventing humility, it nurtures the growth of motive forces that result in unwholesome behavior.

This lack of conscience, this lack of feeling disgrace (alajjana, 不恥) in wrong-doing is the common denominator that is found in both shamelessness and lack of humility. Because of this, the holy teachings hypothetically speak of it being their existential nature. However:

- a. If one holds that the lack of feeling disgrace is the existential nature of both, then there would be no distinction between them. With this being so, one could not speak of these two arising at the same time because the arising of one would be no different than the arising of the other. However, it is possible for two different natures to arise at the same time. For example, emotional feelings (vedanā, 受) and mental associations (saṃjñā, 想) are different in nature but they arise at the same time.
- b. If one maintains that they are only distinguished because shamelessness is with regards to oneself and humility is with regards to others, there would be a contradiction with the holy teachings because they would then not really exist separately as different natures.
- c. If one allows that they both have a real existential nature but arise separately (one after another) it would also contradict volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation which says that they arise together in all evil states of minds. When unwholesome states of mind connect with the conditions at hand, they always belittle or reject virtue while respecting and esteeming evil. Because of this, shamelessness and lack of humility are to be found in all unwholesome states of minds. Because the object before one (ālambana, 所緣) is no different in both of these situations, it would be incorrect to say that these two must arise separately (at different times).

But the holy teachings do say that both of these lack respect for either oneself or others.

* 'Oneself' is a reference to one's own moral purposes.

* 'Others' is a reference to those of the world one lives in.

Some say that this rejection of virtue and respect for evil occurs when benefiting oneself results in the harming of others. In fact, The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that lack of shame and humility are part of greed, hatred and delusion, but their real existential natures are that of secondary emotional disturbances which are similar to and flow forth (naiṣyandika, 等流) from these primary kinds of emotional disturbance.

c. The eight broadly defined kinds found in all corrupted states of mind (saṃkleśa citta, 染心)

13. The restlessness of worry (auddhatya, 掉舉) is the nature of angst, the anxiety that causes the mind to lack serenity or a relaxed and composed confidence in facing an object. Its action consists of preventing impartiality (upekṣā, 捨) or stillness of mind (śamatha, 奢摩他 or 止). There are different theories about the relationship between the restlessness of worry and the primary kinds of emotional disturbance:

- a. *There is a thesis* that the restlessness of worry is part of greed (lobha, 貪) because volumes fifty-five and fifty-eight of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation and Sthiramati's Commentary about The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya Vyākhyā, 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論) say only that it is the part of greed that arises through a recollection of agreeable things from the past (that no longer exist or will no longer exist).
- b. *There is another thesis* that the restlessness of worry does not only involve greed because, as volume fifty-eight of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, it pervades all corrupt states of mind. It also says

that the defining characteristic found in the restlessness of worry is a lack of serenity and stillness of mind. This is a shared characteristic that is found in all kinds of emotional distress and, apart from this, the restlessness of worry is without any distinct characteristic function of its own. Although hypothetically all kinds of primary emotional disturbances therefore serve as its foundation, in this thesis the restlessness of worry is said to be part of greed because it increases with the arising of greed.

- c. *There is yet another thesis* (deemed to be correct) that the restlessness of worry arises through its own separate and distinct nature that it is found in all corrupt states of mind, like lack of proper faith, the lack of self-restraint, etc. When it is said to be part of another nature (in this case, greed), this does not mean that it does not also have a real existence of its own (dravyasat, 實有)² because, like such secondary emotional disturbances as lack of proper faith, lack of self-restraint and others, it does not just have a hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat, 假有)². Therefore, volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation explains that, like fatigue and regret, the restlessness of worry also has another, conventional existence (saṃvṛtisat, 世俗有) that is in accordance with the characteristics of this world. The distinctive characteristic found in the restlessness of worry is the excitability (capala, 囂動) found in emotional disturbances that causes them to arise together, preventing serenity and stillness of mind. If the restlessness of worry was without any distinct characteristics apart from those found in other kinds of emotional disturbance, this discourse would not specifically say it prevents stillness of mind (śamatha, 奢摩他 or 止). Consequently, its distinct characteristic is this excitability, not merely a lack of serenity and stillness of mind.

14. *Apathy* (styāna, 惛沈) is the *nature* that causes the mind to lack the necessary competence (karmaṇya, 堪任) to meet its objectives and its *action* consists of preventing introspection (vipaśyana, 毘鉢舍那 or 觀心) and the confidence (praśrabdhi, 輕安) that arises from a higher sense of purpose. There are different theories about the relationship between apathy (styāna, 惛沈) and the primary kinds of emotional disturbance:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that apathy is part of the delusion (moha, 癡) found in selfish indifference because, as The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, the darkness and heaviness found in apathy are characteristics of delusion.
 - b. *There is another thesis* that apathy is not only involved with delusion. This is reference to the lack of competence (akarmaṇya, 無堪任) that is a distinctive characteristic of apathy. In this thesis, all kinds of emotional disturbance involve a lack of competence but, apart from this, apathy has no distinctive characteristic of its own. Although hypothetically all kinds of primary emotional disturbances serve as a foundation for this lack of competence, the discourse says that apathy is a part of delusion because it only increases with the arising of the delusions found in the stupidity of selfish indifference.
 - c. *There is yet another thesis* (deemed correct) that apathy has its own distinct existential nature. Although it is said to be partly delusion, it has a real distinct nature of its own that is similar to delusion and flows from it (naiṣyandika, 等流性). Like lack of proper faith and the lack of self-restraint, it is not merely delusion. In adapting to this other characteristic (of delusion) it is said to have a conventional existence recognizable in this world (saṃvṛtisat, 世俗有) but, like fatigue and regret, it does have a real nature of its own (dravyasat, 實有性). The distinctive characteristics of apathy are a lack of interest

(tandrā, 瞢) and a leaden dullness, a heaviness (gaurava, 重) that make conscious purposes arise with a lack of competence. If apathy was without a distinct characteristic apart from those found in the other kinds of emotional disturbance, The Discourse of the Masters would not specifically say it prevents introspection (vipaśyana, 毘鉢舍那 or 觀心). Consequently, its distinct characteristics are said to be disinterest and dullness.

In distinguishing between apathy and delusion:

- * *Delusion* (moha, 癡) is characterized by a lack of knowledge (ajñāna, 迷闇) about the purpose of objects or objectives that directly prevents the lack of delusion (amoha, 無癡), but it is not necessarily characterized by dullness or disinterest.
- * *Apathy* (styāna, 惛沈) is characterized by dullness or disinterest about objects or objectives that directly prevents the confidence that arises from a higher sense of purpose (praśraddhi, 輕安) but it is not necessarily characterized by a lack of knowledge.

15. *Lack of faith in a transcendent moral purpose* (aśraddhā, 無信) is the *nature* of the corrupted mind that is incapable of an enduring longing and aspiration for virtue. Its *action* consists of preventing the purity of faith and serves as a foundation for negligence (kausīdya, 懈怠) because those without it are usually passive and lethargic. One should understand that this lack of proper faith is said to have three characteristics that are the opposite of those with it. The three characteristics found in lack of faith in a transcendent moral purpose are:

1. The polluting of the mind (kāluṣya, 渾濁) that is the opposite of its clarity (prasāda, 淳心)
2. The doubts of the mind (vicikitsā, 疑) that are the opposite of its singleness of purpose (ekagrata, 一心)
3. The interruptions of the mind (sāntara, 有間) that are the opposite of its continuity (saṃtati, 相續心)

In fact, corrupt purposes each have their own distinct characteristics. Only lack of proper faith has pollution of the mind (kāluṣya, 渾濁) as its own distinctive characteristic. It also can pollute the minds and mental states of others, just as a filthy thing is not only dirty itself but soils everything around it that it comes into contact with. And so it is said that the faithless mind has the nature of polluting the world around it. One is incapable of an enduring longing or aspiration for real virtue because of a lack of proper faith, but this is not its distinctive nature. If one has an enduring longing and aspiration for things that are immoral, there will be the cause and effect that is found in the lack of proper faith, but this is not itself the existential nature of polluting the atmosphere of the mind.

16. *Negligence* (kausīdya, 懈怠) is the *nature* of laziness (alasya, 懶惰) in the cultivation of virtue and elimination of evil. Its *action* consists of preventing diligence of effort (vīrya, 精進) and promoting habitual corruption (saṃkleśa, 染). This is reference to how those who are negligent nurture and develop bad habits. However, diligence in the pursuit of corrupt purposes is also said to constitute negligence because it results in a retreat from virtuous purposes. Diligence in the pursuit of morally undefined purposes results in neither advancing towards nor retreating from virtue and therefore it is just aspiration (chanda, 欲) and decisiveness of determination (adhimokṣa, 勝解), not a distinct existential nature. Just as an enduring longing and aspiration for something that is morally neutral is neither pure nor corrupt, it involves neither faith in a transcendent moral purpose nor a lack of it.
17. *The idleness found in lack of self-restraint* (pramāda, 放逸) is the *nature* of self-absorption that is unable to guard against evil or cultivate virtue. Its *action* constitutes the preventing of vigilance (apramāda, 不放逸) and promotes damage to the foundations of virtue. This is a reference to being unable to prevent evil or cultivate virtue because of negligence being

combined with greed, hatred and delusion. It is generally said to be the lack of self-restraint but it does not have its own distinct nature. Although pride, doubt and false beliefs have the capacity to prevent virtue and promote evil, lack of self-restraint, greed, hatred and delusion have a much greater strength to prevent diligence of effort as well as the absence of greed, hatred and delusion. The characteristics of the idleness found in lack of self-restraint can therefore be deduced as being the opposite of those that are found in vigilance.

18. Forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛitā, 失念) is the lapse of remembrance, particularly moral lapses. It is the *nature* that is unable to clearly record, keep in mind or recollect objective purposes. Its *action* constitutes the preventing of proper mindfulness (samyak smṛti, 正念) and is the foundation for mental distraction (vikṣepa, 散亂). This is a reference to those whose lapses of remembrance cause their minds to be scattered and disordered. There are different theories on the relationship between forgetfulness and the primary kinds of emotional disturbance:
 - * *There is a thesis* that forgetfulness is part of the mindfulness of remembrance (smṛti, 念) because, as The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya, 大乘阿毘達磨集論) says, it is a result of emotional disturbances being directly associated with it.
 - * *There is another thesis* that says forgetfulness is a part of delusion (moha, 癡) because, as The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論) says, it is called forgetfulness because the delusions of selfish indifference make the mind loses it remembrance.
 - * *There is yet another thesis* (deemed correct) that forgetfulness is part of both remembrance and delusion because the above citations from these two texts are brief, ambiguous and inconclusive. As The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation also says, forgetfulness refers to the moral lapses that pervade all corrupted states of mind.
19. Distraction (vikṣepa, 散亂) is the *nature* that causes the mind to scatter and be dispersed (pariṣyanda, 流蕩) among many different objects or objectives while its *action* constitutes preventing proper resolve (samyak samādhi, 正定) and serving as the foundation for improper discernment. This is a reference to those who have improper discernment of purpose because they are distracted. There are different theories about the relationship between distraction and the primary kinds of emotional disturbance:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that distraction is part of delusion (moha, 癡) because volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that this is the case.
 - b. *There is another thesis* that distraction involves greed, hatred and delusion because, as The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya, 大乘阿毘達磨集論) says, it contains all three of these. In saying that it is part of delusion, The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation is referring to distraction being found in all corrupted states of mind. This is a reference to distraction existing when greed, hatred and delusion make the mind wander and become dispersed so that they prevail over other mental states.
 - c. *There is yet another thesis* (deemed correct) that distraction has its own distinct existential nature. In saying that it is part of greed, hatred and delusion, The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle is referring to its effect being similar to and flowing from (niṣyanda, 等流) these three, just as it says the same about shamelessness

and lack of humility. It is also said to have another, conventional existence (saṃvṛtisat, 世俗有) that is in accordance with the characteristics of this world. (This was also said before about shamelessness and lack of humility). A distinct characteristic of distraction is its instability (cañcala, 躁擾), because it makes all innate purposes (sahaja dharma, 俱生法) of the mind scatter and become dispersed (pariṣyanda, 流蕩). If distraction did not have any distinct nature of its own apart from greed, hatred and delusion, it would not specifically be said to prevent the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 三摩地 or 定).

Question: What is the distinction between the functions of distraction (vikṣepa, 散亂) and the restlessness of worry (auddhatya, 掉舉)?

Answer: The restlessness of worry causes changes of mind (determinations) about objects while distraction causes changes in the objects of perception themselves. Although in any given moment the object does not change, there are such changes continuously occurring over time. When the mind is corrupted, the powers of restlessness and distraction cause the objects and determinations of the mind to ever change from moment to moment. Some say that when the mind is held in check by the powers of mindfulness and mental resolve, it is like a monkey that is has been tied down so that it will stay in one place. Because of this, distractions and the restlessness of worry are both said to be found in all corrupted states of mind. Also, as already explained, distraction (vikṣepa, 散亂) is characterized by instability (cañcala, 躁擾) while the restlessness of worry (auddhatya, 掉舉) is characterized by excitability (capala, 囂動).

20. Lack of self-awareness, lack of knowledge about one's true purpose (asamprajanya, 不正知) is the nature of mistaken understanding about the objects or objectives that are being observed while its action constitutes the preventing of a full awareness of one's true purpose that results in moral wrong-doing (āpatti, 毀犯). This is a reference to those who commit moral transgressions because they lack an awareness of their true purpose. There are different theories about the relationship between this lack of awareness about one's true purpose and the primary kinds of emotional disturbance:
- There is a thesis* that this lack of proper awareness partially involves the discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧) because it is said that, through it, there are discernments that are directly associated with emotional disturbances.
 - There is another thesis* that lack of awareness is a part of delusion (moha, 癡) because, as The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, in being aware of something which is not true, there is said to be a lack of proper awareness.
 - There is yet another thesis* (deemed correct) that it involves both delusion and discernment of purpose because the two citations above are brief, ambiguous and inconclusive and, as The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, this lack of proper awareness is found in all corrupted states of mind.

Through such terms as 'and' (punar, 及) and 'together with' (saha, 與), the stanza indicates that there are not only twenty kinds of secondary emotional disturbance. The Detailed Analysis of Moral Training (Vinaya Kṣudraka Vastu, 毘奈耶雜事) and other texts say that a multitude of secondary kinds of emotional disturbance arise from greed and the other primary kinds. The term 'secondary kinds of emotional disturbance' (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) also involves the primary kinds (kleśa, 煩惱) because their nature is similar to them and flows from them (naiṣyandika, 等流性). These other corrupted mental states that are similar to the primary emotional

disturbances are only called 'secondary kinds' because they are not counted among them. These twenty kinds of secondary emotional disturbance are only distinguished from the primary kinds because they are more explicitly manifested kinds of corrupted mental states. Some say that these are just different phases of the primary kinds while others describe them as being similar to them and flowing forth from them. One should understand that these secondary kinds all involve the primary kinds in accordance with their distinct characteristics.

On secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) ***being real*** (dravyasat, 實有) ***or merely hypothetical*** (prajñaptisat, 假有)²:

Among these twenty kinds of secondary emotional disturbances:

1. All ten more narrowly defined kinds and three of the eight broadly defined kinds (*forgetfulness, the lack of self-restraint and the lack of self-awareness*) only have a hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat, 假有).
2. The two intermediate kinds (*lack of shame & lack of humility*) and two of the eight broadly defined kinds (*lack of proper faith & negligence*) have a real existential nature of their own (dravyasat, 實有) as evidenced by both the holy teachings and logical reasoning.
3. With regards to the other three of the eight broadly defined kinds (*restlessness of worry, apathy and distraction*), some say they are real while others say they are hypothetical. We have already cited scriptural references and logical arguments about these.

On secondary kinds of emotional disturbance being innate (sahaja, 俱生) ***or purely speculative*** (vikalpana, 分別):

All twenty kinds of secondary emotional disturbances can be either innate (sahaja, 俱生) or purely speculative (vikalpana, 分別) because they can arise through both of these powers.

On the mutual interactions (anyonya paramparā, 展轉) ***among the twenty different secondary kinds of emotional disturbance***:

1. The ten more narrowly defined kinds definitely do not arise together because, in interacting, they are in contradiction to each other. They are incompatible with each other in how they imagine objects (ākāra, 行相) because each of them is predominant and controlling when they arise.
2. The two intermediate kinds are both found in all unwholesome and corrupting states of mind and may arise together with all the narrowly and broadly defined kinds, in accordance with the situation.
3. The Discourse of the Masters on Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that the eight broadly defined kinds are found in all corrupted states of mind. Because of this, they can all arise with each other on occasion and also interact with the narrowly defined and intermediate kinds. However:
 - a. Volume fifty-five of the same discourse says that only six of them are found in all corrupted states of mind because, when apathy and the restlessness of worry grow too powerful, they become incompatible with each other and no longer arise together.
 - b. Elsewhere it is said that only five of them are found in all corrupted states of mind because apathy, the restlessness of worry, lack of proper faith, negligence and the idleness found in lack of self-restraint are only incompatible with virtuous states of mind (while distraction, forgetfulness and lack of self-awareness are incompatible with other states of mind regardless of whether they are virtuous, unwholesome or morally undefined).

The other direct associations (samprayoga, 相應) of secondary kinds of emotional disturbance:

a. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and the eight different projections of consciousness (aṣṭābhir vijñānaiḥ, 八識):

1. Because these secondary kinds of emotional disturbance are corrupted, they are not directly associated with the eighth projection of consciousness, *the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識)* (which is morally undefined).
2. Only the eight broadly defined kinds are found in the seventh, *the deliberating and calculating mind of self-interest (manas, 末那)*. One should understand why it is that some of these secondary kinds of emotional disturbances are retained in this projection of consciousness while others are not, which was already explained in the section on the deliberating and calculating mind.
3. All of these secondary kinds of emotional disturbance are found on occasion in the sixth, *the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識)*.
4. Being coarse, intense and volatile, the ten narrowly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbance do not exist in *the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識)*. However, the intermediate and broadly defined kinds are all occasionally found in them.

b. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and the five kinds of emotional feeling (pañca vedanā, 五受):

Because the intermediate and broadly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbances are found in all corrupted states of mind, they are directly associated with all five kinds of emotional feeling: rejoicing, contentment, sorrow, suffering and indifference. Regarding the more narrowly defined kinds:

1. *There is a thesis* that seven of the more narrowly defined kinds (*anger, resentment, concealment, hostility, stinginess, jealousy and cruelty*) are only directly associated with rejoicing, sorrow and indifference but not suffering or contentment. The other three (*deceit, dishonesty and arrogance*) are said to be associated with all emotional feelings except suffering.
2. *There is another thesis* that these seven are associated with rejoicing, sorrow, suffering and indifference, but not contentment. The other three (*deceit, dishonesty and arrogance*) are said to be associated with all five kinds of emotional feeling, because suffering can exist in the deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意), as explained before.

Question: Kuṇḍī added: How can anger and the like be associated with rejoicing and how can stinginess and the like be associated with sorrow?

Answer: These emotional feelings are associated with each other as explained before in the section about the primary kinds of emotional disturbance.

3. *There is another thesis* (deemed to be correct) that, in terms of their most coarse and explicit characteristics:
 - a. *Anger, resentment, hostility, jealousy and cruelty* are directly associated with feelings of sorrow and indifference.
 - b. *Concealment and stinginess* are directly associated with feelings of rejoicing and indifference.
 - c. The other three (*deceit, dishonesty and arrogance*) promote contentment (through feelings of rejoicing and indifference).

In conclusion, what is said about the intermediate and broadly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbance also applies to the more narrowly defined kinds that are more coarse and explicit (they can be found in all kinds of emotional feelings).

- c. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and the five kinds of motive forces that distinguish specific objects (pañca viniyata saṃskāra, 五別境行): These twenty secondary kinds of emotional disturbance are all directly associated with the five kinds of motive forces that distinguish specific objects because they all occasionally arise together with them without any incompatibility. For example:
1. Although proper remembrance and corrupted discernment are not compatible with corrupted remembrance and proper discernment, they are directly associated with the part of them that is still invested with the delusions of selfish indifference.
 2. Remembrance is also connected with objects that have been manifested before. Since anger is also acquired through connections with moments in the past, anger and remembrance can certainly be directly associated with each other.
 3. When there is the arising of corruption, the mind also experiences instability, so there is no problem for mental resolve and distraction to be directly associated with each other.
- d. Direct associations between secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱) and primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱):
1. The two intermediate and eight broadly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbance are directly associated with all the primary kinds.
 2. With regards to the ten more narrowly defined kinds:
 - a. Because they are coarse and volatile, they cannot be directly associated with the more subtle examinations of doubt or flawed belief.
 - b. *Anger, resentment, hostility, jealousy & cruelty* can be directly associated with pride or delusion but, as they are parts of hatred, they are not directly associated with greed (the opposite of hatred) or hatred (which would just be association with themselves).
 - c. *Stinginess* can be directly associated with delusion or pride but, because it is a part of greed, it is not directly associated with hatred (which is the opposite of greed) or greed (which would just be association with itself).
 - d. *Arrogance* is only directly associated with delusion. It is distinguished from pride because it is a part of greed.
Kuijī added: Arrogance is a part of greed that is only directly associated with the delusion of selfish indifference. It is not directly associated with hatred or greed. It is distinguished from pride and so not directly associated with it either. Arrogance not only arises from self-exaltation but also from putting others down. Because of this, pride and arrogance do not necessarily arise at the same time.
 - e. *Concealment, deceit and dishonesty* are directly associated with greed, delusion and pride because they are all part of greed and delusion and they do not contradict each other in how they are imagined (ākāra, 行相).
- e. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and the three moral natures (prakṛti traya, 三性):
1. The two intermediate kinds of secondary emotional disturbance (*lack of shame & lack of humility*) and seven narrowly defined kinds (*anger, resentment, hostility, jealousy, cruelty, stinginess & concealment*) are only unwholesome.
 2. The other three narrowly defined kinds (*deceit, dishonesty & arrogance*) and the eight broadly defined kinds can also be morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記)
Kuijī added: These seven narrowly defined and two intermediate kinds are said to be unwholesome because they are only attached to sentient existence in the sphere of desire and can only bring about unwholesome behavior. The three other narrowly defined kinds and the eight broadly defined kinds can also be morally undefined because they also pervade the objective reality of sentient existence in the sphere of form.

f. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and meditations on the three spheres of sentient existence (trayo dhātavaḥ, 三界):

These three spheres of sentient existence are:

- a. The sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界): Its afflictions
 - b. The sphere of form (rūpa dhātu, 色界): Its objective reality
 - c. The sphere beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界): Its existential principles
1. The two intermediate kinds of secondary emotional disturbance (*lack of shame & lack of humility*) and seven of the ten narrowly defined kinds (*anger, resentment, concealment, hostility, jealousy, stinginess & cruelty*) are only involved in the sphere of desire while *deceit & dishonesty* are only found in both the spheres of desire and the objective reality of form. The other eleven secondary kinds of emotional disturbances are found in all three spheres of sentient existence.
 2. Sentient beings reborn into and living in the sphere of desire can bring about eleven secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (*deceit, dishonesty, arrogance & the eight broadly defined kinds*) when in meditation on the two higher spheres because those overly eager about attaining the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定) can generate arrogance (about the superiority of their attainments) as well as deceit and dishonesty to others (about their attainment of these meditations).
Kuiji added: Because the eight broadly defined kinds are found in all corrupt states of mind, there is no need to specifically treat them here.
 3. Sentient beings reborn into and living in the two higher spheres can experience intrusion of the last ten (the two intermediate and eight broadly defined) kinds of secondary emotional disturbance found in the lower sphere of desire because flawed beliefs (kudṛṣṭi, 見) occasionally arise in these meditations combined with the craving for existence (bhavā tṛṣṇā, 有愛).
Kuiji added: When the last ten kinds of secondary emotional disturbance (the two intermediate and eight broadly defined kinds) found in the lower sphere of desire arise in those reborn into meditations on the higher spheres or in the intermediate stage between the lower and higher spheres (dhyānantarā, 中有), that is, between the first & second levels of meditation, flawed beliefs can be combined with shamelessness and lack of humility. Here, upon being moistened and nurtured with existential craving, there arise the last eight kinds (the restlessness of worry, apathy, lack of proper faith, negligence, the idleness found in lack of self-restraint, forgetfulness, distraction and a lack of awareness of one's true purpose).
 4. The ten narrowly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbances have no reason to arise in those reborn into these higher levels of meditation because:
 - a. Being only unwholesome, they cannot fuel rebirth onto these higher spheres.
Kuiji added: The craving for existence is morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記) and so not directly associated with the unwholesome purposes found in these ten.
 - b. Those reborn into these higher spheres do not deny the truth of the transcendence of suffering (nirodha satya, 滅諦)
Kuiji added: Upon being without any false beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose (mithyā dṛṣṭi, 邪見), there are no direct associations with these ten.
 5. Those reborn into and living in the lower sphere of desire can aim to connect with the higher spheres of meditation while still having the two intermediate kinds (*lack of shame and lack of humility*) and the eight broadly defined kinds (*restlessness, apathy, lack of proper faith, negligence, lack of self-restraint, forgetfulness, distraction & lack of self-awareness*) because these higher spheres can arise while one still has associations with greed and other kinds of (primary and secondary) emotional disturbance.
 6. With regards to connecting with the higher spheres:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that none of the ten narrowly defined kinds of secondary emotional

disturbance can connect with a higher sphere of meditation as an object because their mode of imagining objects (ākāra, 行相) is coarse and short-sighted (superficial and immediate) and they do not apprehend long-term (deep or remote) objects or objectives.

2. *There is another thesis that:*

- a. *Jealousy* and other secondary kinds of emotional disturbance can be connected with the higher spheres because they are produced with regards to them.
Kuijī added: Just as jealousy, stinginess and arrogance can be produced with regards to the attainment of meditation in these higher spheres
- b. *Deceit, dishonesty* and the eight broadly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbance (*the restlessness of worry, apathy, lack of proper faith, negligence, lack of self-restraint, forgetfulness, distraction & lack of self-awareness*) can also connect with the lower spheres as their objects because:
 1. There can be pride and other kinds of (primary and secondary) emotional disturbances experienced in relation to overcoming the lower sphere of desire.
 2. Even the creator (Mahā Brahmā, 大梵) was deceptive and not fully honest to the Buddha's disciple Aśvajit.¹⁰
- c. *Arrogance* is not generally associated with the lower sphere of desire as an object of meditation because it cannot be relied on as a foundation of support for it.

g. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and the three kinds of spiritual training (trīṇi śikṣāṇi, 三學):

Because they are only found in corrupted states of mind, the twenty secondary kinds of emotional disturbance do not involve those in spiritual training (śaikṣa, 學) or those beyond any further need for such training (aśaikṣa, 無學). These stages of spiritual development are only involved with unafflicted states of mind.

h. The direct associations between the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance and the three means of severing attachments to them (prahātavya traya, 三所斷):

In terms of severing them, there are three kinds of secondary emotional disturbances (prahātavya traya, 三所斷):

1. *Secondary emotional disturbances that do not need to be severed (aheya, 非所斷),* those that are not corrupting and are severed spontaneously as soon as they arise.
2. *Secondary emotional disturbances arising from speculations (vikalpa, 分別) that are only severed through attaining a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷)* because they are coarse, explicit and easier to sever.
3. *Secondary emotional disturbances that are innate (sahaja, 俱生) that are only severed through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷)* because they are subtle and more difficult to sever.

1. The two intermediate kinds (*lack of shame and lack of humility*) and the eight broadly defined kinds (*restlessness, apathy, lack of proper faith, negligence, the idleness found in lack of self-restraint, forgetfulness, distraction & lack of self-awareness*) are severed through both vision and cultivation of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷 & bhāvanā heya, 修所斷) because they are directly associated with emotional disturbances that arise both innately (sahaja, 俱生) and through speculations (vikalpa, 分別).
2. The secondary kinds of emotional disturbance that are only severed through vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷) confuse the characteristics of the four truths both generally (in principle) and specifically (in terms of their different characteristics). Accordingly, they are all penetrated through meditation on the four truths. These confusions about the four truths can be penetrated both directly and indirectly, just like

the primary kinds of emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱) (as explained before in the section on them).

3. Regarding the ten narrowly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbance (*anger, resentment, concealment, hostility, jealousy, stinginess, deceit, dishonesty, cruelty & arrogance*):
 - a. *There is a thesis* that they are only severed through cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷) because their connections to objects arise spontaneously in obvious and explicit ways.
 - b. *There is another thesis* (deemed to be correct) that they are severed through both vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷) and cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷) because they arise depending on the power of emotional disturbances that are both innate (sahaja, 俱生) and speculative (vikalpana, 分別). For example, in perceiving the flawed beliefs (kudṛṣṭi, 惡見) of others, one may bear anger, resentment, etc.
 - c. In severing disturbances through attaining a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷), one adapts to the general and specific powers of all these confusions, penetrating them through a transcendental knowledge of the four truths. In this:
 1. *There is a thesis* that anger, resentment and the other narrowly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbances are only confused about these truths remotely (indirectly) because their mode of imagining objects (ākāra, 行相) are obvious and superficial, and they cannot apprehend these truths deeply.
 2. *There is another thesis* that five of these narrowly defined kinds (*jealousy, hostility, cruelty, stinginess and arrogance*) also directly confuse these four truths because they are known to arise with regards to the truths about the transcendence of suffering (nirodha satya, 滅諦) and the noble path (ārya mārga satya, 聖道諦).

i. Secondary kinds of emotional disturbance being based on objects of meditation that have a real karmic function (sa vastuka, 有事) & objects that do not (avastuka, 無事):

Objects with a real karmic function (vastuka, 有事) here is a reference to the actual substance of sentient existence, such as its projections of purpose (skandhas, 蘊), alignments of subject & objects (āyatana, 處) & spheres of consciousness (dhātu, 界).

Anger and the rest of the ten narrowly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbances only connect with objects that have a real karmic function (sa vastuka, 有事) (within one's own mind) because they need to connect with these original objects (bimba, 本質) in order to arise. Whether one is with or without affliction, connection with objects that may exist in principle but do not have a real karmic function (avastuka, 無事) should be understood as explained before in the last section on the primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱).

The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness,
***Vijñapti Matrātā Siddhi*, 成唯識論**
End of Volume Six

The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness,
Vijñapti Matrātā Siddhi, 成唯識論
Beginning of Volume Seven

The Four Uncategorized Kinds of Motive Forces (catvāri aniyata saṃskāra, 四不定行)

Having explained the twenty secondary kinds of emotional disturbances, next there are the four kinds of motive forces that are not necessarily of any determined category.

Question: What are their characteristics?

Answer: On this, the fourteenth stanza of verse says:

14b f. The uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行) include:

1. **Regret (kauṛtya, 惡念) and**
 2. **Fatigue (middha, 眠) as well as**
 3. **Seeking (vitarka, 尋) and**
 4. **Discovery (vicāra, 伺)**
- These two (pairs) are each two-fold.**

14a kauṛtyaṃ middhameva ca

14b 不定謂悔眠，尋伺二各二。 vitarkaśca vicāraś cety upakleśā dvaye dvidhā

Why they are said to be uncategorized (aniyata, 不定)?

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

Regret, fatigue, seeking and discovery are not determined to be in any of the above categories because:

- * They are not necessarily virtuous (kuśala, 善), corrupted (saṃkleśa, 染) or morally undefined (avyākṛta, 無記).
- * They are not omnipresent motive forces found in all mental states (saṃprayuktā saṃskāra, 相應行) like contact (sparśa, 觸), etc.
- * They are not the motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行) found in all levels of meditation (bhūmis, 地)⁹ like aspiration, etc.

Because of this, they are said to be ‘uncategorized’ (aniyata, 不定).

In describing these four specifically:

1. **Regret** (kauṛtya, 惡作) occurs in reference to improper behavior. Its *nature* is a sense of guilt about wrong-doing (akuśala karma, 惡業) that has been committed while its *action* constitutes preventing stillness of mind (śamatha, 止 or 奢摩他). The name ‘regret’ is based on its effect but first there must be an improper action that serves as its cause. Regret also involves improperly not making actions, just as one may express guilt by saying ‘I regret that I did not do this before’ or ‘I was wrong not to do it.’

The narcissist, who deliberates and calculates everything only in terms of self-interest, has no real sense of guilt.

- a. With regret (kauṛtya, 惡作) there is a sense of guilt that acknowledges harmful actions. However, without remorse, it only disturbs the mind with sorrow, leading to the destructive actions of self-condemnation and self-pity. Being paralyzed by this guilt gives rise to various kinds of emotional disturbances.
- b. With remorse (kṣamayati, 懺) there is not only acceptance of guilt but a sense of shame (hrī, 愧) and humility (apatrāpya, 慚) motivating one towards the constructive actions of atonement, self-forgiveness and removal of this sense of guilt. The ritual of confession (kṣamāpatti pratideśana 懺悔) intensifies this motivation.
- a. By itself, guilt remains focused on a self-centered existence, the individual who had committed the action.
- b. Remorse is selfless, with focus on the action itself and empathy for those who have been wronged.

2. *Fatigue* (middha, 睡眠) is the *nature* of exhaustion and sleepiness that causes the body to lose control of its sense faculties and the mind to become dark and dull (as the conscious mind subsides and crosses the threshold back into the subconscious). Its *action* constitutes preventing introspective observation of the mind (vipaśyana, 觀心 or 毘鉢舍那). This is a reference to those who are sleepy losing control over their bodies and becoming mentally muddled and weak because their sensory faculties have been suspended. The mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) becomes the only avenue through which consciousness can be manifested.

* In being dull, it is distinguished from mental resolve (samādhi, 定).

* In being dark, it is distinguished from an awakened state (bodha, 寤)

This makes it apparent that fatigue is not without an existential nature and function

(as it can allow a weakened and exhausted body and mind to restore its energy following a period of rest).

Sometimes fatigue is conventionally said to refer to any state of unconsciousness because, like other mental entanglements (pariyavasthāna, 纏縛) and obstacles to meditation (nivarāṇa, 蓋), it is directly associated with consciousness.

1. - 2. There are four different theories about the nature of regret and fatigue:

- a. *There is a thesis* that the essential nature of regret and fatigue is delusion (moha, 癡) because, as The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, they consist partially of delusions and partially of secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱).
- b. *There is another thesis* that this is not so because they can both also be found in virtuous mental states. Thus it is said that these two are corrupted when there is delusion and they are without affliction when there is an absence of delusion. The passage above from The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation is only explaining how regret and fatigue are corrupted when they involve delusions and secondary kinds of emotional disturbance.
- c. *There is a third thesis* asserting that this second thesis is also not entirely correct because regret and fatigue can have a undefined moral nature that is neither with nor without delusion. In this third thesis, both regret and fatigue have a dual nature:
 1. *Regret* (kaukr̥tya, 惡作) has the nature of both intent (cetanā, 思) and discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧) because, in having it, one clearly understands what has been done or not done so that one can willfully choose to take actions to correct it.
 2. *Fatigue* (middha, 睡眠) has the nature of both intent and mental association (samjñā, 想) because there are also various kinds of intent and mental associations made with regards to the imagined objects in dreams.

This is why, according to this thesis, The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says that fatigue and sleep both have a conventional worldly existence. When they are corrupted, they are similar to and flow from delusion and, like the lack of proper faith and other secondary emotional disturbances, they are both said to consist partially of delusion.

- d. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that this third opinion is not entirely right as the nature of mental entanglements (pariyavasthāna, 纏縛) found in regret and fatigue do not consist of intentions (cetanā, 思), discernments of purpose (prajñā, 慧) and mental associations (samjñā, 想). It should rather be said that regret and fatigue each have their own distinct nature because their modes of imagining objects (ākāra, 行相) can be distinguished from other mental states (caitta, 心所). In saying that have a conventional worldly existence, The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the

Practice of Engaged Meditation is just referring to how they adapt to delusional states.

3. *Seeking* (vitarka, 尋) is a reference to requesting or asking (yācikā, 求). It is the *nature* that causes the mind to chase after objects of verbalized thought (manojalpa, 意言) and is a more explicit manifestation of the mind (sthūla pravṛtti vijñāna, 麤轉識) than discovery.
4. *Discovery* (vicāra, 伺) is a reference to mental investigation (parīkṣā, 察). It is also the *nature* that causes the mind to chase after objects of verbalized thought (manojalpa, 意言) but it is a more subtle manifestation of the mind (sūkṣma pravṛtti vijñāna, 細轉識) than seeking.

This pursuit of *objects of verbalized thought* differentiates seeking and discovery from aspiration (chanda, 欲).

The *actions* of seeking and discovery serve as foundations for the comfort and the discomfort of the body and mind.

Kuṣī added: There is comfort when one discovers what one is seeking and there is no comfort when one does not.

Both seeking and discovery utilize deliberate intent (cetanā, 思) and discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧) as parts of their existential nature. They are distinguished by the depth of the inferences (anumāna, 推度) they make. Seeking refers to a shallow investigation of purpose while discovery constitutes a more profound one. Apart from deliberate intent and discernment of purpose, neither of these has a distinct nature of its own that can be found.

The stanza then says

“These two (pairs) are each two-fold.” (dvaye dvidhā, 二各二)

There are different theories about the meaning of this:

- a. *There is a thesis* that this is a reference to seeking and discovery each being uniquely distinguished as either corrupted (afflicted) or pure (unafflicted).
- b. *There is another thesis* that this explanation is not correct because:
 1. Regret and fatigue can also be either corrupted or pure.
 2. It could be also said that they are two-fold in the same way that the nature of corrupted mental states treated in the earlier sections on primary and secondary emotional disturbances can be either unwholesome or morally undefined.
 3. There are also some who say being two-fold here means that each of these can be either active entanglements in the conscious mind (paryavasthāna, 纏縛) or just latent predispositions (anuśaya, 隨眠) found in the subconscious mind.
- c. *There is a third thesis* (deemed to be correct) that this second explanation is also not entirely right because the stanza here is speaking about there being four motive forces that are uncategorized. In speaking about ‘these two pairs’ it is therefore referring to both pairs being either consciously manifested or latent seeds in the subconscious mind. Each of these pairs is then in turn two-fold. The pairs are as follows:

1. The first two are regret (kaukṛtya, 惡念) and fatigue (middha, 眠).
2. The second two are seeking (vitarka, 尋) and discovery (vicāra, 伺).

These two pairs can then also have various other kinds of distinctions.

- a. Each pair said to be two-fold can be either corrupt or pure, unlike the virtuous and corrupted states (kuśala caitta, 善心所 & saṃkleśa caitta, 染心所) discussed before that are each categorized (niyata, 定) as being of only one moral nature or the other.
- b. Some say that these four are said to have a dual nature just to distinguish them from the corrupted natures of primary and secondary kinds of emotional disturbances because elsewhere it is mistakenly said that they are secondary kinds (upakleśa, 隨煩惱).

It is therefore concluded that the words “these pairs are each two-fold” are said in this stanza to show that they are uncategorized (aniyata, 不定) and, because of this, the placement of these words in the verse serves a very useful purpose.

Issues related to these uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行)

On the uncategorized motive forces being real (dravyasat, 實有) or just hypothetical mental constructions (prajñaptisat, 假有):²

Among these four:

1. Seeking and discovery are definitely hypothetical because, as the holy teachings say, they are both accomplished through a combination of deliberate intention (cetanā, 思) and discernment of purpose (prajñā, 慧).
2. On regret and fatigue:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that they are also hypothetical because, as volume fifty-five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, they have an existence in terms of the conventions of this world.
 - b. *There is another thesis* (deemed to be correct) that regret and fatigue both have a real existential nature because, as the above discourse says, among these four, only seeking and discovery have a hypothetical existence. When it speaks about the hypothetical existence of regret and fatigue, it is only speaking about their characterization in terms of other things (such as delusion). This does not mean to say that they only have a hypothetical existence. This is similar to how the volume fifty-two of the discourse speaks about the existential nature of the inner seeds (in the subconscious mind) being hypothetical even though they also have a real existential nature.

On the direct associations between these different uncategorized motive forces:

1. Seeking and discovery do not necessarily have direct association with each other in all cases because, although they have the same nature, they are different in that one is coarse while the other is subtle. There are three levels of entry into the meditative state (tri bhūmi, 地) that are distinguished based on whether there is corruption or freedom in the seeking and discovery of purpose, not on whether or not they arise as potential seeds from the subconscious or they are actually being manifested in the conscious mind. Because of this, these three levels are not confused.

These three levels are:

- a. There is both seeking and discovery (savitarkā savicārā bhūmi, 有尋有伺)
- b. Seeking is transcended but there is still discovery (avitarka savicārā bhūmi, 無尋唯伺地.)
- c. Seeking and discovery are both transcended (avitarka avicārā bhūmi, 無尋無伺地)
2. Seeking and discovery can both be directly associated with regret and fatigue.
3. Regret and fatigue can be directly associated with each other.

The other direct associations of these four uncategorized motive forces

a. The direct associations between these four uncategorized motive forces and the eight different projections of consciousness (aṣṭābhir vijñānaiḥ, 八識):

1. None of these four are directly associated with #8 the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) or #7 the mind deliberating and calculating self-interest (manas, 末那), as already explained in the sections on these projections of consciousness.
2. Regret and fatigue are only directly associated with #6 the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) because they cannot be associated with #1 - #5 the five sensory projections of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識).
3. There are two different theories about the direct association between seeking and

discovery and these five sensory kinds of consciousness:

a. *There is a thesis* that seeking and discovery are directly associated with these five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) because, as volume five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, there is seeking and discovery within these five. It also says that there are seven kinds of distinctions made in seeking and discovery.

1. Distinctions that have mental images (nimitta vikalpa, 有相分別); These includes objects from the present and the past
2. Distinctions that are without mental images (animitta vikalpa, 無相分別); These includes objects or objectives that will arise in the future.
3. Distinctions that arise spontaneously (anābhoga vikalpa, 任運分別)
4. Distinctions that are consciously wished for and sought out (vitarka vikalpa, 尋求分別)
5. Distinctions that are discovered through investigation (vicāra vikalpa, 伺察分別)
6. Distinctions that are corrupted by attachments (kliṣṭa vikalpa, 染污分別)
7. Distinctions that are not corrupted by attachments (akliṣṭa vikalpa, 不染污分別)

Sthiramati's Commentary about the Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya Vyākhyā, 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論) further says that spontaneous distinctions exist *because of* the five sensory kinds of consciousness.

b. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that seeking and discovery are only directly associated with the mind distinguishing imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) because:

1. As The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, seeking and discovery uniquely belong to the mind that distinguishes imagined objects.
2. It also says that seeking and discovery are directly associated with sorrow and rejoicing (which are found in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects) and it is never directly associated with suffering and contentment (which are found in the five sensory kinds of consciousness). There are feelings of indifference or impartiality (vairāgya or upekṣā, 捨) in all eight projections of consciousness so those feelings have no bearing on this.

Question: Why does the discourse speak of them not being directly associated with suffering and contentment?

Answer:

- a. Although at the first stage of meditation with stillness of mind, there is contentment to be found in the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地), it is not free from the feelings of rejoicing and it is generally said to be a stage of rejoicing.
- b. Although unadulterated feelings of suffering also may be experienced at this stage, they appear more as sorrow and so there are generally said to be feelings of sorrow rather than those of suffering.

The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation also says that the objects (ālambana, 所緣) before seeking and discovery are soundings (vyañjana kāya, 文身), words (nāma kāya, 名身) and phrasings (pada kāya, 句身) along with the meanings (artha, 義) they convey, and that these are not the same as the objects of the five sensory kinds of consciousness. This discourse does say that seeking and discovery are found in these five, but this is primarily because they can arise through seeking and discovery, not because they necessarily have any direct associations with them. The statement in Sthiramati's Commentary

about The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Great Vehicle saying that spontaneous distinctions (anābhoga vikalpa, 任運分別) arise because of the five sensory kinds of consciousness is in apparent contradiction with The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation. Sthiramati's Commentary explains that spontaneous distinctions are because of the direct experiences of the five sensory kinds of consciousness while the Discourse explains that the seeking (vitarka, 尋) and discovery (vicāra, 伺) found in the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are directly associated with the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識). Therefore, the texts cited above supporting the first thesis are not conclusive and the sensory kinds of consciousness do not necessarily have direct associations with the motive forces of seeking and discovery.

- b. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the five kinds of emotional feeling (pañca vedanā, 五受): There are two theories on this:
 1. *There is a thesis that:*
 - a. Regret (kaukr̥tya, 惡念) is directly associated with feelings of sorrow and indifference because its activity only leads to worry but it can be morally undefined.
 - b. Fatigue (middha, 眠) is directly associated with feelings of rejoicing, sorrow and indifference because its activity can be delightful, stressful or somewhere in between.
 - c. Seeking (vitarka, 尋) and discovery (vicāra, 伺) can be directly associated with feelings of sorrow, rejoicing, indifference and contentment because, in the first level of meditation with stillness of mind, the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) can also be directly associated with contentment.
 2. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that all four of these uncategorized motive forces are also directly associated with feelings of suffering because the environment of the thinking mind (mano bhūmi, 意地) can be directly associated with the destinies that can be imbued with unadulterated feelings of suffering (in the destinies of hell, hunger and brutality).
- c. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the five kinds of motive forces that distinguish specific objects (pañca viniyata saṃskāra, 五別境):
All four of these uncategorized motive forces are directly associated with the five kinds of motive forces that distinguish specific objects because they are not incompatible with the objects before them (ālambana, 所緣) or how they imagine them (ākāra, 行相).
- d. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the eleven kinds of virtuous purpose (kuśala dharma, 善法):
 1. Regret and fatigue only incidentally arise in ten of the eleven virtuous mental states because, only being found in the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界), they do not arise when there is the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose (praśrabdhi, 輕安) found in the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定).
 2. Seeking and discovery can incidentally be found with all eleven virtuous states of mind because the confidence that comes from a higher sense of purpose is also directly associated with the very first stage of meditation with stillness of mind (prathama dhyāna, 初靜慮).

- e. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the primary kinds of emotional disturbance (kleśa, 煩惱):
1. Regret is only incidentally associated with the delusions of stupidity because its method of operation is coarse and explicit, while it is directly associated with greed and the other primary kinds of emotional disturbance because they are more subtle.
 2. Fatigue, seeking and discovery arise with all ten primary kinds of emotional disturbance because there is no incompatibility in their interaction with these three.
- f. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the secondary kinds of emotional disturbance (upakleśa, 隨煩惱):
1. Regret can arise together with the two intermediate and eight broadly defined kinds of secondary emotional disturbance but not with anger and the rest of the ten narrowly defined ones because the latter each arise autonomously by themselves, without regret.
 2. Fatigue, seeking and discovery occasionally arise together with all twenty kinds of secondary emotional disturbance because these disturbances can arise in any one of these three states.
- g. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the three moral natures (prakṛti traya, 三性):
- These four uncategorized motive forces can be virtuous, corrupted or morally undefined because one can even have regret about things that are morally undefined.
1. *There is a thesis* that:
 - a. Regret and fatigue only involve virtues in which the methods of operation in regret are coarse and explicit and those in fatigue are benighted and dull.
 - b. Seeking and discovery involve the attainment of virtues through the intensified motivation of preparation (prayoga, 加行) because there is hearing, deliberation and cultivation through seeking and discovery.
 2. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that:
 - a. Regret and fatigue can also be involved in the intensified motivation for the cultivation of virtues because they can exist even during the stages of listening and deliberation.
 - b. Fatigue, seeking and discovery can all be corrupted, pure or morally undefined.
 - c. Regret is not corrupted just because its understanding is coarse and explicit.
 - d. There are four morally neutral mental states that are found in meditation (catur avyākṛta citta, 四無記):
 - #1 States of consciousness arising from the different ripening seeds in the subconscious mind during meditation (vipākaja, 異熟生心)
 - #2 States arising through the postures of deportment during meditation (airyāpathaka, 威儀路心)
 - #3 States arising through employing ritual techniques during meditation (śailpasthānika, 工巧處心)
 - #4 States arising through apparent manifestations of spiritual transformation (nairmānika, 能變化心)
- Among these four:
1. Regret can only be found during #2 the postures of deportment and #3 the employment of ritual techniques. This is because:
 - a. Its method of operation is coarse and explicit and so it does not arise through #1 the different ripening seeds from the subconscious mind.
 - b. It is not one of the fruits of meditation (found in #4 the capacity for spiritual transformation).

2. Fatigue can be found in the first three because:
 - a. It cannot be found while #4 the fruits of spiritual transformation arise.
 - b. It can be found while #1 seeds ripen from the subconscious memory.
 3. Seeking and discovery can only be found in the last three because #1 seeds arising in the subconscious store of memory do not have the power to deeply investigate the meaning (artha, 義) behind soundings (vyañjana kāya, 文身), words (nāma kāya, 名身) and phrasings (pada kāya, 句身).
- h. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the nine levels of meditation (nava bhūmayah, 九地)⁹ found in the three-fold sphere of sentient existence (trayo dhātavaḥ, 三界)⁴:
1. Regret and fatigue only exist in its sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界).
The two higher spheres are too subtle to have these mental states.
 2. Seeking and discovery are found in its sphere of desire as well as the first level of meditation on sentient existence with stillness of mind (prathama dhyāna, 初靜慮) that allows entry into the objective reality that is its sphere of form. However, due to their mental turbulence, they cannot penetrate the other, more sublime levels of meditation in the higher spheres.
These more sublime levels of meditation include:
 - a. The three other levels of meditation found in the objective reality that constitutes its sphere of form (rūpa dhātu, 色界)
 - b. The four levels of existential principles found in its sphere beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界).
 3. Those reborn into its higher spheres do not manifest any regret or fatigue but they can engage in the seeking and discovery found in the lower sphere (of desire). Also, those in this lower sphere can also connect with the higher ones through seeking and discovery.
There are different theories about this:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that regret and fatigue are unable to connect with the levels of meditation in the two higher spheres because the method of operation in regret is too coarse and shallow and that in fatigue is too dark and dull.
 - b. *There is another thesis* (deemed correct) that regret and fatigue can connect with objects in these higher spheres because:
 1. Regarding regret: Those with flawed beliefs about the transcendental nature of life's purpose repent upon cultivating meditation.
 2. Regarding fatigue: Through dreams one can connect with anything that one has experienced in the wakened state.
- i. Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the three kinds of spiritual training (trīṇi śikṣāṇi, 三學):
1. Regret is found in those still in spiritual training (śaikṣas, 無學) but it is not a mental state found in those who are beyond any further need for such training (aśaikṣa, 無學) because those freed from desire (vīta rāga, 離欲) already have complete impartiality of mind (upekṣā, 捨).
 2. Fatigue, seeking and discovery can be found in all three kinds of spiritual training, those of moral commitment (adhiśīla, 增戒學), mental resolve (adhicitta, 增心學) and discernment of purpose (adhiprajñā, 增慧學), because all those who seek emancipation through conditionally virtuous purposes are said to be spiritual trainees. However, those who have already attained the ultimate realization to be acquired through conditionally virtuous purposes are said to be beyond any further need for spiritual training.

- j. *Direct associations between these uncategorized motive forces and the three means of severing attachments to them* (prahātavya traya, 三所斷):
1. Attachments to regret and fatigue are only severed through the attainment of a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya, 見所斷) and the subsequent cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā heya, 修所斷) because:
 - a. These attachments can produce flawed beliefs that are powerful, such as those about the transcendental nature of life's purpose (mithyā dṛṣṭi, 邪見) (which are only severed through attaining a transcendental vision of the noble path).
 - b. They are not among the attachments that do not need to be severed (aheya, 非所斷) because:
 1. Their severance is not induced or produced spontaneously just through the non-affliction of the noble path (anāsrava mārga, 無漏道).
 2. No deep wish for emancipation arises from regret and fatigue as it does from sorrow.

However, fatigue may be said to be among the attachments that do not need to be severed in those beyond any further need for spiritual training (āśaikṣa, 無學).
 2. Although seeking and discovery do not constitute a vision of the transcendental principle of the noble path (tattva darśana mārga, 真道) that is beyond affliction (anāsrava, 無漏), they are able to induce it and bring it about. Because of this, they can involve vision of the noble path, cultivation of the noble path and can be among the attachments that do not need to be severed (aheya, 非所斷). There are different theories about this:
 - a. *There is a thesis* that, among the five defining characteristics of conscious purposes, attachment to seeking and discovery can be among those that do not need to be severed (aheya, 非所斷) because, as volume five of The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation says, among these five defining characteristics of conscious purposes, seeking and discovery only involve the making of distinctions (vikalpa, 分別) about them.
The five characteristics of conscious purposes (dharma lakṣaṇa, 法相) are:
 1. Mental images of them (nimitta, 相)
 2. Names for them (nāman, 名)
 3. Distinctions of them (vikalpa, 分別)
 4. Transcendental knowledge of them (samyag jñāna, 正智)
 5. Their transcendental principles (bhūta tathatā, 真如)
 - b. *There is another thesis* that seeking and discovery can also involve transcendental knowledge (samyag jñāna, 正智) because, as The Exposition of the Holy Teaching (Āryadeśanā Vikhyāpana, 顯揚聖教論) and other discourses say:
 1. Proper deliberation (samyak saṃkalpa, 正思惟) is without any affliction (anāsrava, 無漏).
 2. Proper deliberation causes the mind to seek and discover the transcendental nature of life's purpose with impartiality of mind.
 3. Proper deliberation causes the teachings about it.

Because of this, seeking and discovery can be pure of affliction.

If there has not yet been the ultimate realization of perfect enlightenment (niṣṭha avasthā, 究竟位), there is not yet omniscience (parijñā, 遍知) about all the proper medicines to treat the different kinds of sickness that afflict sentient beings. Because of this, seeking and

discovery are still needed to acquire the knowledge attained subsequent (pṛṣṭha labdha jñāna, 後得智) to being endowed with a transcendental vision of the principle of the noble path (tattva darśana mārga, 真道) so that one can teach others about the transcendental nature of life's purpose (bhūta tathatā, 真實). This is not the same as the level of perfect enlightenment (buddha bhūmi, 佛地) in which this teaching is spontaneous and effortless (anabhisaṃskāra, 無功用) because, in this latter case, seeking and discovery are beyond any affliction (anāsrava, 無漏) whatsoever.

Although The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation does say that seeking and discovery involve the making of distinctions (vikalpa, 分別), it does not say that it only belongs to this third category of the five characteristics of conscious purposes (just described) because, in both the perfect knowledge (samyag jñāna, 正智) acquired through a transcendental vision of the noble path and the various kinds of knowledge that are acquired subsequently (pṛṣṭha labdha jñāna, 後得智), there are also the making of distinctions (vikalpa, 分別).

One should deliberate on the other aspects of these four uncategorized motive forces in accordance with logical reasoning.

The relationship between the first six manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ vijñāna, 六識) & The six categories of their mental states (caitta, 心所):

Two Questions: And so, as already described, there are these six categories of mental states:

- a. Omnipresent motive forces (sarvatraga saṃskāra, 遍行)
- b. Motive forces that distinguish specific objects (viniyata saṃskāra, 別境行)
- c. Virtuous purposes (kuśala dharma, 善法)
- d. Primary emotional disturbances (mūla kleśa, 本煩惱)
- e. Secondary emotional disturbances (upakleśa, 隨煩惱)
- f. Uncategorized motive forces (aniyata saṃskāra, 不定行)

Question One: Do they have a distinct existential nature (svabhāva, 自性) apart from that of these six manifestations of consciousness or are they just different parts of them?

Question Two: Is there anything wrong in either of these theories?

Answer: Both of these ideas are incorrect.

Answering Question One:

If these mental states had a distinct existential nature apart from consciousness, how could the holy teachings say that there only exists the virtual nature of consciousness (vijñapti matratā, 唯識)? And why do other teachings say that:

1. Verse thirty-seven of The Verses on Life's Purpose (Dharma Pada, 法句) says:
"The mind is far-reaching, acting on its own." (dūraṅgamaṃ ekacaram, 心遠獨行).
2. Corruption and purity only exist because of the mind.
3. Human existence (puruṣa, 士夫) dwells in six spheres: earth, water, wind, fire, space and consciousness.

And why would a stanza of verse from The Discourse on the Adornment of the Greater Vehicle Scriptures (Mahāyāna Sūtra Alamkāra Kārikā, 大乘莊嚴經論) say?

"It is allowed that the mind appears to be a duality.

Sometimes it appears to be greedy, hateful, etc.

And other times its has proper faith, a sense of shame, etc.

But there is no corrupt or pure purpose that is distinguished apart from the mind."

Answering Question Two:

- b. If the mental states (caitta, 心所) are just different parts of the mind (citta, 心), why do the holy teachings like volume ten of The Scripture on the Buddha's Descent into Śri Laṅka (Laṅka Avatāra Sūtra, 入楞伽經) speak of them being directly associated with it, as there cannot be associations unless there are differences and they cannot be associated with other natures and characteristics unless they have their own distinct existential nature. And why does the same scripture also say:
"Mental states arise simultaneously with the mind just as light arises with the sun."
And why does The Discourse of the Masters on the Levels of Grounding in the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra Bhūmi Śāstra, 瑜伽師地論), which speaks of mental states not being the same as the mind, also say in a stanza of verse?:
"The five lineages of seeds (pañca gotrāni, 五種性) are innate, not acquired,
But the idea of them being separable from the conscious mind is mistaken.
Because the conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness
(hetu pratyaya, 因緣) are inseparable
It would be in contradiction with the holy teachings."

It could be said that mental states have a distinct existential nature that is apart from these first six manifestations of consciousness but, because consciousness ultimately prevails, it is said that they are really only its virtual characteristics. The mental states depend on consciousness as their foundation (āśraya, 所依). Through its power, they arise and are its simulations. However, they are not really consciousness itself. Yet the words 'consciousness' and 'mind' are said to include its mental states because they are constantly being directly associated with it. The expressions 'there is only the virtual nature of consciousness' (vijñapti matratā, 唯識) and 'they are the simulations of the mind' (pratibhāsa, 似現) are therefore not in error.

This explanation is based on the conventional realities of this world (saṃvṛti, 世俗) (so that it can be expressed and communicated among sentient beings). In terms of the ultimate reality (paramārtha satya, 勝義), the mind (citta, 心) is neither separable nor identical with its mental states (caitta, 心所). The (eight) different projections of consciousness are also like this in interfacing with each other. This can only be understood through the sublime dialectical principle found on the greater track of spiritual awakening (Mahāyāna, 大乘) that is both transcendental and of this world.

The Arising of the First Six Evolving Manifestations of Consciousness

Question: Having described the mental states directly associated with the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness, how should one recognize the different stages of these manifestations?

Answer: On this, the fifteenth and sixteenth stanzas of verse say:

15a With dependence on primordial consciousness (mūla vijñāna, 根本識), the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañcā vijñāna, 五識) arise and are manifested (udbhava, 現), adapting to (yathā, 隨) the conditions at hand (pratyaya, 緣).

15b Sometimes they rise up and sometimes they do not (vijñānānām saha na, 或俱或不俱), just as the appearance of waves (taraṅgā, 濤波) depends on the conditions of the water (jala, 水).

16a The mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is without rest (sarvadā ādṛte, 常), ever arising and manifesting (saṃbhūtiḥ, 現起) through the making of mental associations (saṃjñika, 想), except in five special cases when it is either transcended or suspended (acittakāt, 無心). These five cases include:

1. The trance states of sentient existence (in its sphere of desire) that transcend mental associations (āsaṃjñi devaloka, 無想天),

16b 2. Penetrations of meditative resolve (on the objective reality of sentient existence in its sphere of form) that transcend mental associations (asaṃjñi samāpatti, 無想定),

3. Completely transcendent penetration of meditative resolve (nirodha samāpatti, 滅盡定) (in its sphere of existential principles that is beyond form),

4. Dreamless sleep (middha, 睡眠) as well as (api, 與)

5. Unconscious states (mūrchana, 悶絕).

15a 依止根本識，五識隨緣現， pañcānām mūla vijñāne yathā pratyayam udbhavaḥ

15b 或俱或不俱，如濤波依水。 vijñānānām saha na vā taraṅgānām yathā jale

16a 意識常現起，除生無想天， mano vijñāna saṃbhūtiḥ sarvadā saṃjñika ādṛte

16b 及無心二定，睡眠與悶絕。 samāpatti dvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

- The primordial consciousness* (mūla vijñāna, 根本識) here includes the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) because it is the root source from which all corrupted (afflicted) and pure (unafflicted) kinds of consciousness arise.
- With dependence on* (āśritya, 依止) here is a reference to the first six evolving manifestations of consciousness (ṣaḍ vijñāna, 六轉識) which all share this primordial consciousness as their immediate foundation of support.
- The five sensory kinds of consciousness* (pañcā vijñāna, 五識) is a reference to the first five evolving manifestations of consciousness - vision, hearing, taste, smell and touch. They are spoken of together because they are all in a similar category.

Kuṣī explains that they are all in a similar category because:

- They all depend on physical sense faculties (rūpa indriya, 色根)
- They similarly connect with physical sense objects (rūpa viśaya, 色境)
- They are only connected with that presently before them (pratyutpanna, 現在)
- They are all attained by direct perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量) rather than inference (anumāna, 比量)
- They are all subject to interruptions (sa antarāya, 有間斷)

- d. *Arise and are manifested, adapting to the conditions at hand:*
1. *Arise and are manifested* (udbhava, 現). This shows that they are impermanent, as all things that arise must also perish.
 2. *Adapting to the conditions at hand* (yatha pratyayaṃ, 隨緣) is a reference to the attention (manaskāra, 作意) of the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) being applied to the sense faculties, the sense objects and all the other aspects of consciousness (the seeds ripening in the subconscious, the deliberations and calculations of self-interest, etc.). This means that, in terms of the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañcā vijñāna, 五識), there is an internal dependence on the primordial consciousness (mūla vijñāna, 根本識) while the mind externally adapts its attention to the five sense faculties, the five sense objects and all the other aspects of consciousness, blending the many conditions together that are presented before it. Sometimes these conditions arise together at the same time and sometimes they do not, because the combining of external conditions can occur either gradually or suddenly. It is like how waves (taraṅgā, 濤波) can be great or small, many or few, depending on the conditions of the water (jala, 水). This analogy is explained in greater depth in The Scripture on Understanding the Deep Mystery (Saṃdhi Nirmocana Sūtra, 解深密經).
 - a. Because the imaginings (ākāra, 行相) of the five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are coarse, explicit and volatile, and the many conditions they depend on are often incomplete, sometimes all of them arise at the same time and other times only one or two arise.
 - b. Although the consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is also coarse, explicit and volatile, there are very few times that the conditions it depends on are absent. Because of this, the only time it does not arise is when there are conditions that actively prevent it.
 - c. The imaginings (ākāra, 行相) of the consciousness that deliberates & calculates self-interest (manas, 末那) and the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) are very subtle and the many conditions they depend on exist at all times because there are no conditions that can actively prevent their operation.

Furthermore:

1. The five sensory kinds of consciousness (pañca vijñāna, 五識) are incapable of deliberate thought by themselves. They only evolve externally and depend on the arising of the external conditions that are at hand in any given moment. Because of this, they are often interrupted and their manifest activities (samudācāra, 現行) are infrequent.
Kujī added: They are incapable of deliberate thought because:
 - a. They are without the capacities of seeking (vitarka, 尋) and discovery (vicāra, 伺).
 - b. They cannot arise by themselves because they depend on the inducement of another projection of consciousness (the mind that distinguishes imagined objects).
 - c. They only connect with material objects that are coarse and explicit.
2. The consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) is capable of deliberate thought by itself even without the five sensory kinds of consciousness, as it is endowed with the capacities of seeking (vitarka, 尋) and discovery (vicāra, 伺). It evolves both internally and externally but does not depend on many conditions to arise. There are only five situations in which it does not arise. Because of this, it is rarely interrupted and is usually arising and being manifested. For this reason, the fifteenth stanza is really speaking about this sixth projection of consciousness when it says that the first five “arise and are manifested, adapting to the conditions at hand.”