

On Realizing There is Only The Virtual Nature of Consciousness

Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi

成唯識論

Source text by Vasubandhu (天親)

Commentaries on it by Dharmapāla (護法) and others

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Dedicated to An Lạc

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On the Nature of Identity (ātma, 我) **& Purpose** (dharma, 法)

Those who believe in the existence of an external reality apart from consciousness ask:

“If there is only the virtual nature of consciousness, why do both worldly and holy teachings speak of there being the existence of identity and purpose?”

On this, the first one and a half of The Thirty Stanzas (Triṃśikā, 三十論頌) say:

1a Identity (ātma, 我) and purpose (dharma, 法) are hypothetical constructs that serve as metaphors (upacāra, 假說) and evolve (pravartate, 轉) as various kinds of mental images (vividha (nimitta), 種種相).

1b Through its permutations (pariṇāmaḥ, 所變), there are three ways (tridhā, 三) that consciousness (vijñāna, 識) is able to manifest them (pariṇāma isau, 能變).

2a These three are:

- 1. The different ripening seeds of the subconscious mind (vipāka, 異熟),**
- 2. The deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manana ākhyā, 思量), and**
- 3. Combining these two with (ca, 及) the virtual framing of consciousness through the distinguishing of imagined objects (vijñaptir viṣayasya, 別境識).**

1a 由假說我法，有種種相轉。 ātma dharma upacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate

1b 彼依識所變，此能變唯三。 vijñāna pariṇāma isau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā

2a 謂異熟思量，及了別境識。 vipāko manana ākhyaśca vijñaptir viṣayasya ca

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

1. Defining Identity & Purpose

Both worldly and holy teachings speak about the existence of identity and purpose, but these two are really without an existential nature of their own because they are only mental constructs hypothetically established (prajñapti, 假立) to serve as metaphors for the mind.

* *Identity* (ātman, 我) here refers to a self or a soul, an agent that serves as the lord or master over a life (īśvara, 主宰) and has control over its purpose and destiny.

* *Purpose* (dharma, 法) is the content or moral nature of this life, its role, duty or destiny.

2. Evolving as various kinds of mental images

In evolving, these two assume many different kinds of mental images (nimitta, 相).

- a. *Various mental images of identity* (vividha ātman, 我種種相) is a reference to the diversity of lives led by sentient beings, including those who are good, those who are evil and those who have entered the noble path such as stream-enterers (srotāpanna, 預流), once-returners (sakṛdāgāmin, 一來) and the like.¹²

- b. *Various mental images of purpose* (vividha dharma, 法種種相) refers to the diversity of content in these lives, including their virtues (guṇa, 德), their destiny producing actions (karmas, 諸業) as well as their five projections of purpose (skandha, 蘊), their twelve-fold alignment of subject & object (āyatana, 處) and their eighteen-fold sphere of sentient existence (dhātu, 界)¹.
- c. *Evolving* (pravartate, 轉) here is a reference to the different ways that identity and purpose adapt to the conditions at hand.
3. *On these evolving characteristics only being hypothetical constructs that serve as metaphors*
Question: If all of these different mental images are just hypothetical constructs that serve as metaphors or symbolic expressions (upacāra, 假說), what is the basis for their existence?
Answer: There are two theories about this.
 - a. *The thesis of Dharmapāla & Sthiramati:*
 There is a thesis that these mental images (nimitta, 相) are the hypothetical constructs (prajñapti, 假施設) that the evolving manifestations of consciousness (vijñāna pariṇāma, 識所轉變) depend on.
 1. *Consciousness* (vijñāna, 識) in the verse here is a reference to the virtual nature that frames perception (vijñapti, 了別). This also involves its mental states (caitta, 心所), including its emotional feelings, mental associations and other motive forces, because they are directly associated with it.
 2. *Permutations, or evolving manifestations* (pariṇāma, 變), is a reference to the nature of consciousness that produces the simulations (pratibhāsa, 似) of identity and purpose. It is essentially divided into two parts:
 - a. The imager (darśana bhāga, 見分) - its subjective aspect
 - b. That which is imagined (nimitta bhāga, 相分) - its objective aspect
 These two arise because they are the basis of self-awareness (sva saṃvedana or sva saṃvitti, 自證). Consciousness depends on them to construct and establish identity and purpose because, apart from these subjective and objective aspects, it would have no foundation of support (āśraya, 所依).
 - b. *The thesis of Nanda, Bandhuśrī and others:*
 Some say that the inner evolving consciousness creates simulations (pratibhāsa, 似) that appear as external objects through the power of conditioning or 'perfuming' (vāsa, 熏習) the mind with speculations (vikalpa, 分別) about identity and purpose. When these speculations arise as the permutations of consciousness, they simulate the existence of real identity and purpose. Although these mental images arise within consciousness, because of their simulation through the power of speculation they appear to be external objects. This is why, since the very beginning of time, sentient beings of all kinds have mistakenly held that identity and purpose really exist apart from consciousness.
4. *The Analogy with Dreams* (svapna, 患夢):
 This can be compared to those who have dreams. Because of dreams, the mind creates mental images (nimitta, 相), objects that seem to be external to it and are incorrectly held to really exist as such.
5. *Identity & purpose just being hypothetical constructs of the mind rather than having a real existence of their own:*
 That which the ignorant imagine to be identity and purpose does not have a real existence (dravyasat, 實有)² that can be found anywhere. Because they are just hypothetical constructs

(prajñāpti, 施設)² based on the illusions of sentient existence, they are said to be metaphors (upacāra, 假說). Although these permutations arise from within consciousness, they are just simulations of identity and purpose that do not have a real existential nature of their own. For this reason, the verse says that they are metaphors. Because these illusions are only imagined (kalpita, 計所) to be external objects, they are really just mental constructs and do not really exist like consciousness itself. Because of the existential nature of the inner mind that relies on the arising of an 'other' (paratantra svabhāva, 依他起自性) in the conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣)¹⁴, it is never without these objects. And so one can reject two of the false contentions cited before:

1. The one that claims external objects have a real existence of their own apart from the mind, as held by The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部)
2. The one that claims consciousness is not real, as held by followers of Bhāvaviveka (清辯) and others of the Dialectical School (Madhyamaka, 中性教).

Kuīji added: Because of this, inner consciousness is not without a real existential nature while the existence of identities and purposes outside the mind are without this reality. This is the means for dismissing:

- * Attachments to objects that are falsely imagined to really exist apart from the mind
- * False and exaggerated beliefs about the nature of emptiness.

This is dismissing views of consciousness that either underestimate or overestimate the nature of emptiness (śūnyatā, 空). Free from attachments to both emptiness and existence, there is only the virtual nature of consciousness (vijñāpti matratā, 唯識性). In forever letting go of the real existence of the ever-revolving wheel of death & rebirth (cyuty upapāda cakra, 輪迴生死) that is external to the mind and being aware of this virtual nature in each and every thought, there is proper establishment of the dialectical principle of the middle way (madhyamā pratipad, 中道理).

- * Because external objects are just mental constructs, they only exist as the hypothetical (conventional) understandings of this world.
- * Because the inner consciousness is the foundation of support on which these mental constructs depend as objects, they can also be said to have a real, meaningful existence.

Question: How does one know that there really are no external objects and there is only an inner consciousness from which these external objects arise as simulations?

Answer: Because the real existence of identity and purpose are impossible to prove beyond any doubt.

This dismissal of the real existence of identity and purpose will now be explained in two parts:

1. Dismissing false attachments to identity
2. Dismissing false attachments to purpose

On Attachment to Identity (ātma grāha, 執我)

Question: Why is it impossible to prove the reality of identity beyond any doubt?

Answer: On this, we will examine beliefs in the existence of an eternal soul (ātman, 我) and the identity of a self as the aggregated projections of its purpose (dharma skandha, 法蘊).

1. **Attachment to beliefs about the real existence of an identity (ātma dr̥ṣṭi, 我見) in an eternal soul** (puruṣa or ātman, 我) - there are three theories about this:
 - a. That the existential nature of a soul is eternal, omnipresent and its size is great like that of empty space, because its actions (karma, 業) and its consequential experiences of suffering and contentment occur everywhere, at all times and in all places.
Kuīji added: This was the position of Kapila (迦毘羅) & The Numerological School (Sāṃkhyavāda, 數論), Kaṇāda (蹉尼陀) and The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) as well as others.
 - b. Although the existential nature of this soul is eternal, the size of its life can be great or small because it can expand or contract.

Kuṇḍī added: This was the position of Jñātiputra (若提子), also called Mahāvīra, (大雄), & The School on Victory Over or Freedom From the Fetters of Karma (Jainas, 闍伊那 or Nirgranthas, 尼犍陀).

- c. Although the existential nature of the soul within a life is eternal, it is infinitesimal, like a single atom that is hidden deeply within it, creating its actions and consequences.

Kuṇḍī added: This was the belief of ascetic worshipers of Śiva from the School on Worship of a God Within (Pāśupata Śaivas, 播輪鉢多 or 獸主), various wandering ascetics (Parivrājakas, 般利伐羅句迦) and others.

Refutation of these beliefs about the identity of an eternal soul

- a. *The first position (that the soul is eternal and omnipresent)* is logically flawed because:

1. If the existential nature of a soul is eternal, omnipresent and the size of empty space, it should not experience suffering and contentment in accordance with the life of an individual.
2. In being eternal and omnipresent, it should be without any change or movement. If it is without any change or movement, how could it create actions that have consequences in accordance with the life of an individual?
3. And is this eternal and omnipresent soul different in each life or the same in all?
 - a. *If the soul is said to be the same in all*, when one creates actions that will have consequences (karmas, 諸業), they should be created in all lives. When one experiences the consequences of actions, they should be experienced by all. When one attains emancipation from actions with consequences, this deliverance should be attained by all. All these ideas are quite mistaken.
 - b. *If the soul of each is said to be different but they are still characterized by omnipresence*, the souls of all sentient beings should pervade one other and the existential nature of each should still be blended together with all the others. Further:
 1. Since they are all in the same place, when one soul creates *actions that have consequences*, these actions and consequences should be no different from those of all souls.
 2. It would be just as illogical to claim that the *consequences experienced* from the actions made are different for each if they are all omnipresent. With the consequences being experienced together by all souls in the same place, how could they belong to one but not the others?
 3. With one soul *attaining emancipation from actions and their consequences*, they all should do so because, in the cultivation and realization of the nature of life's purpose, all souls would be combined together as one.

- b. *The second position (that the soul can vary in size)* is also illogical because:

1. If the existential nature of a soul is eternally abiding, it should not expand and contract in accordance with the life it is in. If it expanded and contracted like the air in a balloon (literally, here, a bellows), it would not remain eternal and unchanging.
2. And if it could expand and contract in accordance with the life it is in, it should be divisible. How could one then hold that the existential nature of souls was eternal or ever one and the same?

As a consequence, this assertion about the existence of an eternal soul is simplistic.

- c. *The last position (that the soul is infinitesimal like an atom)* is also illogical because:

1. If the existential nature of an identity or soul is infinitesimal like a single atom, how could it stir a much greater body into motion?
2. If it is asserted that, despite its small size, it can quickly move about in a body like a vortex of spiritual fire (alāta cakra or cakra brahmi, 旋火輪) that seems to pervade all of it, one would hold that the soul is not always the same because, in coming and going like this, it would not be eternal or ever one and the same.

2. *Attachment to beliefs about the reality of self-centered existence (ātma dr̥ṣṭi, 我見) as the projections of its purpose (dharma skandha, 法蘊):* There are three ways the identity of a self or soul is held to be the same as the projections of its purpose (skandha, 蘊)¹.

a. It is identical with these projections.

Kuījī added: This was the position held by some Buddhist schools who believed in the enduring existence of a soul, a self-centered existence or a personality (Pudgalavāda, 補特伽羅論者).

b. It is different from them.

Kuījī added: This was the position of The Numerological School (Sāṅkhyavāda, 數論) and others.

c. It is neither identical with nor different from them.

Kuījī added: This was the position ultimately arrived at by the followers of Vatsa (Vātsīputrīya, 犢子部) as well as The School on the Proper Measure Between Identity & Purpose (Saṃmitīya, 正量部).

Specifically disproving any real existence of identity as a projection of its purpose apart from the mind

a. The position that an identity is the same as the projections of its purposes is illogical because:

1. If identity was identical with these projections, it would not always be the same (as these projections are forever-changing).
2. In terms of the projections of physical form (rūpa skandha, 色蘊), internal forms (sense faculties) cannot be one's real identity because they are only external matter, configurations of physical substance (mūrta, 有質礙) taking up space and divisible.
3. In terms of the four projections of the mind (citta, 心) & its mental states (caitta, 心所), that is, consciousness (vijñāna, 識) with its emotional feelings (vedanā, 受), mental associations (saṃjñā, 想) and the other motive forces that are directly associated with it (saṃprayukta saṃskāra, 相應行); These also cannot be one's real identity because they are ever-changing in accordance with conditions at hand and they are not continuous without interruption.
4. Motive forces not directly associated with the mind (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行) and unexpressed thought forms (avijñapti rūpa, 無表色) cannot be one's real identity because, like empty space, they are themselves without any nature of awareness.

b. The second position, that an identity is different from its projections, is also illogical.

If identity is separable from its projections, it should then not be able to make actions or experience the consequences that arise from them, just like empty space.

c. The third position, that an identity is both the same as and different from its projections, or that it is neither the same as nor different from its projections, is also illogical because first it allows identity to be based on these projections but then it says that it is neither identical to nor different from them. In this case, identity could not really exist on its own. It is like how a vase is really only the clay it consists of but its existence as a 'vase' is only in the eyes of the beholder or the use to which it can be put. This way, first it is both clay and a vase, but then it is neither the clay nor really apart from the clay from which it is made.

It is also impossible to say whether identity is conditional, that is, a result of cause and effect, or if it is unconditional and so beyond cause and effect. Because of this, it cannot be conclusively proven to have a real existence this way either.

Generally disproving the real existence of an identity apart from consciousness

a. Refuting those who believe in the real existence of an abstract, external reality that is apart from the mind (Tīrthikas, 外道):

1. For those who maintain that the identity of a self or soul has a real existence of its own apart from consciousness, there is the question of *whether or not it is endowed with a free will (cetanā, 思慮)*.

- a. If it is, it would not be eternal because it cannot exercise this free will forever.
- b. If it is not, like empty space it would not be able to make actions (karma, 業) and then experience their consequences.

Therefore, the real existence of identity cannot be proven conclusively from either of these positions.

- 2. And for those who maintain that the identity of a self or soul has a real existence of its own apart from consciousness, there is also the question or *whether or not it performs a specific function* (kriyā, 作用).
 - a. If it does, it would be like the hands or feet and so it would not always be needed.
 - b. If it does not, it would be purely imaginary and hypothetical like the horns of rabbits, the hairs of turtles or blossoms in the sky, etc.

The real existence of this identity cannot be proven conclusively this way either.

Consequently, the identity of a self or soul cannot be conclusively proven to have a real existence apart from consciousness through any of these methods.

- b. *Refutation of beliefs about identity from those Buddhist schools that emphasize the lesser track of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level* (Hīnayāna, 餘乘): And do those that hold the nature of identity to really exist (Pudgalavādins, 補特伽羅論者) perceive the same object (ālambana, 所緣) as those with self-centered beliefs (ātma dṛṣṭi, 我見)?
 - 1. If they do, how can they say that it is real?
 - 2. If not, there should be a belief in self-centered existence that is not a distortion (viparyāsa, 顛倒) of transcendental reality because knowledge of it would need to be in accordance with this reality. If there is such a self, why do those who maintain there is a real existential nature of identity also have faith in the idealistic teachings about life's greater purpose that denounce self-centered beliefs (ātma dṛṣṭi, 我見) and praise selflessness (anātman, 無我), saying that those with selfless beliefs will be able to realize spiritual freedom (nirvāṇa, 涅槃) and those clinging to self-centered beliefs will sink into the never ending rounds of suffering along the stream of life and death (saṃsāra, 生死)? How could those with false views (mithyā dṛṣṭi, 邪見) about the nature of life's transcendental purpose realize spiritual freedom and how could those with proper vision of this purpose be caused to sink into these rounds of life and death by believing in the real existential nature of identity?
 - 3. Furthermore:
 - a. Self-centered beliefs (ātma dṛṣṭi, 我見) are not actually connected with the real existence of an identity because the object (ālambana, 所緣) before one mind is really just the same as that perceived before any other.
 - b. The objects of self-centered beliefs are definitely without a real identity because they are just manifestations of the projections (skandhas, 諸蘊) that arise from within consciousness.

These are among the different kinds of illusions that arise from the nature of sentient existence and they are all in accordance with its imagination.

3. *Subduing & Severing These Attachments to Identity* (ātma grāha vibhāga, 我執伏斷)

In summarizing the attachments to identity (ātma grāha, 我執), there are two kinds:

- a. Attachments that are innate (sahaja, 俱生)
- b. Attachments that are speculations of the imagination (vikalpa, 分別)
 - a. *Attachments to identity that are innate* (sahaja, 俱生): Since the beginning of time, the inner lives of sentient beings have been constantly conditioned ('perfumed') with illusions

about the real existence of identity. These are spontaneous and evolve without any need for false teachings from others or any false speculations of one's own about them. Because of this, these attachments are said to be innate. They are of two kinds:

1. *Innate attachments to identity that are continuous & uninterrupted* (saṃtāna, 常相續): These attachments are found in the seventh projection of consciousness, the mind that deliberates and calculates self-interest (manas, 末那). In connecting with the eighth, the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識), it brings about mental images of identity that are held to be real.
2. *Innate attachments to identity that are transient & subject to interruption* (sa antarāya, 有間斷): These attachments are found in the sixth projection of consciousness, the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識). In connecting with the manifestations of consciousness (vijñāna pariṇāma, 識變), there are attachments to mental images of the five projections of one's own purpose (pañca upadāna skandha, 五取蘊), as described before. Sometimes there is connection with all of these projections generally and sometimes there is just connection with specific ones. Upon bringing about mental images (nimitta, 相) of them in the mind, they are held to be one's real identity.

Both of these innate attachments to identity are subtle and difficult to sever. After repeated training in meditation on the empty nature of one's very life (jāta śūnyatā, 生空) during cultivation of the noble path (bhāvanā mārga, 修道), one perfects an ability to eliminate and transcend these innate attachments.

- b. *Attachments to identity that are speculations of the imagination* (vikalpa, 分別): These are not due to the innate attachments to one's very life but rather to the influence of external conditions that are occurring before one at any given moment. Because they depend on false teachings from others and one's own false speculations that arise afterwards, they are said to arise from the imagination. Only found in the consciousness that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識), they are also of two kinds:
 1. *Speculative attachments to identity that arise from false teachings about the projections of purpose* (skandha, 蘊): This is bringing about their mental images and holding them to be one's real identity through speculations of the imagination.
 2. *Speculative attachments to identity that arise from false teachings about identity* (ātma, 我): This is bringing about mental images of them and holding them to be one's real identity through speculations of the imagination.

Both of these speculative attachments to identity are explicit and so easier to sever than innate attachments. When one attains a vision of the noble path (darśana mārga, 見道) and begins to observe the transcendental nature of reality (tathatā, 真如) and the empty nature of all things that arise and perish (sarva utpatti śūnyatā, 一切法生空), one is able to eliminate and transcend these attachments.

4. *A general conclusion about attachment to identity:*

Although it is said that, in some cases, clinging to identity arises in one's own mind due to external projections of purpose, in all cases it can be said that it arises due to the inner projections arising from one's own mind. Therefore, all clinging to identity is connected with the impermanent projections of purpose (skandha, 蘊) as objects and falsely clinging to them having a real independent identity (ātman, 我). In reality, because the mental images of these projections arise as conditions of the mind (pratyaṃ, 緣) that are like magical illusions and because false attachments to them as one's identity are only imagined, it is determined

that this identity does not really exist apart from consciousness. And so the scriptures say: “Monks should understand that beliefs about the reality of one’s self-centered existence (satkāya dr̥ṣṭi, 我見) are held by those of this world (laukika, 世間), worshipers of a creator (brahmins, 婆羅門) and ascetics (śrāmaṇas, 沙門) and they all arise due to attachments to the five projections of their purpose (pañca upadāna skanda, 五取蘊).”

Question: If the identity of a self or soul does not have a real existence, how can there be such things as recollection, memory, learning, the holding of gratitude, grudges, etc.?

Answer: If one holds that identity is eternal and unchanging, its past should be the same as its future and these things (recollection, memory, etc.) which did not exist in the past, could not exist in the future. Conversely, with its past being the same as its future, those things (recollection, memory, etc.) that will exist in the future must have already existed in the past. This is because there would be no difference between the past and the future for the existential nature of an eternal soul or self. It would be just as illogical if one claimed that the function (kriyā, 用) of identity changed from the past to the future but its existential nature (svabhāva, 體) did not because:

- * If it is unchanging and permanent, its function would be inseparable from its existential nature.
- * If it is changing and impermanent, its function would be separable from its existential nature.

In fact, sentient beings are each endowed with a primordial consciousness (mūla vijñāna, 本識) which evolves into a consistent and continuous series holding onto and maintaining the seeds of conscious purposes as a subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識). With all of these conscious purposes interacting with the subconscious mind in conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣), the subconscious is influenced through the power of conditioning or ‘perfuming’ (vāsa, 熏習) so that there is the attainment of such things as memory, recollection, and the like. This allows for a solution to the problem found in your thesis about memory, recollection and the like being rooted in identity.

Question: If identity does not have a real existence of its own apart from consciousness, who is it that is able to create actions and then experience the consequences?

Answer: In clinging to an identity that is eternal and unchanging like empty space, how could it be able to create actions and then experience their consequences? If it is changeable, it should be impermanent. In fact, because of the conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣), the subconscious mind and mental states of sentient beings interact with their conscious purposes in a continuous series without interruption, creating actions and then experiencing the consequences. This explanation is not in contradiction with logical reasoning.

Question: If the identity of a self or soul does not have such a real existential nature, who is it that goes from one destiny (gati, 趣) to the next during the endless cycles of life & death (saṃsāra, 生死) and who is it that becomes disgusted with its sufferings and seeks the destiny of spiritual freedom (nirvāṇa, 涅槃)?

Answer: In clinging to the real existence of a self or soul that neither arises nor perishes, how can one speak of it going from one destiny to the next during such cycles of life & death? In being eternal like empty space, it cannot be not tormented by suffering, so how can it possibly be disgusted by it, renounce it or seek spiritual freedom from it? As a consequence, all of these arguments in defense of an eternal self ultimately end up working against its real existence. In fact, sentient beings have a continuity of

body and mind that goes from one destiny to the next during the cycles of life and death through the power of emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱)⁷ and their consequence-producing actions (karma, 業). In having disgust for suffering, they do seek the destiny of spiritual freedom. Because of this, one should understand that there definitely is no real identity of self but only the different projections of consciousness which have continuously followed one another in a succession of causes and effects since the very beginning of time. Because of perfuming with illusions through the conditioning (vāsa, 熏習) of the subconscious mind, they manifest mental images of identity (ātma nimitta, 我相). Those who are ignorant cling to this identity being endowed with a real existence apart from consciousness.

On Attachment to Purpose (dharma grāha, 法執)

Question: How can it be that purposes do not have a real existence outside of consciousness?

Answer: It is because that held to exist by non-Buddhist schools (Tīrthikas, 外道) teaching of an abstract, external reality and Buddhist schools teaching of only attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level (Hīnayāna, 餘乘) logically cannot have a real existence on their own apart from consciousness.

Question: Why don't they really exist apart from the mind?

Answer: First we will explain the logical fallacies of non-Buddhist schools who teach of the existence of an abstract, external reality and then those of Buddhist schools who only teach of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level:

1. The beliefs of non-Buddhists (Tīrthikas, 外道) in the real existence of an abstract, external reality apart from consciousness:

This refutation of non-Buddhist beliefs was largely made in chapter four of 'The Flame of Logical Reasoning' (Tarka Jvala), a commentary by Bhāvaviveka (清辯) of the Dialectical School (Madhyamaka) on his own 'Heart of the Dialectic' (Madhyama Hṛdaya Karikā) in the sixth century. It was not contended that these various beliefs were of no soteriological value, only that they were logically flawed theories about the transcendental nature of life's purpose and that clinging to them as ontological realities rather than just mental speculations leads to cognitive dissonance about this nature. The truth is that this transcendental nature can only be comprehended by understanding one's own inner mind. These schools of thought will be divided into six categories:

- The Numerological School (Sāṃkhyavāda, 數論)
- The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗)
- Theistic Schools
- Monists & Monotheists
- The School of Profound Reflection on Holy Words Through Their Proper Ritual Expression (Mīmāṃsā, 聲論)
- The Schools of Materialism & Naturalism (Lokāyatikas, 路迦耶底迦 & Cārvākas, 順世)

In conclusion, there is a general refutation of all these beliefs.

a. On the metaphysical principles of Kapila (迦毘羅) & The Numerological School

(Sāṃkhyā Vāda, 數論):

The Numerological School (Sāṃkhyā, 數論) is one of the six Hindu schools (Ṣaḍ Darśana, 六派哲學) considered orthodox (āstika, 正統派), related to the orthodox School of Unification (Yoga, 瑜伽) of Patañjali. It is a system of metaphysics that espouses the existence of first causes (pradhana, 勝) apart from the mind. Numerologically:

- #1 First there is the unity of the universal soul
- #2 Then there is the duality between the soul and the nature of the material world.
- #3 Then there is their interaction as the trinity causing the manifestations of its derived states.
- #4 Then there are the four categories of manifestation that are derived.
- #5 Then there are the five levels of manifestation in each of the four categories.

Through freedom from duality and its resultant multiplicities, the soul is restored to its original unity.

1. On the existence of first causes apart from consciousness:

The Numerological School espouses the existence of #1 a universal, omnipresent and eternal soul (puruṣa, 神我), an originally and ultimately transcendent agent of free will (cetanā, 思) that accepts and employs ('enjoys' - bhokṭṛ, 受用) #2 the nature of the material universe (prakṛti, 性). This was seen as being the fundamental duality of life.

a. *This nature of the material universe is composed of three spiritual qualities (tri guṇa, 三德):*

1. *Essential being* (sattva, 薩埵) is the most subtle, corresponding with the light from the firmament of heaven above (svaḥ). It is the quality of harmony and freedom that is endowed with the bliss of serene illumination (prakāśa, 寂照). Like the surface of a completely still body of pure water, it acts as a mirror with perfect clarity, with all reflections being integrated and radiating in unison. In terms of the other two, essential being is the harmony of freedom between interaction (rajas) & the inertia of position (tamas).
2. *The interaction of dualities* (rajas, 刺闍) corresponds with the atmospheres and oceans (bhuvah) between heaven and earth: Literally the 'turbulence of dust', it is the adulterated state in which the dusts of impurity are stirred up by turbulence of thought, emotion and desire and driven by the motive forces of their own interests, like the different meanderings found within a crowd. It causes the waves of motion (kriyā, 作) that distort the clear mirror of illumination. In terms of the other two, it is the interaction between the harmony of freedom (sattva) and inertia of position (tamas).
3. *The inertia of mass* (tamas, 答摩) is the most coarse, corresponding with the darkness of the earth below (bhuḥ): Literally the 'darkness of ignorance', it is the state of blindness, the numb state of heaviness and dullness attached to self-interest in which hunger, brutality & suffering predominate. It consists of entities dwelling in fixed positions (sthiti, 住), resulting in a state of disintegration through which each prisoner is trapped within a cell of its own device. In terms of the other two, it is the inertia of position between harmony of freedom (sattva) and interaction (rajas).

b. *The three spiritual qualities are manifested as twenty-three derived states (vikāra, 轉異):*

Through the involvement of #1 this universal soul (puruṣa, 神我) that is transcendent and beyond any qualities with #2 the nature of the material universe (prakṛti, 性), these three qualities (guṇa, 求那) evolve into #3 - #25 twenty-three derived states (vikāra, 轉異) that are the different manifestations of this fundamental duality between the universal soul and the nature of the material universe:

The three-fold internal causality (antaḥkaraṇa, 內作因) is the most subtle:

- #3 Awareness of the greater purpose of life (buddhi or mahat, 大覺), the most subtle of the subtle, centered at the crown of the head
- #4 Awareness of one's own purpose (ahamkāra, 自覺), the next subtlest, centered between the brows, as the so-called 'third eye'
- #5 The deliberations & calculations of the thinking mind (manas, 意) in the lower brain and central nervous system; this is the most explicit of these three, mediating between the first two and the final twenty derived states

The final twenty derived states are in four categories, each with five manifested states, and with each respectively corresponding with the autonomic nervous system and its five psycho-somatic centers (cakras, 輪) of the body: the throat (the subtlest), heart, gut, pubic area & base of the spine (the coarsest):

1. The ten internal faculties (āntara tattva, 內諦):

- a. The five sense organs (jñānendriya 五知根) from #6 the subtlest to #10 the coarsest:
 - #6 The ears (śrotra, 耳): The capacity for hearing
 - #7 The skin (tvak, 皮): The capacity for touch
 - #8 The eyes (cakṣuḥ, 眼): The capacity for vision
 - #9 The tongue (jihvā, 舌): The capacity for taste
 - #10 The nose (ghrāṇa, 鼻): The capacity for smell
- b. The five motor organs of action (karmendriya 五作根) from #11 the subtlest to #15 the coarsest:
 - #11 The organs of speech (vāk, 聲): The capacity for verbal expression (centered at the throat)
 - #12 The hands (pāṇi, 手): The capacity for contact & manipulation (centered at the heart)
 - #13 The feet (pāda, 足): The capacity for locomotion, led by the eyes (centered at the gut)
 - #14 The genitals (upastha, 生殖器): The capacity for procreation (centered at the genitalia)

- #15 The anus (pāyu, 非泄器); The capacity for digestion & elimination (centered at the rectum)
2. The ten external elemental forces (bāhya tattva, 外諦)
- The five subtle elemental principles (tanmātra, 五唯) from #16 the subtlest to #20 the coarsest:
 - #16 Audible sounds (śabda, 音): That heard
 - #17 Physical contacts (spraṣṭavya, 觸): That felt
 - #18 Visible forms (rūpa, 色): That seen
 - #19 Flavors (rasa, 味): That tasted
 - #20 Aromas (gandha, 香): That smelled
 - The five explicit elemental forces (mahā bhūta 五大) from #21 the subtlest to #25 the coarsest:
 - #21 Space (ākāśa, 空): The ether, emptiness
 - #22 Wind (vāyu, 風): Motion, turbulence
 - #23 Fire (agni, 火), The radiation of light and heat
 - #24 Water (apaṇ, 水): Fluidity, liquidity
 - #25 Earth (pṛthivī, 地): Solidity, density

With the freedom or separation (kaivalya, 絕對獨存) of this universal soul (puruṣa, 神我) from the nature of the material universe (prakṛti, 性) there is its emancipation (mokṣa, 解脫) from rebirth.

This Numerological School (Sāṃkhyavāda, 數論) holds the following beliefs about these derived states (vikāra, 轉異) that result from union of the soul (puruṣa, 神我) with the nature of the material universe (prakṛti, 性):

- They are all only composed of different combinations of its three spiritual qualities (guṇa, 德).
- Like them, they are all said to have a real existence (dravyasat, 實有) apart from the mind. They are not just hypothetical (aprajñaptisat, 非假有).
- They may all be known through direct perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量).

2. Disproving the idea of these having a real existential nature apart from consciousness:

These beliefs are logically flawed in a variety of ways.

- With regards to the twenty-three derived states (vikāra, 轉異):
 - If the different derived states consist only of these three spiritual qualities, they are but a sum of their parts, like an army composed of men or a forest composed of trees. Consisting only of these three qualities, these derived states should not be considered to have a real existential nature of their own but rather just be hypothetical combinations of them. With this being the case, how can they be said to be known through direct perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量)?
 - But if each of these derived states has a real existential nature on its own, they should each have their own unique nature and not just be composed of the three different spiritual qualities, as they are said to be.
- With regards to the three spiritual qualities (guṇa, 求那):
 - The three spiritual qualities are said to be identical with the twenty-three derived states because these states are each said to only be composed of them. With this being so, like the derived states, these three qualities must be impermanent rather than eternal, as they are then ever evolving and subject to change.
 - And with each of these three spiritual qualities being said to have the functions of all of these multiple derived states, their existential natures should also be multiple, since these functions and natures should really be one and the same.
 - With the natures of these three spiritual qualities being found in all of these twenty-three derived states, when they are transformed into any one of them, they should also be transformed into all the others because these natures are said to be no different in them.

4. In allowing that the natures and the characteristics of these three spiritual qualities are each distinct and different from each other, how can they be combined together to become these derived states that each have a uniquely distinct characteristic? These three should not be transformed into these twenty-three uniquely distinct characteristics when being combined if their natures are not different from what they were prior to being combined.
5. If one claims that the natures of these three spiritual qualities are different but they become uniquely distinct characteristics upon being combined together into these twenty-three derived states, it would contradict the thesis of this school that the existential natures of these three different spiritual qualities are identical with their characteristics.
 - a. The distinct characteristics of these derived states should be just like the three spiritual qualities instead of being combined into characteristics that are each uniquely distinct from one another.
 - b. These three spiritual qualities should be just like the uniquely distinct characteristics of these derived states, but instead they are said to manifest these three different qualities.

And so the three spiritual qualities are said to not be the same upon being combined into the uniquely distinct characteristics found in the twenty-three derived states.

- c. *With regards to the combining of these three spiritual qualities & twenty-three derived states:*
 1. The three spiritual qualities are different while the derived states are each said to have a uniquely distinct characteristic. With them being both different and unique at the same time, they should not be only unique or only three-fold.
 - a. If these three were not combined into a uniquely distinct characteristic when transformed into one of these derived states, they would just remain as they were before being transformed (as three different qualities). How could they then each be manifested as a single, unique compound like, say, visible form?
 - b. If these three are combined into a uniquely distinct characteristic, they should lose their three original characteristics and natures that are different.
 2. It cannot be said that each of the three spiritual qualities has two natures, one in uniquely distinct compounds and another as one of the three different qualities.
 - a. If the derived states are uniquely distinct but identical with the three different spiritual qualities, they should also have three uniquely distinct characteristics. How could they then each be seen as being part of a single unique compound?
 - b. If it is claimed that the nature of each of these three spiritual qualities has the characteristics of all three but that through being combined into derived states they are seen as only having a single unique characteristic because it becomes too difficult to recognize the differences between the three, we respond that:
 1. If they only have the characteristics of each of the three spiritual qualities, how can these derived states be seen as having unique characteristics?
 2. If not, how can these three different qualities be recognized in them?
 3. If each of the three spiritual qualities is endowed with the characteristics of all three, each of them should be able to be transformed into visible form or any one of the other derived states. What further need would there be for combining with the other two to create these derived states?
 4. If the natures of each were identical with the characteristics of all three, the natures of each of these three spiritual qualities would also be three-fold (making for nine).

5. Since all the derived states are said to only be composed of these three qualities, upon interacting there should be no further distinctions among them. Consequently, there should be no differences found between:

- * Cause (awareness of a greater purpose - buddhi or mahat, 大覺) & Effect (awareness of one's own purpose - ahamkāra, 自覺),
- * The five subtle elemental forces (tanmātra, 五唯量) & The five explicit elemental forces (mahā bhūta 五大)
- * The five sense organs that perceive objects (jñānendriya 五知根) & The five motor organs that create actions (karmendriya 五作根).

If this were so, each of the sense organs should perceive all of the sense objects (the eyes should perceive sounds, etc.). Some would say that each sense object should therefore be perceived by all of the sense organs and there should also be no difference between sentient and insentient beings, that which is pure and that which is corrupted, direct perception and perception through inference, etc., etc. All of these conclusions are obviously very mistaken!

3. Conclusion: None of the qualities or derived states really exist apart from consciousness:
The purposes which The Numerological School (Sāṃkhyavāda, 數論) holds as having a real existential nature apart from the mind do not really do so. They are only flawed speculations about what they imagine to really exist.

b. On the ontological principles of Kaṇāda (塞尼陀) & The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗):

One of the six orthodox Hindu schools, related to the orthodox School on Logical Reasoning (Naiyāyika, 如理), it is an ontological system that posits the existence of categories of meaning (padārtha, 句義) apart from the mind which serve as the foundation for the relationship between language and thought (linguistics).

1. On the categories of words with meaning (padārtha, 句義)

The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) holds that there are six categories of 'words with meaning' (padārtha, 句義) defining reality and that these timeless categories have the nature of real existence apart from consciousness. The first three of these six categories (#1 things with actual substance, #2 the qualities (guṇa, 德) of things or actions & #3 actions with consequences) contain realities that are said to be ascertained through direct perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量).

#1 Things with actual substance (dravya, 實), for which there are nouns:

- a. The elemental forces (bhūta, 大) directly perceived through the senses (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量)
 1. Space (ākāśa, 空), Ether, voidness, emptiness
 2. Wind (vāyu, 風): Motion, turbulence
 3. Fire (tejas, 火), The radiation of light and heat
 4. Water (apah, 水): Fluidity, liquidity
 5. Earth (pṛthivī, 地): Solidity, density
- b. Those indirectly perceived (abhūta, 無物) through inference (anumāna pramāṇa, 比量)
 6. Location in time (kāla, 時)
 7. Location in space (dik, 方)
 8. Identity; self or soul (ātman, 我)
 9. The thinking mind (manas, 意)

#2 The qualities (guṇa, 德) of things or actions for which there are adjectives or adverbs -

The original seventeen qualities of Kaṇāda are:

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Visible form (rūpa, 色) | 2. Flavor (rasa, 味) | 3. Odor (gandha, 香) |
| 4. Physical contact (spraṣṭavya, 觸) | 5. Number (saṃkhyā, 數) | 6. Size (parimāṇa, 形量) |
| 7. Difference (pṛthaktva, 別異) | 8. Association (saṃyoga, 相應) | 9. Separation (vibhāga, 離) |
| 10. Distance (paratva, 遠) | 11. Proximity (aparatva, 近) | 12. Awareness (buddhi, 覺) |
| 13. Contentment (sukha, 樂) | 14. Suffering (duḥkha, 苦) | 15. Attraction (icchā, 愛欲) |
| 16. Aversion (dveṣa, 瞋) | 17. Potency (prayatna, 功用). | |

To these Praśastapāda added seven: audible sound (śabda, 音), weight (gurutva, 重), flow (dravatva, 濕), viscosity (sneha, 潤澤), motive force (saṁskāra, 行), morality (dharma, 法) & amorality (adharma, 無法).

- #3 Actions with consequences (karmas, 諸業), for which there are verbs: Qualities (guṇas) & actions (karmas) have no separate existence, belonging to the actual things (dravya) to which they are connected. While qualities are permanent features of actual things, actions are transient ones. Although empty space (ākāśa, 空), time (kāla, 時), place (dik, 方) and identity (ātman, 我) are things, they are by themselves devoid of action.

The next three are known through direct judgment (adhyavasāya, 解) & inference (anumāna pramāṇa 比量).

- #4 Distinct characteristics unique to each (viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, 勝相); In perceiving the differences between things, their distinct characteristics are identified. There are as many such distinctions between things as there are atoms in the universe. These distinct characteristics are perceived through direct judgments (adhyavasāya, 解).

- #5 Universal characteristics common to all (sāmānya lakṣaṇa, 共相); Since there are many things, there are many properties among them. When these properties are found to be common to many things, there is the identification of their characteristics that are shared and indirectly perceived through inference (anumāna pramāṇa 比量).

- #6 Inherent connectivity (samavāya, 衆緣和合), for which there are conjunctions, prepositions, etc. These define relationships; Kaṇāda defined this as the relation of cause & effect (logic). Praśastapāda defined it as the seamless and inseparable relationship between things, like a container & that which it contains. These relationships are not directly perceivable but inferred as the inseparable connections between things.

Later Vaiśeṣika exponents (Śrīdhara, Udayana, Śivāditya, etc.) added a seventh category:

- #7 Absence, or non-existence (asattā, 非有) as opposed to those that are distinguished as having the nature of existence (satta, 有).

2. Disproving the logical flaws in a real existence of these defining categories apart from the mind:

This scheme has various logical flaws.

- a. Regarding the categories of meaning (padārtha, 句義) generally:

1. If they are eternally existing (like the atoms in their system):

- If these eternal categories are able to produce any consequences (such as being combined with other categories), then they should be impermanent because that which is eternal does not have such a function of changing.
- If they do not produce such consequences, they should not have any real existential nature apart from consciousness. They should just be hypothetical constructs, like the horns of rabbits and hairs of turtles, etc.

2. If they are not eternal (like the physical mass formed by the combination of atoms in their system):

- If they have a material existence as things that occupy space, then they must be divisible. Like an army that consists of men or a forest that consists of trees, they would then be without the nature of something that really exists on its own, only an inferred collection of things.
- If they are without such a material existence as things, like the mind (citta, 心) or its mental states (caitta, 心所), then they should have no real existential nature apart from consciousness.

- b. Regarding separation of the categories of actual things (dravya, 實) & qualities (guṇa, 德):

- The elementary principles of earth, water, fire and wind held by this school should not be limited to the category of things of actual substance (dravya padārtha, 實句義) because, upon having physical contact (spraṣṭavya, 觸) with the senses, they are just like the qualities (guṇa, 德) of solidity, liquidity, radiation and motion.
- Conversely, that which this school holds to be solidity, liquidity, radiation and motion should not be limited to the category of qualities (guṇa padārtha, 德句義) because that which has physical contact with the senses are things with actual substance (dravya, 實) such as earth, water, fire and wind.

3. The same criticism can be applied to how earth, water and fire can be in the category of qualities (guṇa padārtha, 德句義) when they are, for example, seen through the eyes as visible forms (rūpa, 色) that are further categorized as yellow, blue, red, etc. And so one should understand that there is no real existential nature of earth, water, fire and wind that is distinct from solidity, liquidity, radiation and motion, and there is no real earth, water, fire and wind that is distinct from, say, that which is seen by the eyes. Further on these two categories (padārtha, 句義) of actual things and qualities:
 1. Among those things held to have actual substance (dravya, 實), there are those said to both take up physical space and be eternal. However, all material things that take up space, like the amassing of atoms that make up the elements of earth, water, etc., should be deemed to be impermanent as they all can disintegrate.
 2. Among those things held to not take up physical space but be apprehended by the physical sense faculties, there are the qualities (guṇa, 德) of visible form, audible sound, flavor, odor and physical contact. However, these should all be deemed to take up physical space and be divisible since it is allowed that they can be apprehended by the physical sense faculties, just like earth, water, wind and fire.
 3. The categories not held to be things with actual substance like qualities (guṇa, 德) should not have a distinct nature that is inseparable from consciousness because, if they do not involve actual substance (dravya, 實), their existence would be purely hypothetical, like the children of barren women.
 4. Substantial things, qualities & actions that do not really exist (asattā, 非有) like blossoms in the sky also do not have any distinct nature apart from consciousness.
- c. *On there being a separate category of 'existence' (sattā, 有) or 'non-existence' (asatta, 無):*
 1. Those things held to exist should not have their own distinct nature apart from the other categories of things with actual substance, qualities, etc., because it is admitted that, like them, that which exists is not without existence.
 2. If there was a nature of existence that is separable from these other categories, it would allow for something to exist that was different from them, that is, something that ultimately does not exist (like horns of rabbits, hairs of turtles, etc.).
 - a. If existence does not have its own distinct nature apart from the other categories, why should a category such as things with actual substance (dravya, 實) be said to exist in distinction to it?
 - b. If there is a distinct nature of 'existence' apart from existing things, then there should also be a distinct nature of non-existence apart from non-existing things. If the latter is not necessary, why should the first be?
 3. In conclusion, any designation of a separate 'nature of existence' (sattā, 有) is just a speculation of the imagination.
- d. *On the categories (padārtha, 句義) of commonality (sāmānya, 共) & uniqueness (viśeṣa, 勝):* Apart from the natures of things with actual substance (dravya, 實), qualities (guṇa, 德) and actions (karma, 業), there are said to be separate categories of their characteristics that are either universal and shared by all (sāmānya lakṣaṇa, 共相) or distinct and unique to each (viśeṣa lakṣaṇa, 勝相). It is definitely illogical for these to be considered as separate categories because:
 1. There would be universal natures that were common to things with actual substance, qualities and actions that were somehow different from their distinct natures, just as there were previously said to be natures for the qualities and actions of things that were different from things themselves.

2. There would be actual things that were not included in the category of actual things because they had a different nature, just as there would be qualities and actions that were not included in the categories of qualities and actions.
3. The elemental principles of earth, water, fire and wind would have natures that were also contrasted with themselves. This is understood by analogy with the above.
4. Just as the shared natures of actual things, qualities and actions are inseparable from the distinct nature of actual things, qualities and actions, these should also be inseparable from their own real existential natures.
5. If there are existential natures of actual things, qualities and actions that are separable from the actual things, qualities and actions themselves, there should also be non-existent natures of actual things, qualities and actions that are separate from actual things, qualities and actions. If non-existent natures do not exist separately, why should these existential natures?

Therefore the natures of commonality and distinctiveness are only hypothetical, not real.

- e. On the Category of Inherent Connectivity (samavāya padārtha, 和合句義):

And the category of inherent connectivity held by this school definitely does not have a real independent existence because, even in their system, it is not included among those things said to have the nature of existence (sattā, 有性), just like those which ultimately do not exist. This school allows that actual things, qualities and actions are perceivable through direct perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量), yet we have shown through logical reasoning that they do not really exist apart from the speculations of the mind. With this being so, how could a category of inherent connectivity possibly exist? Even The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) admits that this category cannot be known through direct perception, only through inference (anumāna pramāṇa 比量), so it cannot possibly have a real existence apart from the mind. Even if it was held that this inherent connectivity was an object of direct perception, it still could not have a real existence apart from the mind based on logical reasoning, as already explained.

None of these categories really exist apart from consciousness:

In reality, actual things with substance and the rest of these categories do not really have an existential nature apart from consciousness that can be apprehended through direct perception because, as even admitted by this School on the Definition of Reality, they are only objects of cognition, imaginary objects such as the horns of rabbits and hairs of turtles.

- * Transcendental knowledge (jñāna, 智) does not directly perceive any category of actual things with substance that exists apart from consciousness because it only arises through the making of hypothetical constructs (prajñapti, 假), just as do the categories of qualities, actions, common and distinct characteristics and inherent connectivity.
- * Transcendental knowledge also does not indirectly perceive any essential nature of inherent connectivity (samavāya padārtha, 和合句義) (through judgment or inference) that is apart from consciousness because it too arises through hypothetical constructs, just like the transcendental knowledge of actual things with substance.

Therefore, all six of the categories of meaning (padārtha, 句義) from The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) are just hypothetical constructs based on illusions that arise from speculations of the imagination.

c. ***On theism, belief in the real existence of an almighty lord god that rules over all living things*** (Maheśvara, 大自在天) ***apart from consciousness:***

Theistic schools posit the existence of an almighty lord god apart from the mind, ruling over all living things and serving as their object of worship in the sphere of desire (kāma dhātu, 欲界). In surrendering to an omniscient and omnipotent god through prayer and meditations in its heaven of judgment, repentance & atonement (Suyāma Devaloka, 須夜摩天), souls enter into its heaven of forgiveness, redemption & rebirth (Tuṣita Devaloka, 兜率天), with the grace (prasāda, 恩慈) of this almighty lord god's higher power, working through their lives to deliver them from the suffering in this sphere of desire. Depending on the school, there may be but one great god that exists before all others (Maheśvara, 大自在天) or many different manifestations of god (Īśvara, 自在天) that may serve as such an object of worship.

There are those who hold to a belief in the existence apart from the mind of an almighty lord god that is the master over the lives of sentient beings. Ruling over them and determining their spiritual destiny, this god is said to be eternal, omnipresent and able to produce all things (including the deliverance of souls). This theory is illogical because:

- a. That which produces things is not eternal (nitya, 常). That which is not eternal is not omnipresent (avyāpin, 不遍) and that which is not omnipresent does not have such a transcendental nature (bhūta tathatā, 真實).
- b. With this existential nature of a god being eternal, omnipresent and endowed with all potentialities and capacities, it should produce all things, all times and all places in a single moment. If this god depends on the conditions at hand or a desire to produce them, it contradicts this single cause thesis. Some express this by saying that the conditions at hand and the desire to produce them should also arise in a single moment because its cause exists eternally.

d. ***On the existence of a universal reality apart from the mind (Monism or Monotheism):***

Monists and monotheists believe in the existence of a universal sphere of objective reality & existential principle (rūpa dhātu, 色界 & arupa dhātu, 無色界) apart from the mind, a monad that transcends the duality of sentient existence found in the sphere of desire. Depending on the belief system, this universal reality may or may not be invested with the power of a god as the creator of the universe.

There are those who hold to beliefs in the existence of:

- a. The one great creator of the universe (Mahā Brahman, 一大梵)
- b. The one time that has always existed and always will (yugapad, 一時)
- c. The one place that is omnipresent (ekaṃ diśam, 一方)
- d. The one original source of existence (bhūta koṭi, 一本際)
- e. The one self-existing cause (svayambhū, 一自然)
- f. The one great void of empty space (ākāśa, 一虛空) that contains all things
- g. The one ever abiding transcendental reality (nitya sthita bhūta tathatā, 一常住實有) that is endowed with the potential to produce all things

Holding to beliefs in the real existential nature of any of these universals apart from the mind are all disproven in the same way as those who hold to belief such a real existence of an almighty lord god that rules over all living things (Maheśvara, 大自在天).

e. ***The School on the Profound Reflection of Holy Words & Their Ritual Expression*** (Mīmāṃsā, 聲論)

One of the six orthodox Hindu schools, related to The School on the Ultimate Meaning of the Ancient Wisdom (Vedānta, 吠檀多); While The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) holds that valid knowledge (pramāṇa, 量) is only attained through direct perception, inference, scriptural authority and analogy, this school holds that there are five ways to attain such valid knowledge:

- a. Direct perception (pratyakṣa, 現)
 - b. Inference (anumāna, 比)
 - c. Analogy (upamāna, 譬喻); Comparison, illustration, example
 - d. Deduction from compelling circumstantial evidence (arthāpatti, 通義)
 - e. Testimony from words on it (śabda, 聲); within this school this is interpreted differently:
 1. Testimony from the ancient, time-honored scripture, specifically the Vedas
 2. Testimony from reliable authority (including other accepted scriptures)
 3. The words of anyone who reveals truth about life's greater purpose
 4. Those with true discernment kind find this greater purpose within all words, even if unintended
- One sub-school (that of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa) added:
- f. Proof of truth by its absence (anupalabdi, 不可得)
1. *On belief in the real existential nature of sacred words apart from consciousness:*
There are two main divisions of this school:
 - a. One holds only the words of the Ancient Wisdom (Vedas, 明論) to be that which is eternal because only it is able to perfectly determine, measure and express the greater purposes for all things through their proper ritual expression.
 - b. The other holds that all testimony (śabda, 聲) faithful to life's purpose is eternal but that it is only revelatory of this purpose when there are the proper conditions.
 2. *Disproving this belief:* These beliefs are illogical for the following reasons:
 - a. Because it is admitted that the Ancient Wisdom (Vedas, 明論) are just words about life's greater purpose and they can be expressed by anyone, they should not be any more eternally abiding than any other voiced words.
 - b. Other testimony (śabda, 聲) about life's greater purpose should also not be regarded as having the nature of eternal expression. Like a vase or piece of clothing, they are only of value if there is a fortuitous combination of conditions at hand making it so.
- f. **Materialists or Naturalists** (Lokāyatikas, 路迦耶底迦 or Cārvākas, 順世)
- This was the Indian school of materialism, belief only in the real existence of physical matter, that which is sensible. They were skeptics who held that valid knowledge is attained through direct perception, empiricism and inference only when thoroughly tempered through reasonable doubt. They were atheists who rejected the Vedas with their gods and rituals, holding that morality and spiritual exertion were ultimately meaningless as there is no after-life and no purpose to life beyond survival, procreation, pursuit of experience, knowledge and happiness for the short time we are given in this life as well as an epicurean appreciation of life's pleasures. Ajita Keśakambali (無勝髮褐) was their forerunner while Bṛhaspati (勿哩訶婆跋底) formalized the philosophy.
1. *Beliefs about gross physical matter having a real existential nature apart from consciousness:*
This school of thought held that it is the atoms (paramāṇu, 極微) found in the elemental principles of earth, water, fire and wind that are real, eternal and able to produce gross physical matter (audārika rūpa, 麤色), and the gross physical matter they produce does not exceed the measure of the atoms that cause it. Although they allow that masses of physical form are impermanent, they claim that (through its atoms) this gross matter has a real existential nature of its own apart from consciousness.
 2. *Disproving these flawed beliefs:*
 - a. *With regards to atoms occupying space or not occupying space:*
 1. If these atoms (paramāṇu, 極微) that are the parents of gross matter are said to occupy space and so be divisible, they would be like a colony of marching ants that were working together and consequently they should not be considered to collectively have a real existential nature of their own.
 2. If they do not occupy space and are not divisible, they could not amass together to consequentially produce gross physical matter (audārika rūpa, 麤色). They would be without physical substance, like the mind and its states.

b. *With regards to atoms being eternal*: If they are able to produce the fruit of gross physical mass, upon being transformed into it they are as impermanent as the fruit they produce. How can they then be said to have an existential nature that is always remaining?

c. *With regards to gross physical mass just being the aggregation of these atoms*:

1. If the fruit of physical mass produced does not exceed the measure of its causes (atoms), there should be no distinction between this gross mass and the atoms.
2. If the fruit of this gross mass does not exceed the measure of its causes (atoms), it should not be beheld by the eyes or the other physical senses faculties (since they are infinitesimal).

However, in holding to these conclusions, this school would be in contradiction to its thesis that one is eternal (and invisible) and the other is impermanent (but visible).

d. *With regards to gross physical mass existing by virtue of its size* (parimāṇa guṇa, 量德):

If one claims that the visibility and impermanence found in the fruits of gross physical mass are connected with the virtue of its size (which is much greater than that of any atoms of which it consists), then it is not really physical mass that is being beheld by the sense faculties but something that simulates it, since it is held that the fruit of gross physical mass is of the same measure as the atoms that cause it.

However, gross physical mass should not really be connected with any virtue of size because it is of the same size as the atoms that it consists of. Some would express this objection by saying that the atoms should be connected with the virtue of size in the same way as gross physical mass because the space they occupy is not any different.

e. *With regards to gross physical mass arising from the multiple causes (of its different atoms)*:

1. If one asserts, as do both Materialists (Lokāyatikas, 路迦耶底迦) and those from The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗), that the fruit of gross physical mass is found in its own causes (atoms) and it is only because it has many different causes that it may be said to be 'amassed', then it should also not have a single existential nature, just as each atom is a different cause with a different location in space. Based on this, the fruit of gross physical mass should not really be said to have any real existential nature of its own or really be beheld by the physical sense faculties.
2. If the fruit of gross physical mass is acquired through such a combination of multiple components (that are amassed) so that the combining of multiple causal atoms reaches to the point at which they were no longer subtle but gross enough to become an object beheld by the physical senses, what use is there in speaking about a fruit (of gross physical mass) being caused by atoms? The Materialists believe that, despite being combined together, atoms always remain subtle and imperceptible. Since gross physical mass would then be composed of multiple components of mass, it should be a collection of things and not really have an existential nature on its own. It follows therefore that the second assertion (that gross physical mass has a real existential nature) is in contradiction with the first (that it is the atoms that have a real existential nature).

f. *With regards to the fruits (of gross physical mass) and the causes (of the atoms) taking up the same space as each other*: If the fruit (of gross physical mass) or its causes (atoms) take up space, no two should be found in the same location.

1. If it is asserted that natures and characteristics of the fruit (of gross physical mass) or their causes (atoms) are mutually penetrable (taking up the same space), in the same way that sand absorbs water or elements (like tin or zinc) are added

into molten copper (to make the alloys of bronze or brass), we reply ‘who is allowing that it is the nature of sand to absorb water or the nature of copper to be penetrated by the elements that produce its alloys’? (In fact, water just enters into the empty spaces around grains of sand and the atoms of tin and zinc just bond to those of copper to form its alloys).

2. Some suggest that the atoms are separate (in the case of sand and the water) and they are transformed (in the case of copper alloys). Actually, in being separate it is shown that they are not unified, and in being transformed it is shown that they are impermanent, not always remaining the same.

g. *With regards to the oneness of all gross physical mass:*

And if the existential nature of gross physical mass is an indivisible unity, when one attains any part of it one should be attaining all of it because, whether or not it is acquired, it should all be one and the same. If one does not admit this, one will be in contradiction with the logic of this idea of its existential unity. However, if one does admit it, one will also be in contradiction to the facts of everyday experience. Consequently, these beliefs about materialism result in dilemmas about the real, existential nature of physical matter being conclusive. In fact, all of these beliefs are only based on flawed speculations of the imagination.

g. *A general refutation of all these beliefs held by non-Buddhist schools of thought*

Although there are many theories about existence (sat, 有) and purpose (dharma, 法) held by various schools that espouse the existence of an abstract, external reality apart from the mind (Tīrthikas, 外道), they can ultimately be reduced to the four parts of the tetralemma (catuṣ koṭika, 四句):

1. Those who hold that the nature of existence (sattā, 有性) & purpose (dharmatā, 法性) are necessarily identical: This is a reference to beliefs held by The Numerological School (Sāṃkhyavāda, 數論) and others. This theory is flawed because:

- a. It cannot be that the purposes for all things (sarva dharmāḥ, 一切法) are simply identical with the nature of existence (sattā, 有性). With them all just having the same nature of existence, there would be no distinctions among them.
- b. It would contradict there being the different natures of the three spiritual qualities (guṇa, 德), the universal soul (puruṣa, 神我), the nature of the material universe (prakṛti, 性) and its various derived manifestations (vikāra, 轉異).
- c. It would also contradict there being all the different distinctions of life’s purpose that are found in this world.
- d. And if the derived manifestations such as, for example, visible form, just had the nature of visible form without any other distinctions, there would not be its further distinctions such as the colors blue, yellow, red and the like.

2. Those who hold that the natures of existence & purpose are necessarily different:

This is a reference to beliefs held by those from The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) and others. This theory is also flawed because:

- a. It cannot be that the purposes for all things are without the nature of existence, just as things that have perished or never existed are without an existential nature.
- b. It would also contradict there being things with substance (dravya, 實), qualities (guṇa, 德), actions (karma, 業) and the like that are not without their own existential natures.

- c. It would also contradict the evident existence of all the things we see in this world.
- d. And if, for example, visible form did not have the distinct nature of visible form, and it was just the same as, say, audible sound, there would be no objects that were just for the eyes to see.

3. Those who hold that the nature of existence & purpose are both identical and different:

This refers to beliefs held by Jains (耆那教).

They were called 'The Unashamed' (Ahrikya, 無慚) by Xuánzàng here because some of this school did not believe in the wearing of clothes. Such ascetics were also known as 'The Sky Clad' (Digambara, 空衣).

This theory is also flawed because:

- a. They are mistaken about the identity of existence and purpose, as asserted by the first school, and difference between existence and purpose, as asserted by the second.
- b. The characteristics of being identical and different contradict each other and so their natures should be distinguished as one or the other.
- c. It is not possible for things to simultaneously be identical and different.
- d. It cannot be that all purposes only have a single existential nature.

Some suggest that the ideas of identity and difference here are just hypothetical constructs that are without a real existential nature. In any case, the logic of holding them to have a real existence apart from consciousness is not proven.

4. Those who hold that the nature of existence & purpose are neither identical nor different:

This is a reference to beliefs held by The School of Improper Livelihood (Ājīvikas, 邪命) (so called because its followers held that free will and spiritual cultivation are futile) who believed in fatalism and predestination (niyati, 決定). This theory is also flawed because:

- a. The theory that they are neither identical nor different is essentially the same as them being both identical and different.
- b. Is being neither identical nor different an affirmation of what it is or only a denial of what it isn't?
 - 1. If it is an affirmation of what it is, then it should not only consist of these two negations.
 - 2. If is only a negation of what it isn't, there is really no thesis being put forward.
 - 3. If it is both affirmation of what it is and a denial of what it is not, it would be in contraction with itself.
 - 4. If it is neither an affirmation of what it is nor a denial of what it is not, it would be mere sophistry.
- c. And being neither identical nor different contradicts the common sense of this world about things either being the same as or different from each other.
- d. It also contradicts the principle propounded in The School of Improper Livelihood's own doctrine that things such as visible form really do have an existential nature of their own.

Therefore, we conclude that these positions held by non-Buddhist schools espousing the existence of an abstract, external reality apart from the mind are just contentious arguments designed to hide the flaws found in their beliefs. Those with wisdom should not accept these mistakes.

2. Theories from Buddhist Schools that only emphasize the lesser objective of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level (Hīnayāna, 小乘)

On there being such objective purposes that really exist apart from the mind:

Question: Buddhist schools that emphasize the lesser objective of attaining spiritual freedom from affliction on an individual level also hold that there are objective purposes that

really exist apart from consciousness that include:

- a. Form (rūpa dharma, 色法)
- b. Motive forces not directly associated with the mind (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行)
- c. Unconditional purposes (asamskrta dharma, 無為法)

How can it be held that these do not really exist apart from consciousness?

Answer: Because logically they do not.

The ideas of form, motive forces not directly associated with the mind & unconditional purposes having their own existential nature apart from consciousness are now treated separately:

a. ***On the real existence of form*** (rūpa dharma, 色法) ***apart from the mind***

Schools emphasizing the lesser track of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level such as The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) hold that there are two kinds of form:

1. Forms that offer resistance to other forms and occupy space (sa pratigha, 有對) in the environment, physical forms that are divisible and composed of atoms (paramāṇu, 極微). This is comparable to the ideas about form that are held by materialists and naturalists (Lokāyatikas, 路迦耶底迦 and Cārvākas, 順世), as already explained.
2. Forms that do not offer resistance to other forms or occupy space (apratigha, 無對) in the environment, mental (thought) forms that are not divisible and not composed of atoms.

1. ***On physical form that offers resistance and occupies space*** (sa pratigha, 有對):

It was already determined in the section of the beliefs of materialists and naturalists that physical forms offering resistance to other physical forms and occupying space in their environment do not have a real existential nature of their own because the atoms that they consist of do not have such a real existential nature.

a. ***Dilemmas about the real existence of forms that offer resistance to other forms***

1. *The dilemma about whether or not its atoms offer such resistance to each other*
 - a. If atoms (paramāṇu, 極微) were objects with actual substance (mūrta, 質礙) that offered resistance to each other (so that no two could occupy the same space), like a vase or an article of clothing, their existence as atoms rather than just as physical form (rūpa, 色) would merely be hypothetical rather than real.
 - b. If atoms were not objects with actual substance and did not offer this resistance, they would be like existential principles that were without form (arūpa, 非色). How could they then amass together to become such objects as vases, articles of clothing, etc.?
2. *The dilemma about its atoms occupying space in the environment*
 - a. If atoms occupy space and so are forever divisible (into smaller sub-particles), as held by The School Based on the Authority of the Scriptures (Sautrāntika, 經量部), they should not have a real existential nature of their own.
 - b. If it is held that they do not occupy space and so are not divisible, as held by The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部), they would be like existential principles that are without form (arūpa, 非色). This creates five dilemmas:
 1. If they are like existential principles that are without form (and so do not amass to create gross physical forms), how can they create shadows upon impact with light? When the sun rises up and shines on a pillar, there is light to the east and a shadow to the west. Since the place where the light

is received and the shadow arises are not the same, it is held that the atoms of the pillar must certainly occupy space and so be divisible.

2. When one sees or touches a barrier such as a wall or another object, one is only sensing one side and not the other. Since the object is identical with its many amassed atoms, the atoms must occupy space and so be divisible.
3. The atoms must be distributed according to their different locations in space (the east, west, north, south as well as above and below). If there were no such distribution of the atoms, there would be no order in space in which they aggregated together.
4. Some would suggest that atoms interpenetrate each other, but in this case they would not aggregate to form any gross physical mass. Because they do, they must occupy space and so be divisible.
5. The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes holds that the physical form offering resistance and occupying space is identical with the atoms of which it is composed. If the atoms did not occupy space, neither would physical form and there would not be any barriers or walls. Therefore, the atoms postulated by this school must in fact occupy space and be divisible. In still being divisible, they cannot each have their own existential nature.

3. *Conclusion:* Consequently, physical forms (rūpa, 色) that offer resistance to other physical forms and occupy space (sa pratigha, 有對) are not conclusively proven to have an existential nature of their own.

- b. *Physical form as the foundation of support for* (āśraya, 所依) *and the object before* (ālambana, 所緣) *the five sensory projections of consciousness* (pañcā vijñāna, 五識):

Question: Does not physical form (rūpa, 色) serve as the foundation of support (as the five sense faculties - pañca rūpa indriya, 五色根) and the objective conditions (as the five sensory objects - pañca rūpa viṣāya, 五色境) before the five sensory projections of consciousness?

Answer: Although the sense faculties and sense objects are not without physical form, they are really just states in the evolving manifestations of consciousness. This means that when consciousness arises, physical form is manifested through the power of inner conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣)¹⁴, simulating the eyes and other sense faculties as well as the images that are manifested before them. Through these inner conditions of consciousness, there are respectively its foundation of support (āśraya, 所依) and the object before it (ālambana, 所緣).

Kuījī added: This means that, when the eight projections of consciousness arise, through the power of the inner conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (between the seeds in the subconscious mind and conscious purposes), the subconscious store of memory is manifested, simulated as the five sense faculties (pañca indriyaḥ, 五根) and the content of the five sense objects (pañca viṣayāḥ, 五塵). The sense faculties serve as the foundation of support for vision and the rest of the five sensory projections of consciousness. Although they do not have an immediate and direct connection with this sensory content, they must rely on that which arises before them to become manifested. Actually, it is the primordial consciousness that is being superimposed over this sensory content. In manifesting it, it makes the images of the five kinds of sensory objects appear. Therefore, through the five sense faculties that serve as the foundation of support and the five kinds of sensory content that serve as the objective conditions before it, there are the five projections of sensory consciousness. If there was no subconscious store of memory to rely on, there would be no means to have any objective conditions because, among the objectives that may appear before the mind, some are immediate and direct while others are more remote and indirect.

1. On physical form as the foundation of support (āśraya, 所依) for consciousness:
 Since the faculty of (capacity for) vision (as opposed to the physical eyes) and the rest of the sense faculties cannot really be known through direct perception (pratyakṣa pramāṇa, 現量), their existence is only known through inference (anumāna pramāṇa 比量) from the consciousness they are able to bring about. They are capacities, not something only externally created by physical elements. Since it was shown that physical forms (rūpa, 色) occupying space and offering resistance to other physical forms (sa pratigha, 有對) do not have a real existential nature of their own apart from the mind, these five sensory faculties (and their objects) must only be manifestations of an inner consciousness. By dint of their bringing about vision and the rest of the sensory projections of consciousness, there are said to be the eyes and other sense faculties that serve as foundations of support (āśraya, 所依) for these five sensory projections of consciousness.
2. On physical form as the objective conditions present before consciousness (ālambana pratyaya, 所緣緣): Because the external existence of objective conditions before vision and the rest of the five sensory projections of consciousness has been proven to logically be inadmissible, it has been determined that these objective conditions must be the evolving manifestations of these five. With the exception of The School on the Proper Measure Between Identity and Purpose (Saṃmitīya, 正量部), Buddhist schools emphasizing the objective of attaining spiritual freedom from affliction on an individual level define ‘the objective conditions before consciousness’ as ‘that which is able to induce or produce a consciousness of its own kind.’ (vision before the eyes, hearing before the ears, etc.). Among these early schools, there are different views about the true nature of the objective conditions before consciousness:
 - a. *Refuting the understanding of The School on the Proper Measure Between Identity & Purpose* (Saṃmitīya, 正量部) *about the objective conditions before consciousness*:
 This school holds that the objective conditions present before consciousness (ālambana pratyaya, 所緣緣) alone can induce or produce consciousness. This cannot be right because there are three other kinds of conditions that produce consciousness, namely those that:
 1. Directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣)
 2. Are similar to and immediately connected with those of the past (samanantara pratyaya, 等無間緣), and
 3. Will prevail in the future (adhipati pratyaya, 增上緣)
 These three cannot also be called the objective conditions that are presently before consciousness (ālambana pratyaya, 所緣緣).
 For example, the sense faculties are conditions that will prevail in the future and cannot be the objective conditions present before consciousness, yet they too help to produce consciousness.
 - b. *Refuting the understanding of The School Based on the Authority of the Scriptures* (Sautrāntika, 經量部) *about the objective conditions present before consciousness*:
 This school held that when vision perceives visible forms (or other sensory kinds of consciousness perceive their objects) they are only connecting with mental images (nimitta, 相) that simulate the aggregated mass of atoms before them. However, these simulated images of aggregated mass must be different from the atoms themselves (which they hold to have a real existential nature) because they would certainly not arise before consciousness if the aggregated

mass was divided up into its atoms. This school must therefore admit that, since these mental images arising from aggregated conditions of amassed form which do not have a real existential nature of their own, they cannot really be the objects (ālambana, 所緣) that are before sensory consciousness. The objective conditions present before it must have a real existential nature and not just be optical illusions, like second moons being seen in the sky.

- c. *Refuting the understanding of the earlier School on the Real Existence of All Purposes* (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) *about the objective conditions before consciousness*: This school held that it is the atoms that aggregate into gross physical forms but not the individual atoms by themselves that constitute the objective conditions before each of the five sensory kinds of consciousness. This cannot be not so because:
- * These atoms do not appear in the mental images of these sense objects.
 - * No mental images of these atoms appear, whether they are aggregated together into gross physical forms or not.

In either case, the nature and the characteristics of the atoms are not different, whether they have aggregated together or not. Because of this, whether or not the atoms have aggregated into visible form or any of the other sense objects, they do not themselves serve as the objects of sensory consciousness.

- d. *Refuting the understanding of the later School on the Real Existence of All Purposes* (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) *about the objective conditions before consciousness*: Later proponents of this school (such as Saṃghabhadra, 僧伽跋陀羅 or 衆賢) held that it is not the individual atoms of visible form and the other sensory kinds of consciousness that are its objects but rather it is the gross physical forms that produce mental images and serve as the objective conditions before them. This theory is also untenable because:

1. Whether atoms have aggregated or not, their characteristics and natures remain the same.
2. In this case, any mental object imagined (nimitta, 相) to be, say, a vase or a bowl, should never appear as such before consciousness. Instead, it should just appear as a certain number and configuration of amassed atoms.
3. In being aggregated together, each of the individual atoms should lose their characteristics of infinitesimal smallness and perfect roundness.
4. Consciousness of images of gross physical form does not behold the subtle atoms as its objects, just as it cannot be that consciousness of one kind of object (e.g., visible form) could then apprehend those of any other kind (sound, etc.) or that a single kind of consciousness (e.g., vision) could connect with all kinds of objects (those heard, tasted, smelled & touched).

Even allowing for the existence of atoms, there are still many flaws of logic such as these. Even more mistaken is the idea that their reality exists apart from consciousness (as explained before).

- e. *The correct thesis about the objective conditions before consciousness*: From this, we conclude that consciousness beholds images that resemble and simulate its own manifestations as the objective conditions before it (ālambana pratyaya, 所緣緣). This is because:
- a. The conditions (pratyaya, 緣) of consciousness are its imagining component (darśana bhāga, 見分).
 - b. The objects before (ālambana, 所緣) consciousness are its imagined component (nimitta bhāga, 相分).

c. *The correct thesis about the nature of atoms* (paramāṇu, 極微):

In fact, whether adapting to objects that are large or small, consciousness suddenly manifests them as single composite images, not dividing them up into the host of atoms that they consist of, as held by those who believe that gross physical form has a real existential nature on its own (such as The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes).

1. The Buddha did speak about atoms to those who believed in the reality of physical form to show them that they could be even further divided up and, consequently, did not have a real existential nature of their own. He certainly did not do so to show them that atoms themselves have a real existence of their own apart from the mind.
2. The masters of engaged meditation (yoga ācārya, 諸瑜伽師) gradually divided and subdivided gross physical forms (audārika rūpa, 麤色) with discernment until they could be divided no longer and hypothetically gave the name 'atoms' (paramāṇu, 極微) to that which is ultimately minute. Although these atoms were said to still occupied space, they could not be divided any further. If one were to try to divide them any further, they would resemble the emptiness of space and could no longer be called 'physical form' (rūpa, 色). Therefore, atoms are said to be the extreme limit of physical form. Because of this, we conclude that physical forms that occupy space and offer resistance to each other (sa pratigha, 有對) are not really atoms but just manifestations of consciousness.

2. *On mental forms, thought forms that do not offer resistance to each other or occupy space* (apratigha rūpa, 無對色):

Those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivādins, 有部者) espoused the existence of thought forms that do not occupy space or offer resistance to each other. These are of two kinds:

- a. *Thought forms that are expressed or communicated* (vijñapti rūpa, 表色), which is further of two kinds:
 1. Those expressed through the physical body (kāya vijñapti, 身表); deeds
 2. Those expressed through the voice (vāg vijñapti, 言表); words
- b. *Thought forms that are not expressed or communicated* (avijñapti rūpa, 無表色); innermost thoughts, those unexpressed through words and deeds.

There is another kind of form that does not occupy space and offer resistance to other forms. Like the one that does, it does not have a real existential nature of its own apart from consciousness. Some say that, in not occupying space or offering resistance to other forms, it is more like the mind and its mental states than physical form. On the basis of logical reasoning, we have already concluded that manifestations of physical form characterized by occupying space and offering resistance to other physical forms do not really exist apart from consciousness. This is even more evident with regards to these thought forms that do not manifest the characteristics of occupying space and offering such resistance. These may be also called 'the transcendental reality of form'.

Question: Do these expressed and unexpressed thought forms have a real existential nature of their own apart from consciousness?

Answer: No, they do not.

Question: Why not?

Answer: The answer to this will be explained in terms of:

- a. Expressed thought forms (vijñapti rūpa, 表色); words and deeds,
- b. Unexpressed thought forms (avijñapti rūpa, 無表色); inner thoughts, and
- c. Ulterior motives of intent (cetanā, 思).

- a. On there being the real existence of expressed thought forms (vijñapti rūpa, 表色) apart from consciousness: words & deeds
 1. *Deeds, thought forms expressed through the physical body* (kāya vijñapti, 身表): If the deeds of the physical body really exist apart from the mind, what is their nature?
 - a. If 'deeds' refers to the *physical shapes or configurations expressed through the body*, as held by The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部), then they do not really exist on their own apart from the mind because:
 1. These shapes or configurations can still be divided up into atoms.
 2. The atoms that are distributed throughout space (length, width and height) are imperceptible (and so incapable of expression or communication).
 - b. If they are said to be the *movements expressed through the body*, as held by a theory of The School on the Proper Measure Between Identity & Purpose (Saṃmitīya, 正量部), then they still do not really exist on their own apart from the mind because:
 1. In instantly perishing in each moment as soon as they are produced, conditional purposes such as these do not really have any movement.
 2. These conditional purposes instantly perish without needing a reason.
 3. If they really needed a reason to perish, they would not do so without one.
 - c. According to a theory that arose from The School of Those Who Believe In Allegories (Dārṣṭāntikas, 譬喻者), the thought forms expressed through the deeds of the body are without any particular shape or configuration but *induce mental states* that are able to move the hands, feet and other parts of the body. This thesis also does not prove they exist apart from the mind because:
 1. If this refers to the mind being the cause of these movements, their real existence apart from the mind has already been disproven by their very explanation.
 2. If it is a reference to form being the cause of these movements, it would be identical with the idea of the elemental principle of wind (vāyu, 風) being the cause of movement. However, because this elemental principle of wind (motion) does not of itself express any meaning or purpose, it should not be said to be a form of expression that frames consciousness (vijñapti, 表). Furthermore, physical contacts (spraṣṭavya, 觸) that are said to be in alignment with the sense of touch and involve motion (the elemental principle of wind) do not have any moral nature (such as good or evil) and so are not forms of expression per se. The same can be said for visible forms, odors, flavors and the like that impact the sense faculties. Consequently, the actions expressed by the deeds of the physical body are determined to not have a real existential nature apart from the mind.
 - d. *The correct thesis*: In reality, with the mind as the cause, consciousness is manifested through the physical features of the hands, feet and other parts of the body, arising and perishing in continuous series of moments that evolve in certain defined directions. Because they simulate movement this way, these deeds are really just expressions of the mind that are hypothetically said to be 'thought forms expressed through the physical body' (kāya vijñapti, 身表).
 2. *Words, thought forms expressed through the voice* (vāg vijñapti, 身表), also do not really have an existential nature apart from consciousness because:
 - a. The voice sounded in any single moment (eka kṣaṇa, 一刹那) does not express

- any meaning (in and of itself).
- b. Over a continuous series of moments, the voice does not have a real existential nature of its own apart from consciousness (it is the same as the voice being sounded in a single moment but being divided into many single moments).
 - c. The real existential nature apart from consciousness of any external (physical) form that takes up space and offers resistance to other forms (pratigha rūpa, 有對色) has already been disproven.
 - d. *The correct thesis:* In reality, with the mind as the cause, consciousness is manifested through the voice, arising and perishing in continuous series of moments that simulate the expression of meaning through words that are hypothetically said to be ‘thought forms expressed through the voice’ (vāg vijñapti, 身表). This explanation does not contradict logical reasoning.
- b. On there being a real existence apart from consciousness of unexpressed thought forms (avijñapti rūpa, 無表色), innermost thoughts unexpressed through words & deeds: With the expression of thought forms (through the body and the voice) already shown to not have a real existential nature of their own apart from consciousness, how can unexpressed thought forms have such a real existence on their own? In fact, in depending on intentions that are good or evil over defined periods of time, it is also not in contradiction to reason to hypothetically establish the existence of these unexpressed thought forms. This is a reference to dependence on the growth of seeds that will ultimately prevail through words or deeds in establishing virtuous or evil states, or resolves of meditation in word or deed that will prevent manifestations of evil behavior (akuśala samudācāra, 惡現行). Because of these things, unexpressed thought forms can also be said to have a hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat, 假有)¹³.
- c. Intention (cetanā, 思) leading to the creation of thoughts, words and deeds; the pathway to actions with consequences (karmapatha, 業道)³:
- Question:* In the scriptures, The Blessed One spoke of there being three kinds of actions that have consequences (trīṇi karmāṇi, 三業):
1. Acts of the body (kāya karma, 身業); deeds
 2. Acts of the voice (vāg karma, 語業); words
 3. Acts of the thinking mind (mano karma, 意業); thoughts
- In denying the real existence of the actions of the body and the voice, are you not in contradiction with the scriptures?
- Answer:* We do not deny the real existence of these actions. We are only saying that they are not really thought forms that exist apart from consciousness.
1. With acts of the body (kāya karma, 身業) there are the kinds of intention (cetanā, 思) that are able to bring about deeds.
 2. With acts of the voice (vāg karma, 語業) there are the kinds of intention that are able to bring about words.
 3. With acts of the thinking mind (mano karma, 意業) there are thoughts in the form of examination (nirūpaṇa, 審) and determination (adhimokṣa, 決), the two aspects of (apperceptual) intent associated with the deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manas, 意), because they are both able to stir the mind into actions that will have consequences (karmas, 諸業).
- When intentions lead to the creation of words and deeds, there are said to be actions with consequences. They are also called ‘embarking on the path to actions with consequences’ (karmapatha, 業道) because:

1. With examination and determination, intention travels along defined paths.
2. These paths lead to the different ripening fruits of suffering and contentment. Because of this, the first seven steps³ on the path to actions with consequences (those of words and deeds) also have intention (cetanā, 思) as their existential nature (svabhāva, 自性), just like the three for the thoughts of the mind.³ Some say that expressions of the body (deeds) & voice (words) are only hypothetically actions with consequences, but they are still said to exist because their steps spring forth from mental intentions.
3. The conclusion about form:
Consequently, one should understand that there really is no external kind of form that exists apart from consciousness. Instead, there are only the inner permutations of consciousness that simulate the arising of both physical forms and thought forms.

b. On the real existence of motive forces not directly associated with consciousness

(viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行)

According to Vasubandhu's Commentary About the Collection of Verses on the Spiritual Science (Abhidharma Kośa Bhāṣyam, 阿毘達磨俱舍論) there are fourteen kinds of motive force (saṃskāra, 行) recognized to not be directly associated with consciousness (viprayukta, 不相應). His later Discourse on the Hundred Characteristics of Purpose in the Greater Vehicle Doctrine (Mahāyāna Śāta Dharmā Prakāśa Mukha Śāstra, 大乘百法明門論) and other works of The School on the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra, 瑜伽宗) expanded this to twenty-four kinds, adding five defining the stream of purpose, three defining orientation in space & time and two defining the relationship between harmony (wholeness) and disharmony (partiality). This full list includes:

- A. In Terms of Purpose:
 - #1 Endowment or non-endowment with a purpose (prāpti aprāpti, 得非得)
 - #2 The differences of these purposes in individual sentient beings (pṛthag janatva, 異生性)
 - #3 Group (collective) purposes (nikāya sabhāgatā, 衆同分)
 - #4 The survival instinct (jīvita indriya, 命根)
- B. In Terms of Transcendental States:
 - #5 Penetrations of meditative resolve beyond mental associations (asaṃjñi samāpatti, 無想定)
 - #6 Completely transcendent penetration of meditative resolve (nirodha samāpatti, 滅盡定)
 - #7 The ripening and fruition of trance states that transcend mental associations (asaṃjñi vipāka, 無想果)
- C. In Terms of the Characteristics of Conditional Purpose (The Phases of Their Existence):
 - #8 Birth (jāti, 生) Arising, coming into existence
 - #9 Stability (sthititā, 住) Duration, continuity
 - #10 Instability (anyathātva, 異) Transformation, maturity
 - #11 Extinction (niruddha, 滅); Perishing, going into non-existence
- D. In Terms of the Verbalized Expression of Purpose:
 - #12 Sets of letters (vyañjana kāya, 文身)
 - #13 Sets of words (nāma kāya, 名身)
 - #14 Sets of phrasings (pada kāya, 句身)
- E. In Terms of the Stream of Purpose:
 - #15 The courses of evolving purpose (pravṛtti, 流轉)
 - #16 The diverging and differentiation of these different courses (pratiniyama, 定異)
 - #17 The associations and converging of these different courses (samyoga, 相應)
 - #18 The speed of these courses (jāvanya, 勢速)
 - #19 The sequential steps, or orders of progress on these courses (anukrama, 次第)
- F. In Terms of Orientation in Space & Time:
 - #20 Location in Place (deśa, 方)
 - #21 Location in Time (kāla, 時)
 - #22 Quantity (saṃkhyā, 數)
- G. In Terms of the Relationship Between Harmony and Disharmony:
 - #23 Synthesis; integration into wholeness (sāmagrī, 和合性)

#24 Analysis; disintegration into partiality (asāmagrī, 不和合性)

Kuṇḍī added: Motive forces that are *not directly* associated with consciousness (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行) include those that are *not* in the categories of:

1. Form (rūpa, 色)
2. Consciousness (vijñāna, 識)
3. Mental states (caitta, 心所) directly associated with consciousness (samprayukta, 相應), including emotional feelings (vedanā, 受), mental associations (saṃjñā, 想) and other motive forces (saṃskāra, 行)
4. That which is unconditional (asaṃskṛta dharma, 無為)

1. A general refutation of their real existence apart from consciousness

Question: These motive forces not directly associated with consciousness (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行) are also said to be without any real existential nature apart from consciousness. Why is this so?

Answer: Endowment or non-endowment with purpose (prāpti aprāpti, 得非得) and the rest of the (twenty-four) motive forces not directly associated with consciousness do not have real existential natures or characteristics of their own apart from the mind because:

- a. They have no useful functions (kriyā, 作用) that are different from form, the mind and its mental states. Because of this, we know that they necessarily do not have any real existential nature of their own apart from consciousness and are only hypothetically established as different stages of development (avasthā, 分位) found in form, the mind and its mental states.
- b. Because they definitely do not have any existential natures or functions that are different from those of form, the mind and its mental states, like them, they are said to be included among the projections of purpose (skandha, 蘊). More specifically, they are included among the projections of motive force (saṃskāra skandha, 行蘊).
- c. Some say that it is because these motive forces are not included among form, the mind and its mental states or unconditional purposes, like things that are ultimately without existence, that they do not have a real existential nature apart from consciousness.
- d. Some say that it is because they are not included among these other things said to be real, just like other hypothetical purposes, that they have no real existential nature of their own apart from consciousness.

2. Specific refutations of their real existential nature apart from consciousness

A. *In terms of purpose*

#1 *Endowment or non-endowment with purpose* (prāpti aprāpti, 得非得)

1. *Thesis:* There is a real existential nature of endowment with purpose apart from the mind.

Question: Why do those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) understand that endowment or non-endowment with purposes are real existential natures and functions that are distinct from form, the mind and mental states?

Answer:

Because in the scriptures it is said that certain kinds of personalities (pudgalas, 補特伽羅) acquire certain kinds of virtuous or immoral purposes. For example, noble beings (ārya sattva, 聖者) acquire the ten virtues of those who no longer need any further spiritual training (daśānām aśaikṣāṇām dharmāṇām, 十無學法). These are::

1. Proper vision (samyag dṛṣṭi, 正見)
2. Proper deliberation (samyak saṁkalpa, 正思惟)
3. Proper speech (samyag vāc, 正語)
4. Proper action (samyak karmānta, 正業)
5. Proper livelihood (samyag ājīva, 正命)
6. Proper exertion (samyag vyāyāma, 正精進)
7. Proper remembrance (samyak smṛti, 正念)
8. Proper resolve (samyak samādhi, 正定)
9. Proper determination (samyag adhimokṣa, 正勝解) &
10. Proper transcendental knowledge of the nature of life's purpose (samyag jñāna, 正智).

With regards to non-endowment with purposes, it is said in the scriptures that ordinary beings (pṛthagjanas, 異生) do not acquire nobility of purpose (ārya dharma, 聖法) while truly worthy beings (arhats, 諸阿羅漢)¹² do not acquire emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱)⁷. In acquiring or not acquiring these purposes, they are either said to be endowed with them (prāpti, 得) or not endowed with them (aprāpti, 非得).

2. *Disproving any real existence of endowment with purposes apart from consciousness*

The scriptures do not actually say here that endowment (or non-endowment) has a real existential nature or function that is different from that of form, the mind or its mental states, so they are not conclusive on this subject.

a. *Distinguishing between endowment with purposes (prāpti, 得) and the acquisition (pariprāpti, 成) of mastery over purposes (vaśitā, 自在):*

1. The scriptures also say that the ruler of a world (cakravartin, 輪王) acquires seven kinds of treasure - gold, elephants, swift horses, desirable women, loyal generals, able ministers and a queen - but how can they really acquire other lives or insentient objects like this?
2. Even The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) admits that it is impossible to actually 'acquire' other sentient beings or insentient objects, saying that they really only acquire a mastery over them.
3. When those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes claim that the ruler of a world is really just employing his power of mastery over the lives of other sentient beings and insentient objects and he is only hypothetically said to acquire them, why don't they admit the same to be true for the acquisition of virtuous or immoral purposes instead of holding that this latter kind of endowment really exists?
4. Those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes respond that it is only because these seven treasures exist in the present that the ruler of a world is hypothetically said to acquire or possess them when he is really just employing his power of mastery over them, but when the scriptures speak about being endowed or not endowed with certain moral purposes it is referring to objects that are not limited to the present.
5. We reply to this by asking 'how can one know that virtuous or evil purposes have an existence apart from the present'?
 - a. Logically that which is real cannot exist apart from the present.
 - b. Even the seeds of future moral purposes (good & bad) must be found in the present.

b. *What are the special functions of endowment with purpose according to The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) (and how are these theories disproven)?*

1. When they say that it is through endowment with the capacity to produce purposes (utpādayati, 能起) that there is endowment with them (prāpti, 得):
 - a. There should also be the capacity to produce unconditional purposes (which are not something that can be produced).
 - b. Moral purposes should never arise from insentient beings (since, even according to this school, they are without any such capacity).
 - c. There can be no capacity to produce purposes that have not yet been acquired (e.g., for a higher sense of purpose) or have already been lost.
2. When they say that the capacity to produce purposes and endowment with purposes occur simultaneously (sahajāta prāpti, 俱生得):
 - a. Holding that these purposes are somehow produced twice would serve no useful function.
 - b. In simultaneously having capacities to produce and being endowed with virtuous, evil and morally undefined purposes, these different purposes should all be manifested before one suddenly at the same time.
3. When they say that purposes arise because of a capacity to produce them, an endowment with them and other factors as well, their whole thesis about endowment really ends up serving no useful function.
4. When they say that the capacity to produce purposes is the reason sentient beings acquire them and do not lose them, we reply that all purposes that can be acquired are inseparable from the very nature of sentient existence. If they were really separate from it, sentient beings could not acquire them or be endowed with them.

And so this thesis of combining the capacity to produce purposes with an endowment with them serves no real use, because endowment does not really have an existential nature on its own apart from the mind, and non-endowment with capacity does not really exist this way either.

3. *The correct thesis about acquisition (pariprāpti, 成) & endowment (prāpti, 得):*
In reality, in depending on the conscious purposes acquired by sentient beings at the various stages of their spiritual development, there are said to be three kinds of acquisition (pariprāpti, 成).
 - a. Acquisition of the seeds (potentialities) of purpose (bīja pariprāpti, 種子成就) within the subconscious mind
 - b. Acquisition of masteries over these purposes (vaśitā pariprāpti, 自在成就)
 - c. Acquisition of the manifested behaviors (samudācāra pariprāpti, 現行成就) of these purposes in the conscious mind.

#2 *The differences of purposes in individual sentient beings* (pṛthag janatva, 異生性)

In distinction to acquiring capacities (pariprāpti, 成), there is a 'non-acquisition' of capacities (apariprāpti, 不成就) that is also purely hypothetical. Although there are many kinds of non-acquisition described, the term 'unacquired capacity' is most properly applied to those who have suppressed emotional disturbances in the three-fold sphere of sentient existence⁴ through a transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana heya bīja, 見所斷種) but have not yet forever destroyed the seeds of these emotional disturbances in the subconscious mind. The term 'non-endowment' (aprāpti 非得) is hypothetically applied to the nature of ordinary sentient beings (pṛthag janatva, 異生性) because they have not yet acquired nobility of purpose (ārya dharma, 聖法).

#3 *Group (collective) purposes* (sabhāgatā, 同分);

1. *Thesis: There is a real existential nature of group purposes apart from consciousness*

Question: Why do those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes

(Sarvāstivāda, 有部) understand that group purposes (sabhāgatā, 同分) really exist on their own apart from form, the mind and mental states?

Answer: Because the scriptures speak of there being the group purposes of divine beings (deva sabhāgatā, 天同分), human beings (manuṣya sabhāgatā, 人同分) and others who share the same purpose.

2. *Disproving the real existence of group purposes apart from consciousness:*

The scriptures never actually say that group purposes (sabhāgatā, 同分) have a real existential nature of their own apart from form, the mind and mental states, so the contention that they do is not conclusive.

- a. Those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes claim that this nature of group purpose does really exist on its own apart from consciousness because it leads to the arising of a shared knowledge and language among sentient beings. If this is so, there should also be group purposes for grasses, trees and all other groups of beings (since they each have their own common characteristics). And if only group purposes bring about group knowledge and group language, then these group knowledges and languages should exist as their own distinct group purposes as well. If they are not needed, why should the former be needed? (And where would this further subdivision into groups end?)
- b. Those from the later School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (such as Saṃghabhadra, 衆賢) claim that this nature of group purpose really exists apart from consciousness because it leads human beings to cooperate with each other towards the same goals (samāna arthatā, 同事) and shared mutual interests (parijñātu kāma, 同欲知). This contention is also logically flawed. Similar habitual forces learned from the past (pūrva abhyāsa, 宿習) account for the arising of shared goals and desires. What need is there to hold that there is a real existence of group purposes that is separate and distinct from consciousness?

3. *The correct thesis about group capacity:*

In reality, the term 'group capacity' (sabhāgatā, 同分) is only a mental construct that is hypothetically established to distinguish the similar mental and physical characteristics that are found in different sentient beings.

#4 *Capacity for life; the survival instinct* (jīvita indriya, 命根)

1. *Thesis: There is the real existential nature of a survival instinct apart from consciousness.*

Question: Why do those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes

(Sarvāstivāda, 有部) understand that there is a distinct survival instinct or capacity for life (jīvita indriya, 命根) that has a real existential nature apart from physical form, the mind and its mental states?

Answer: Because the scriptures speak of there being three capacities that support each other:

#1 *The survival instinct* (jīva or āyus, 壽)

This refers to the need for air, water, food, sleep, relief, etc., that works through the metabolism of the vital organs (and the autonomic nervous system), enabling survival.

#2 *Bodily warmth* (uṣman, 煖)

This refers to virility, enabling reproduction and survival beyond the individual level.

#3 Primordial consciousness (vijñāna 識)

This refers to the source of the mind, enabling the capacity for awareness and memory.

One should understand that the term 'life' (jīva or āyus, 壽) here is a reference to the survival instinct (jīvita indriya, 命根).

2. *Disproving the real existence of a survival instinct apart from consciousness:*

These scriptures never actually say that the survival instinct of a continuous life (jīva or āyus, 壽) has a real existential nature apart from form, the mind and mental states and so the contention that it does is not conclusive. We proved conclusively before that form (rūpa, 色) is inseparable from consciousness (this is true of bodily heat as well). Since a continuous life consists of bodily heat and physical form, there should be no distinct survival instinct that exists apart from consciousness. If this survival instinct had a real existence apart from it, one should be able to become detached from it like one can from emotional feelings or mental associations. However, in this case, it would then not really be a survival instinct.

Question from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部):

If the survival instinct does not have a real existential nature apart from consciousness, why do the scriptures speak about these three capacities supporting each other?

Answer: They explain the meaning of these three capacities to distinguish the different aspects of consciousness, just as the four proper moral exertions (catvāri samyak prahāṇāni, 四正斷)¹⁶ distinguish the different aspects found in diligence of effort (vīrya, 勤) but are really inseparable from it.

Another Question from this school: If this is so, should not those who abide in the states of meditative resolve that transcend any activity of the conscious mind (acittaka, 無心位) also be without any survival instinct or bodily warmth?

Answer: Do not the scriptures say that consciousness never leaves the physical body?

Question: If this is so, why are these meditations said to be beyond any conscious activity of the mind (acittaka, 無心位)?

Answer: In these states of deep meditation, the seven evolving manifestations of consciousness (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識) are transcended but not their source, the primordial consciousness (mūla vijñāna, 本識) with its subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) (and so here the survival instinct and bodily warmth still remain). Later we will elaborate on the reasons for the existence of this primordial consciousness. Its existential nature is enough to include:

- * The three-fold sphere of sentient existence⁴; its desires, the objective reality of its form and its existential principles that are beyond form
- * The six destinies (gatis, 趣) that span from the torments of hell to the bliss of heaven, and
- * The four kinds of rebirth (yonis, 趣生); through moisture, through eggs, through the womb and through spiritual transformation

This is because:

- a. It pervades all of sentient existence.
- b. It abides constantly and continuously.
- c. All other projections of consciousness are the fruits of its different ripening seeds (vipāka phala, 異熟果).

There is no reason to bother with holding that there is the real existential nature

of a survival instinct that is distinct and separable from it.

3. *The correct thesis about the survival instinct:*

In reality, this survival instinct (jīvita indriya, 命根) is the foundation that serves as the direct cause for these seeds of consciousness in the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識). Because actions (karmas, 諸業) induce the different potentialities of these seeds, there is the hypothetical establishment of a 'capacity for life' or 'survival instinct' for a determined length of time.

B. In terms of transcendental states:

There are three levels:

- #5 The penetration of meditative resolve beyond any mental associations (asaṃjñi samāpatti, 無想定) found in the highest (fourth) level of meditation on the objective reality of sentient existence that is its sphere of form (rūpa dhātu, 色界).
- #6 The completely transcendent penetration of resolve (nirodha samāpatti, 滅盡定) found in the highest (fourth) level of meditation on the existential principles of sentient existence that is its sphere beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色界).
- #7 The ripening and fruition of trance states beyond any mental associations (asaṃjñi vipāka, 無想果) found in the sphere of desire for sentient existence (kāma dhātu, 欲界).

1. *On the first two levels; the penetrations of meditative resolve* (samāpattis, 定):

#5 *The penetration of resolve beyond any mental associations* (asaṃjñi samāpatti, 無想定) *found in the highest (fourth) level of meditation in the sphere of form*

#6 *The completely transcendent penetration of resolve* (nirodha samāpatti, 滅盡定) *found in the highest (fourth) level of meditation in the sphere beyond form*

a. *Thesis: There are penetrations of meditative resolve in the two higher spheres (those of form & that beyond form) that have a real existential nature apart from consciousness.*

Question: Why do those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) understand that there are two penetrations of resolve (samāpattis, 定) as well as trance states in the sphere of desire that all go beyond any mental associations (asaṃjñika, 無想) and other ripening seeds of the subconscious (vipāka vijñāna, 異熟), and that these have an existential nature (svabhāva, 自性) that is real and distinguished from form, the mind and mental states?

Answer: They reason that if they did not have a real existential nature apart from consciousness, they would not be able to suppress mental activity so that the conscious mind and its states no longer arise and become manifest.

b. *Disproving the real existence of these penetrations of resolve apart from consciousness*

1. If there are meditative states beyond any conscious mental activity that really exist distinct from form, the mind and its mental states and are able to prevent any mental activity called 'penetrations of resolve beyond any consciousness' (acittika samāpatti, 無想定), then there should also be meditative states in the sphere of existential principles beyond form (arūpa dhātu, 無色) that really exist distinct from form, the mind and its mental states and are able to prevent the activity of form called 'penetrations of resolve beyond any form' (arūpa samāpattis, 無色定). Since the latter states do not really exist, why should the former?

2. And why is a real existential nature of these penetrations of resolve apart from consciousness needed to suppress and prevent mental activity when their

hypothetical existence serves just as well? It is just like how a levee or dam only hypothetically exists when there is no water for it to hold back, but it is still able to prevent a flood when conditions warrant.

- c. *The correct thesis about the penetration of meditative resolve* (samāpatti, 定):
When cultivating the resolve of meditation (samādhi, 定) in the preparatory stages (prayoga avasthā, 加行位) of intensified motivation (abhisamṣkāra, 加行), one has a loathing and disgust for coarse and unstable states of mind and therefore inspires an excellence of dedication (praṇidhāna viśeṣa, 勝願) that prevents these states of mind from arising any further. This causes one's mental state to gradually become ever more subtle and refined. When the mind becomes extremely subtle and refined, just before entering into a penetration of resolve (samāpatti, 定), this dedication perfumes the different ripening seeds of the subconscious mind (vipāka vijñāna, 異熟識) until one acquires the strongest possible seeds of disgust for any such mental activity. Because of this, one weakens and subdues the seeds of all coarse and unstable mental activity until they are temporarily without any manifestation (samudācāra, 現行) in the conscious mind. In depending on these incremental stages of cultivation, these two penetrations of meditative resolve are hypothetically established. Since the seeds of this cultivation are virtuous (kuśala, 善), the penetrations of resolve that are attained (the fruits) are also said to be virtuous.

2. *The third transcendental state:*

#7 *The ripening and fruition of trance states beyond any mental associations*
(asaṃjñi vipāka, 無想果)

Trance includes ecstatic states (in the sphere of desire) that transcend normal awakened consciousness. These may occur intentionally or unintentionally. They can be induced through invocations, breath control, meditations, ritual observances, hypnosis, emotional hysteria, sexual release as well as certain kinds of drugs, music and other catalysts. As in dreams, through trance states the subconscious mind has a chance to express itself without interference or suppression from the conscious mind. They are a way to release repressed or unconscious dispositions that could not otherwise find expression.

Prior to attaining a penetration of resolve (samāpatti, 定) that transcends mental associations, there is a seeking of the fruits of trance (asaṃjñi vipāka, 無想果) through the conscious mind. The seeking of these kinds of mental resolve causes there to be the acquisition of the seeds of trance which perfume the subconscious mind and ultimately lead to its fruits arising from their different ripenings (vipāka vijñāna, 異熟識).

- a. These trance states that transcend mental associations (asaṃjñika, 無想) are temporarily established through incremental states of dependence on mental resolve that prevent explicit and ever-changing states of mental associations and emotional feelings from being manifested (in the conscious mind).
b. They get the name 'different ripenings' (vipāka, 異熟) from their dependence on the different seeds ripening to fruition from within the subconscious mind.

Kuījī added: Just as it is allowed that, where there is the absence of mental activity in the seven evolving manifestations of consciousness (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識) when there is only dependence on the primordial consciousness (mūla vijñāna, 本識) and its subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) as a foundation of support (āśraya, 所依), a state of mental non-activity is hypothetically established as 'the transcendence of mental associations' (asaṃjñika, 無想). This absence of conscious mental activity is not really caused by the different ripening of seeds in the

subconscious mind but, in directly depending on them, these trance states are said to be 'the ripening of fruits that transcend mental associations' (asaṃjñi vipāka, 無想果).

3. Conclusion about transcendental states

As a consequence, these three transcendental states (the two penetrations of meditative resolve and the ripening of trance states) attained from getting beyond mental associations do not have a real existential nature of their own apart from consciousness.

The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness

Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi, 成唯識論

End of Volume One

The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness

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Beginning of Volume Two

C. *In terms of the characteristics of conditional purpose* (saṃskṛta lakṣaṇaḥ, 有為相):

The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 一切有部) claims that, while the identities (ātman, 我) of all things are unreal, impermanent and only arise for fleeting moments (kṣaṇika, 一剎那), there are conditional purposes (saṃskṛta dharma, 有為法) underlying them that are real and eternal, forever existing in the past, present & future. Being conditional (saṃskṛta, 有為法) is a reference to them being subject to cause and effect. There are four characteristics (catur lakṣaṇaḥ, 四相) of a life-cycle (kalpa, 劫) these conditional purposes go through that they claim have a real existential nature apart from consciousness:

#8 *Birth* (jāti, 生): Arising, coming into existence from non-existence

#9 *Stability* (sthititā, 住): Duration, remaining continuously the same,

#10 *Instability* (anyathātva, 異): Changing, transformation and maturity

#11 *Extinction* (niruddha, 滅): Perishing, going into non-existence from existence

1. *Thesis: The characteristics of conditional purpose have a real existence apart from the mind.*

Question: Why do those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes

(Sarvāstivāda, 有部) understand that the characteristics of conditional purpose (saṃskṛta lakṣaṇaḥ, 有為相) have a real existential nature apart from form, the mind and its mental states?

Answer: Because the scriptures speak of all conditional purposes being endowed with the three characteristics of #1 birth, #2 existence and #3 extinction, and then elaborate on them at length.

2. *Disproving the real existence of these characteristics apart from consciousness*

However, these scriptures never actually say that these characteristics of purpose have a real existential nature (svabhāva, 自性) that is apart from form, the mind and its mental states, so the contention that they do is not conclusive.

Kuīji added: In the greater vehicle (Mahāyāna, 大乘) scriptures and discourses on collective spiritual awakening, the four characteristics of #1 birth, #2 stability, #3 instability and #4 extinction are said to be neither identical with nor different from form, the mind and its mental states.

Kuīji also added: Those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes claim that the characteristics of conditional purpose (saṃskṛta lakṣaṇaḥ, 有為相) have distinct natures of their own that exist apart from consciousness.

Kuīji also added: *There was an objection from this School on the Real Existence of All Purposes that said:*

By speaking in the genitive (possessive) case (śaṣṭhī śibhakti, 第六聲) when saying that ‘conditional purposes are endowed with characteristics’ (saṃskṛta lakṣaṇaḥ, 有為相), are not conditional purposes being imbued with a sense of ownership? Just as the (wicked) Devadatta and the white (holy) clothes he wore could be distinguished from each other, so the characteristics of conditional purpose and purposes themselves are each said have their own distinct existential nature.

Answer to the objection: The use of the genitive (possessive) case here does not mean that conditional purposes and their characteristics are separable. Likewise, although there is a fundamental duality between the natures of form and consciousness, one cannot exist without the other.

Kuīji adds *Another Objection:* This School on the Real Existence of All Purposes countered that the terms ‘that being characterized’ (lakṣya, 能相) and ‘characteristics’ (lakṣaṇa, 所相) imply there is a difference between an existential nature and a characteristic, just as smoke is an expression of fire and the thirty-two characteristics (dvātriṃśa lakṣaṇa, 三十二相) found in the greatness of humanity (mahā puruṣa, 大士) characterize a buddha or other great man of destiny.¹⁹ Therefore, it was claimed that there is indeed a distinction between conditional purposes and their characteristics.

Answer: The characteristics (lakṣaṇa, 所相) and the existential nature (svabhāva, 體) of that being characterized (lakṣya, 能相) are necessarily inseparable. For example, the solidity (dṛḍhatva, 堅相) of earth (pṛthivī, 地) is not something different from the elemental nature of earth itself. And if the characteristic of a conditional purpose is different from its nature (that being characterized), why shouldn't the nature and characteristic of an unconditional purpose (like empty space, which is not subject to cause and effect) also be different from each other?

Objection: Those from this school then countered by saying that if the characteristics of birth, stability, instability and extinction simultaneously co-exist within a (single) existential nature, their different functions would be always be occurring at all times. However, since their functions are in contradiction with each other, they cannot all suddenly rise up together at the same time.

Answer: If an existential nature was in contradiction with its characteristics, how could they simultaneously co-exist? Furthermore, the functions of stability, instability and extinction cannot have simultaneity with birth.

Objection: Those from this school then said that the existential nature of that being characterized (lakṣya, 能相) and its characteristics (lakṣaṇa, 所相) always co-exist just as do their functions because an existential nature (svabhāva, 體) and its function (kriyā, 用) are inseparable.

Answer: If it is claimed that the different functions of consciousness (which are subject to interruption) are only based on the conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣)¹⁴ (in which the existential nature of consciousness is continuously occurring without interruption), it would either mean that the conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness do not exist at all times or that the characteristics of birth, stability, instability and extinction really have no functionality (since the conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness would already completely explain the cause and effect of conditional purposes).

- a. If the conditional purposes that are characterized are forever existing yet endowed with the characteristics of birth, stability, instability and extinction, then unconditional purposes (like empty space) could just as easily have these characteristics because there would be no reason why one had these characteristics and the other did not.
- b. And the past and future are not eternal, nor do they exist in the present. Like blossoms in the sky, they do not have any real existence apart from the imagined speculations of the mind.
 1. Birth is said to have existence so how could it be in the future?
 2. Extinction is said to have non-existence so it should not be in the present.
 3. If extinction is not without existence, birth should be without existence (because these two should contradict each other).
 4. And with stability of duration being in contradiction with extinction, how can they both be held to exist at the same time?
 5. The stability of duration is not in contradiction with birth, so why should they be said to occur at different times?

Therefore, we conclude that these theories held by those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) raise dilemmas that show them to be logically flawed.

3. *The correct thesis about the characteristics of conditional purposes:*
 Through the power arising from conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣), conditional purposes (samskṛta dharmāḥ, 有為法) come into existence from non-existence. After existing for a moment, they return to non-existence. In order to express their difference from unconditional purposes (asamskṛta dharma, 無為法) (like empty space), it is hypothetically established that they have these four characteristics (catvāri lakṣaṇāni, 四相).
- Originally without existence, they come into existence and are said to have birth (jati, 生).
 - Having been born, they endure for a certain period of time during which they are said to have stability (sthititā, 住).
 - In changing over time, they are said to have instability (anyathātva, 異).
 - Having existed for a certain period of time they return back into non-existence. When they no longer exist, they are said to have extinction (niruddha, 滅).

The first three exist and so are in the present.

The last one is without existence and so is said to be in the past.

Question: How can something that is non-existent and unconditional (like extinction) be a characteristic of something that is conditional?

Answer: What is wrong with expressing the later unconditional aspect of something that is now conditional?

- Birth expresses the existence of something now that was without existence.
- Extinction expresses the later non-existence of something existing now or that did exist before.
- Instability expresses the existence of something that is changing and not frozen in time.
- Stability expresses the existence of something that serves a purpose (function) for a defined period of time.

And so, although all of these four characteristics are about conditional purposes, they each express different phases of them. These four are each established hypothetically based on the different moments (kṣaṇa, 剎那) of a conditional purpose, yet together they also establish all the different phases that it goes through as a whole.

- Upon first existing it is said to have arisen (been born).
 - After it no longer exists it is said to have perished (been extinguished).
 - Having been born, it seems to be continuous and so is said to have stability.
 - When this continuity evolves and is transformed, it is said to have instability.
- Therefore, these four characteristics are all established as hypothetical constructs (prajñapti, 假立) that serve as metaphors (upacāra, 假說) in the mind.

D. In terms of the verbalized expression of purpose, there are:

#12 Sets of Letters (vyañjana kāya, 文身); the building blocks of alphabets, the soundings of syllables

#13 Sets of Words (nāma kāya, 名身); vocabularies, combinations of letters that are associated with meanings

#14 Sets of Phrasings (pada kāya, 句身); combining words into threads of sentences and weaving these threads into the fabrics of narrative

1. *Thesis: Letters, words and phrasings have a real existential nature apart from consciousness*
Question: Why do those from this School on the Real Existence of All Purposes
(Sarvāstivāda, 有部) understand that these letters, words & phrasings expressing
and communicating meaning and purpose have a real existential nature of their
own apart from form, the mind and its mental states?
Answer: Because the scriptures speak about the Buddha, upon becoming enlightened,
acquiring a wonderful corpus (āścarya kāya, 希有身) of letters, words and
phrasings expressing the true nature of life's greater purpose.
2. *Disproving a real existential nature of letters, words & phrasings apart from consciousness:*
These scriptures do not actually say that these letters, words and phrasings have a
real existence apart from form, the mind and its mental states, so their contention
that they do have such a nature is not conclusive.
 - a. If voiced letters, words and phrasings had a real existential nature of their own that was distinct from the mere uttering of noises, they would not just be nominal (bruvat, 能詮), like their visible forms (written letters, words and phrasings).
 - b. Some from this School on the Real Existence of All Purposes claim that, in the voicing of articulated noises, there is the ability to produce letters, words and phrasings, but there must also be an inflection of the voice through the use of vowels (svara, 韻), consonants (vyañjana, 屈曲), augmentations (anusvāra, 隨韻) and endings (visarga, 止韻), and only these are what are really needed for this expression and communication of meaning and purpose. If this is so, there is no real need for there to be a real existential nature of the soundings, words and phrasings themselves.
 - c. Later proponents of this school (such as Saṃghabhadra, 僧伽跋陀羅 or 衆賢) suggest that these inflections and modulations of articulation found in the voice are the very letters, words and phrasings themselves and that they have a real existential nature apart from the voiced noise one hears. If this is so, then why shouldn't the different shapes, sizes and other variations that are seen in written words also have a real existential nature that is distinct from their visible form?
 - d. To the claim made by some of this school that inflections and modulations do not by themselves express or communicate meaning and purpose because they are just like the notes that are played on stringed or wind instruments, we reply that, like these instruments, the sound of the human voice alone does not produce letters, words & phrasings. But, in any case, who is saying that meaning and purpose cannot be expressed or communicated through the human voice?
 - e. There are some from this school who reply that, if the sound of the human voice is able to express and communicate meaning and purpose, then wind chimes should also have this function. To this, we reply that the sound of the voice by itself is like a musical instrument in being unable by itself to really produce a corpus of letters, words and phrases. If the sound of the voice alone were able to produce them, why not allow that it could also express meaning and purpose without letters, words and meanings?
 - f. Those from this school then ask by what logic can one be certain that it is the sound of the voice that is able to express meaning and purpose, not the letters, words and phrases? We reply with a question. How can you know that there are letters, words & phrasings that distinctly express meaning and purpose apart from the human voice?
 1. That speech is inseparable from the mind expressing meaning and purpose is

- understood by humans (in communicating) and divine beings (in prayer and meditative states) alike.
2. Those who hold that they are somehow separated from each other have a unique need for the love and compassion of heaven (due to their ignorance).
 3. *The correct thesis about letters, words and phrasings:*
In reality, the corpus of letters, words & phrasings are hypothetically established on the basis of the various different articulations of the voice.
 - a. Words (nāma, 名) express existential natures that are identified
 - b. Phrasings (pada, 句) express their distinctions and associations, and
 - c. Letters (vyañjana, 文) are the syllabic characters, soundings or phonemes (akṣara, 字) that serve as the basis (āśraya, 所依) for the first two (morphemes).
Although these three have no distinct nature of their own apart from the sound of the voice, there is a difference between what is hypothetical and what is real, and they are not really identical with the existential nature that is found within the sound of the voice.

Kuñji added: Letters, words and phrasings are only hypothetical while, within the sound of the voice, there is the real existential nature of a mind, and so there is the difference between the hypothetical and the real. Consequently, letters, words and phrasings are not merely identical with the sound of the voice and are not directly involved in the alignment of the ears with audible sound (śabda āyatana, 聲). However, the meaning of the different distinctions of the voice are said to be found in its letters, words and phrasings. Through expressing and communicating meaning and purpose, there are deemed to be motive forces that are not directly associated with the mind (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行). Because they are inseparable from the seeds that arise from the subconscious mind, they are only hypothetically said to be identical with the sound of the voice.

 - a. Because of this, there is an unhindered understanding (pratimsaṃvid, 無礙解) of the distinction between purpose (dharma, 法) and its verbal expression (nirukti, 詞). The objectives between these two are distinguished differently. The sound of the voice and the letters, words and phrasings are each found differently within the projections of purpose (skandhas, 蘊), the alignments of subject & object (āyatana, 處) and the spheres of sentient existence (dhātu, 界).
 - b. Furthermore, it is only in terms of certain arenas of enlightenment (buddha kṣetra, 佛土) that letters, words and phrasings are hypothetically based on the sound of the voice (śabda, 聲). This is not said of all 'lands of enlightenment' because, in other ones, letters, words and phrasings are hypothetically based on illuminations of light (āloka, 光明), sublime fragrances (sugandha, 妙香), flavors (rasa, 味) and other objects of the senses.

E.-G. In terms of the other motive forces that are not directly associated with the mind

1. *The existence of latent emotional disturbances (anuśayas, 隨眠) apart from consciousness:*
Some schools such as The School of the Majority (Mahā Saṃghika, 大眾部) and The School of the Teacher Who Transformed His Land (Mahīśāsaka, 化地部) held that latent, inactive emotional disturbances (anuśayas, 隨眠) exist apart from the mind and its mental states and so should be considered to be motive forces that are not directly associated with consciousness (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行). This idea is also logically flawed because these latent motive forces even have the same names as their active, conscious counterparts; the primary emotional disturbances of greed, hatred, delusion, pride, doubt and false beliefs. Like them, they are motive forces that are *directly* associated with the mind (saṃprayukta saṃskāra, 相應行).

2. Other motive forces not directly associated with the mind:

According to Vasubandhu's Discourse on the Hundred Characteristics of Purpose in the Greater Vehicle Doctrine (Mahāyāna Śata Dharmā Prakāśa Mukha Śāstra, 大乘百法明門論), Asaṅga's Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna Abhidharma Samuccaya, 大乘阿毘達磨集論) and other works from The School on the Practice of Engaged Meditation (Yogācāra, 瑜伽宗), the motive forces not directly associated with consciousness (viprayukta saṃskāra, 不相應行) also include the following ten:

E. In Terms of the Streams of Purpose:

#15 The courses of evolving purpose (pravṛtti, 流轉) refers to continuities of cause and effect (hetu phala prabandha, 因果相續) that are without interruption (anupaccheda, 相續).

#16 The diverging of these different courses (pratiniyama, 定異) refers to cause and effect branching out into different courses (hetu phala nānātva, 因果種種差別).

#17 The converging of these different courses (yoga, 相應) refers to the interactions, associations and blending of different courses of cause and effect (hetu phala ānurūpa, 因果相稱).

#18 The speed of these courses (jāvanya, 勢速) refers to the velocity at which courses of cause and effect evolve (hetu phala āsu pravṛtti, 因果迅疾流轉).

#19 The sequential steps, or orders of progress on these courses (anukrama, 次第) refers to a linear order of cause & effect on any given course (ekatva pravṛtti, 因果一一流轉) over space & time.

F. In Terms of Orientation in Space & Time:

#20 Location in place (deśa, 方) refers to the different distinctions of this cause and effect (hetu phala prabedha pravṛtti, 因果差別) found in the ten directions of space.

#21 Location in time (kāla, 時) refers to the different distinctions in the stream of this cause and effect (hetu phala prabandha pravṛtti, 因果相續流轉) over successive periods of time.

#22 Quantity (saṃkhyā, 數) refers to accounting for each of the different examples found of these same motive forces (ekaika saṃskāra prabheda, 諸行一一差別).

G. In Terms of the Relationship Between Harmony and Disharmony:

#23 Synthesis, integration into wholeness (sāmagrī, 和合性) refers to the synchronization of all these different conditions of cause & effect into a harmonious unity (hetu phala pratyaya samavadhāna, 因果眾緣集和合).

#24 Analysis, disintegration into partiality (asāmagrī, 不和合性) refers to a fragmentation of these conditions into disharmony (hetu phala pratyaya saṃgha bheda, 因果眾緣不和合).

The thesis that any of these has a real existential nature apart from consciousness should be rejected in accordance with the logical reasoning already employed.

c. Unconditional Purposes (asaṃskṛta dharmāḥ, 諸無為法):

According to The Discourse on the Hundred Characteristics of Purpose in the Greater Vehicle Doctrine, The Compendium on the Spiritual Science of the Greater Vehicle and other works of the School on the Practice of Engaged Meditation, there are six ways to recognize unconditional purposes not subject to cause & effect:

- #1 The boundless emptiness that contains and transcends the space/time continuum (ākāśa, 虛空)
- #2 The nature of transcendence acquired through spiritual effort (pratisaṃkhyā nirodha, 擇滅)
- #3 The nature of transcendence not acquired through any spiritual effort (apratisaṃkhyā nirodha, 非擇滅)
- #4 The nature of unchanging, unshakeable purpose (āniñjya, 不動)
- #5 The nature of transcendence beyond any mental associations or emotional feelings (saṃjñā vedayita nirodha, 滅受想)
- #6 The transcendental nature of the dialectical principle (tathatā, 真如)

The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) only recognized the first three.

Thesis: Unconditional purposes have a real existential nature apart from consciousness

This is a position held by those from The School on the Real Existence of All Purposes (Sarvāstivāda, 有部) and others.

Generally refuting a real existential nature of unconditional purpose apart from consciousness

This real existence of unconditional purposes apart from the mind is determined to be a logical impossibility.

- a. The existence of conditional purposes (saṃskṛta dharmah, 諸有為法) is generally determined in three ways:
 1. *The perception of them that is directly evident* (vijñeya dr̥ṣṭa dharma, 現所知法):
Kuiji added: This includes the knowing of objects of form through the five sensory projections of consciousness, including the minds and mental states of others.
 2. *The acceptance and use (experience and enjoyment) of them that is directly evident* (upabhoga dr̥ṣṭa dharma, 現受用法): This is comparable to the use of a vessel or the wearing of a garment.
Kuiji: This is a reference to things that only have a hypothetical existence based on the value they have to one and the use to which they can be put.

These first two are commonly understood to exist by those of this world without having to resort to inference and logical reasoning.

3. *Knowledge of them through their functionality* (kārya kāraṇa dharma, 有作用法):
This includes the eyes, ears and other sensory and mental faculties, which one only knows to exist through an introspective awareness of their existence.
- b. The existence of an unconditional purpose (asaṃskṛta dharma, 無為法) is not commonly understood by those of this world, as it is without direct evidence or the functionality that is found in the sensory or mental faculties. In any case, if it was allowed that it had such a functionality, it could not be eternal. Consequently, it is impossible to determine with certainty that an unconditional purpose definitely has a real existential nature of its own. In fact, since the nature of unconditional purpose can only be known or revealed through form, the mind and mental states, it should not be held that it has any real existential nature apart from them.

Disproving the real existential nature of any unconditional purpose apart from the mind:

- a. *Empty Space* (ākāśa, 虛空): Is there but one empty space or are there multiple ones?
If there is but one, it must be everywhere in all places because it contains all forms, minds and mental states. In being able to accommodate all of these things that occupy it, it should also produce multiple spaces because each one does not occupy the space of the others. If this is not so, they should all interpenetrate each other. If it is claimed that empty space is not occupied by these things, then it should not contain them. The other kinds of unconditional purposes are like this as well. And so are there empty spaces within forms, the minds and their states or not?
* If there are, they should become mixed up with each other (saṃsr̥ṣṭa, 相雜).
* If there are not, empty space would not be found everywhere (avyāpin, 不遍).
- b. *The nature of transcendence that is attained through spiritual effort* (pratisaṃkhyā nirodha, 擇滅): Upon severing each class (nikāyā, 部) and grade (prakāra, 品) of attachment⁵, one should attain the respective classes and grades of transcendence that are attained through spiritual effort. If these kinds of transcendence attained through spiritual discovery are all one and the same, then upon severing any single class or grade of attachment to emotional disturbances (kleśa, 煩惱)⁷, there should be transcendence of all other classes and grades of such attachments.
- c. *The nature of transcendence beyond spiritual effort* (apratisaṃkhyā nirodha, 非擇滅):
The same should apply to the transcendence that is not attained through spiritual effort but through the absence of any condition of causality (reason for its existence). When one condition of causality is absent and cannot arise, there are other conditions of causality (associated with it) that should also not arise. In holding that their existential nature is the same in principle, this should logically be the case.

If these first three kinds of unconditional purpose have existential natures that are different, there should be multiple kinds of unconditional purposes that can be divided up into different categories. However, like form, the mind and its different states, they would then not really be unconditional. With this being the case, empty space would not pervade all things and would not contain them all. The beliefs of other schools about the real existential nature of any unconditional purpose apart from the mind and its states should also be disproven this way. And so the idea that any unconditional purpose really exists apart from the mind but is just without any cause and effect, as is suggested by The School of the Majority (Mahā Saṃghika, 大眾部), is just a speculation of the imagination, like those about the horns of rabbits and hairs of turtles.

4. The correct thesis about unconditional purposes:

In fact, the scriptures do say that there is empty space and there are these two other kinds of unconditional purpose. There are two ways that this can be understood:

- a. *Their existence as hypothetical mental constructs (prajñapti, 假施設) that are based on the manifestations of consciousness (vijñāna pariṇāma, 識變):* This is a reference to hearing about the existence of empty space and transcendence, speculating about them and then producing mental images (nimitta, 相) of them through deliberations of the mind. Through the power of repeatedly doing so, the conscious manifestations of these mental images simulate empty space and the other kinds of unconditional purpose whenever they arise in the mind. These mental images of them seem to remain unchanging through successive manifestations and serve as metaphors (upacāra, 假說) for that which is eternal and everlasting (dhruva, 常).
- b. *Their existence as hypothetical mental constructs based on the transcendental nature of life's purpose (dharmatā, 法性):* This is a reference to the transcendental nature of the dialectical principle (bhūta tathatā, 真如) that is revealed through understanding the nature of emptiness and selflessness. The discursive mind grasps it through the box of the tetralemma (catuṣ koṭika, 四句), reasoning that:
 - * It has existence.
 - * It is without existence.
 - * It both exists and does not exist.
 - * It is neither with nor without existence.

The path of the dialectical principle goes beyond all thoughts and words of the discursive mind, and it is neither the same as nor different from all things. Because it is the ultimate transcendental principle it is called the transcendental nature of purpose.

Kuṇḍī added: In explaining the term 'transcendental nature of life's purpose' (dharmatā, 法性):

- * 'Nature' is a reference to its existential nature (svabhāva, 體)
- * Being the transcendental principle (bhūta tathatā, 真理) that is found in the purposes for all things (sarva dharmāḥ, 諸法), it is called 'the transcendental nature of life's purpose'.

Question from Kuṇḍī: Why is there a need to depend on these metaphors about empty space and the two different kinds of transcendence to understand the unconditional nature of life's purpose?

Answer:

1. Because it is free from any obstacles or barriers (āvaraṇas, 諸障礙), there is said to be empty space (ākāśa, 虛空).
2. Because it is ultimately realized and understood by those who transcend all corruptions of the mind (saṃkleśa, 雜染) through the power of introspective examination (pravicaya bala, 簡擇力) there is said to be the nature of transcendence attained through spiritual effort (pratisaṃkhyā nirodha, 擇滅).

3. Because its original nature is pure of affliction (anāsrava, 清淨), it does not rely on the power of introspective examination and it is revealed through an absence of conditions, there is said to be the nature of transcendence beyond any spiritual effort (apratisaṃkhyā nirodha, 非擇滅).
4. Because it is beyond any feelings of suffering or contentment there is said to be the nature of unchanging, unshakeable purpose (āniñjya, 不動).
5. Because mental associations and emotional feelings are no longer active, there is said to be the nature of transcendence that is beyond any emotional feeling or mental association (saṃjñā vedita nirodha, 想受滅).
6. These five are all based on hypothetically establishing the transcendental nature of the dialectical principle (tathatā, 真如), but that designated this way is also just a hypothetical construct (prajñapti, 假施設).
 - * To prevent it from being rejected as non-existent, it is said to exist.
 - * To prevent attachment to its existence, it is said to have the nature of emptiness.
 - * To prevent claiming it is a false illusion, it is said to be real (in fact it is neither real nor unreal).
 - * Because this dialectical principle is without falsehood or distortion, it is said to be the principle of transcendental reality (bhūta tathatā, 真如).

This is not the same as the idea maintained by other schools of an eternal and everlasting purpose called ‘the transcendental nature’ with a real existence of its own apart from form, the mind and mental states.

3. **On the duality of the beholder (grāhaka, 能取) & that beheld (grāhya, 所取)**

- a. That beheld - the object (grāhya, 所取):
Those purposes held to exist apart from the mind and its states by non-Buddhist schools who believe in the existence of an abstract, external reality (Tīrthikas, 外道) and Buddhist schools based on the objective of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level (Hīnayāna, 餘乘) do not understand the real nature of existence because their beliefs are just objects beheld in their minds, just as the mind and its states are objects perceived through the self-awareness of introspection.
- b. That which beholds - the subject (grāhaka, 能取):
The awareness that beholds them also does not really take on these purposes as its objective conditions, only the mental images (nimitta, 相) of them that arise in one’s mind. One cannot really perceive any form, mind or mental state that is apart from the mind.
- c. The existential duality:
Because the existential nature of all these projections of consciousness and their mental states depend on the arising of an ‘other’ (paratantra, 依他起) that is like a magical illusion, the objects beheld are not endowed with a real existential nature of their own.
- d. There only being the virtual nature of consciousness (vijñapti matratā, 唯識):
In order to disprove the false belief that there are objects with a real existence that are external to the mind and its states, we speak of there only being the virtual nature of consciousness. However, if one clings to only this virtual nature of consciousness as having a real existential nature of its own apart from the mind, it is just like clinging to the existence of an external object and it too constitutes an attachment to purpose (dharma grāha, 法執).

4. **On subduing & severing attachments to purpose** (dharma grāha vibhāga, 我執伏斷)

In fact, there are two kinds of attachments to purpose:

- a. Attachments to purpose that are innate (sahaja, 俱生)
- b. Attachments to purpose that are just speculations of the imagination (vikalpa, 分別)

a. Attachments to purpose that are innate (sahaja, 俱生)

There have been innate attachments to purpose due to the internal power of false conditioning or 'perfuming' (vāsa, 熏習) that have been constantly arising in one's life from its very beginning. Because these evolve spontaneously without depending on one's own speculations or any influences and suggestions (teachings) from others, they are said to be innate. These attachments can be further divided into two kinds:

1. *Innate attachments to purpose that are constant and continuous*: These are found in the mind that deliberates and calculates self-interest (manas, 第七識) and connect to the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 第八識) as its object, producing images (nimitta, 相) in one's mind (sva citta, 自心) that are held to have a real existence of their own.
2. *Innate attachments to purpose that are subject to interruption*: These are mental images found in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 第六識), connected to the five projections of purpose (pañca skandha, 五蘊), the twelve-fold alignment of subject & object (dvādaśa āyatanāni, 十二處) & the (eighteen-fold) sphere of sentient existence (aṣṭadaśa dhātunāni, 十八界)¹ that are ever-changing and producing images in one's own mind. Whether they are general (consisting of all of these factors) or specific (consisting of any one or more of them), they are mistakenly held to have a real existence of their own.

These two kinds of attachment to purpose (dharma grāha, 法執) are subtle and difficult to sever. Only after repeated transcendental cultivation (bhāvanā, 修習) of the ten levels of grounding (daśa bhūmi, 十地) on the bodhisattva path is there an excellence of meditation on the empty nature of purpose (dharma śūnyatā, 法空) that is able to eliminate and transcend these attachments.

b. Attachments to purpose that are speculations of the imagination (vikalpa, 分別)

There are also speculative attachments to purpose that arise due to the power of the external conditions at hand in the present that are not just innate to one's individual life. These require false influences and suggestions (teachings) from others as well as one's own false speculations about them that occur subsequently. Because of this, they are said to be speculations. They are only found in the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 第六識) and are also of two kinds:

1. *Speculative attachments to purposes that are connected to false teachings about the five projections of purpose, the twelve-fold alignment of subject & object & the eighteen-fold sphere of consciousness* from (Buddhist) schools emphasizing the lesser objective of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level (Hīnayāna, 小乘): These bring about images in one's own mind that are just speculations of the imagination but are held to have a real existence apart from the mind.
2. *Speculative attachments to purpose that are connected to false teachings about the existential nature of first principles or causes* (pradhanas, 勝), *ontological categories of existence* (padārthas, 句義) and the like from (non-Buddhist) schools on the existence of an

abstract, external reality (Tīrthikas, 外道): These bring about mental images of them in one's own mind that are really just speculations of the imagination but are held to have a real existence of their own apart from the mind.

These two kinds of attachment to purposes are coarse and explicit and therefore easier to sever than innate attachments. Upon entering into the first level of grounding in joyfulness (pramuditā bhūmi, 歡喜地) one meditates on the transcendental nature of the dialectical principle (tathatā, 真如) in which all things are found to be endowed with the nature of emptiness (sarva dharmāḥ śūnyatā, 一切法法空). This is the transcendental vision of the noble path (darśana mārga, 見道) that is able to eliminate and get beyond these kinds of attachments.

5. The conclusion about attachments to purpose (dharma grāha 我執)

All of these different kinds of attachments to purposes may or may not involve objects that are external to the mind, but in all cases they involve inner objects of the mind as their real foundation of support. Consequently, all attachments to purposes involve the simulation of objects that are being manifested in one's own mind and are held to have a real existence apart from it. In fact, the mental images of these simulated purposes arising from conditions (in the mind) are like mirages or magical illusions because attachments to their real existence apart from the mind are false speculations of the imagination about things that definitely do not have such a real existential nature. Because of this, in The Scripture on Understanding the Deep Mystery (Saṃdhi Nirmocana Sūtra, 解深密經), The Blessed One said:

“Maitreya you should understand:

The objects of consciousness (ālambana, 所緣)

Are only manifestations of its virtual nature (vijñapti matra, 唯識).

In depending on the arising of an 'other' (paratantra, 依他起),

They are like magical illusions (māyā kṛta, 幻事).”

General conclusions about attachments to identity & purpose

(ātma grāha 我執 & dharma grāha 法執)

1. On external objects not being real:

The identities and purposes held to have a real existential nature by non-Buddhist schools that believe in an abstract, external reality (Tīrthikas, 外道) and Buddhist schools that only espouse the objective of attaining freedom from affliction on an individual level (Hīnayāna, 小乘) do not really exist apart from the mind. Consequently, it is determined that the mind and its mental states do not really make use of external objects such as those of form as the objective conditions that are before them (ālambana pratya, 所緣緣). This is because the function of connecting with an object must depend on it having a real existential nature.

2. On there being different projections of consciousness:

The mental states of one projection of consciousness do not serve as the direct and immediate objective condition for any other, just as any one set of objects (like those of audible sound) is not directly and immediately connected with any other condition of consciousness (like vision or touch, etc.).

3. On there being different existential natures:

These mental states are also not directly and immediately connected to the objects of a similar projection of consciousness of one with a different existential nature, just as the eyes of another sentient being do not behold that which one sees for oneself.

Because of this, one should understand that there really are no external objects, only an inner consciousness in which external objects seem to arise. And so there is a stanza of verse in The Scripture on the Buddha's Descent into Śrī Laṅka (Laṅka Avatāra Sūtra, 入楞伽經) that says:

“Just like the entirely imagined speculations of the ignorant
External objects do not have a real existence.
Because the mind is disturbed and corrupted by habitual forces
There are the evolving manifestations of its simulated objects.”

On Metaphors (upacāra, 假說)

As cited before, on metaphors, the first line of Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas says:

1a Identity (ātma, 我) and purpose (dharma, 法) are hypothetical constructs that serve as metaphors (upacāra, 假說) and evolve (pravartate, 轉) as various kinds of mental images (vividha (nimitta), 種種相).

1a 由假說我法，有種種相轉。 ātma dharma upacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says:

1. *Objection about the hypothetical existence of metaphors:*

Objection: Those from the orthodox Hindu School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) asserted that if identity (ātma, 我) and purpose (dharma, 法) have no real existence (dravyasat, 實有) apart from consciousness, they should also have no hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat, 假有)² as metaphors (upacāra, 假說) because three things are needed for there to be a metaphor:

1. Something real that serves as the basis for the comparison
2. Something that resembles it to which it can be compared
3. Something common to both that justifies the comparison

For example, a metaphor for a person being like fire can be made because:

1. There is the reality of fire.
2. There is a person who resembles fire.
3. There is an intensity and redness to both that justifies the comparison.

Other metaphors can also be made like this. For example, comparisons can be made between a person and an ox, etc. However, if identity and purpose do not really exist, what is the basis for making such metaphors (since there must be something real that serves as the basis for the comparison)? And, with there being no metaphor and no such comparison being made, how can it be then said in the verse above that the evolving mind simulates such external objects?

2. *Disproving the validity of this objection:*

This objection is not valid because:

- * The real existence of identity and purpose apart from consciousness has already been disproven.
- * The assertion that metaphors about fire, an ox and the like have to necessarily be based on the real existence of a specific thing or a category of things is not valid.
- a. *The logic of metaphors necessarily being based on categories of things* is not conclusive because the qualities of intensity, redness and the like do not exist categorically as 'fire' (redness is a quality common to many things and intensity is not a quality of fire alone).
 1. On one hand, if a metaphor is not based on shared qualities, one could even say that

water was a metaphor for fire (even though it is really its opposite).

2. On the other hand, if one admits that intensity and redness may not only be unique to the category of fire but maintains that the metaphor is justified because these qualities are always found in fire, the comparison of fire and a person is still flawed because it is evident that these are not qualities that are always found in a person. Therefore, these qualities that are distinct to the category of fire can have a linkage to the category of people, but the metaphor of fire can be only applied to a person in some cases.

Because of this, one should understand that the use of metaphors can be inconclusive or even completely invalid when being applied to categories of things.

- b. *The logic of metaphors necessarily being based on specific things* (as opposed to a category of things) is also inconclusive and invalid because the distinct qualities of intensity, redness and the like are not shared in a fire and a person.
 1. If one claims that the natures of intensity and redness are found in both a fire and a person but they are only distinguished from each other because a fire and a person are fundamentally different things, there is the same error of having a metaphor that lacks shared qualities, as described before.
 2. If one claims that the metaphor is valid just because the qualities of redness and intensity in a fire resemble those found in a person, the comparison is flawed when it is speaking about there literally being a fire in a person rather than just a certain quality of fire.

Because of this, metaphors can also be inconclusive or completely invalid when being applied to specific things.

4. *The real nature of metaphors:*

And so it is illogical to conclude that metaphors just depend on there being #1 something real that serves as the basis for a comparison #2 something that it resembles to which it can be compared & #3 something common to both that justifies the comparison:

- a. *Something real* (dravyasat, 真事) refers to a specific thing with unique and distinct characteristics (sva lakṣaṇa, 自相). This is a reference to objects of evidence that are directly perceived (pratyakṣa, 現量), not hypothetical constructs that are inferred (anumāna, 比量), the metaphors that serve as examples (upamāna, 譬喻量) or the hearsay of communicated expression (śabda, 教量). The knowledge attained through hypotheses, metaphors and hearsay do not directly perceive the unique and distinct characteristics of specific things because they only involve shared characteristics (sāmānya lakṣaṇa, 共相). However, apart from hypotheses, metaphors and hearsay, there is no means of establishing the unique and distinct characteristics that are the foundation of these metaphors.
- b. *The mental constructs of hypothetical knowledge* (prajñapti, 假智) *and the hearsay of communicated expression* (abhidhāna, 詮) in fact depend on verbalization. If the sound of the voice is not in alignment with the ears, the mind will not turn towards it. Neither the expression (vācaka, 能詮) nor that which is being expressed (vācya, 所詮) involves unique and distinct characteristics and so we know that the metaphors of hypothetical knowledge do not necessarily depend on something real. (This is because it is through the mind that distinguishes imagined objects (mano vijñāna, 意識) that communicated expression is known, not through the hearing of the ear, nor through the real external existence of a thing itself.) Consequently, one should understand that metaphors do not depend on the real existence of things, only on their simulation (pratibhāsa, 似).

Simulation here refers to something that is being superimposed (samāropana, 增益) on direct perception, not something with a real existential nature or with characteristics that are apart from consciousness. Based on the superimposition of these simulations, this verbalization process evolves in the mind. And so it cannot be said that the hypothetical existence of metaphors must be based on the real existence of something apart from the mind.

5. *The Conclusion on Metaphors*

We therefore conclude that the objection raised by those from The School on the Definition of Reality (Vaiśeṣika, 勝論宗) about metaphors needing to be based on something real should not be considered as valid.

In fact, depending on the permutations of consciousness, the Blessed One employed hypothetical metaphors about identity and purpose in order to dispel the false idea of their real existence apart from consciousness. Because of this, there is a stanza of verse in The Scripture on the Mysterious Array of Consciousness (Ghana Vyūha Sūtra, 大乘密嚴經 or 厚嚴經) that says:

“To dispel attachments to the real existence of identity and purpose

In those who are deluded,

The Blessed One used metaphors (upacāra, 假說) of identity and purpose

To explain the evolving manifestations of consciousness (vijñāna pariṇāma, 變識).”

On The Manifestations of Consciousness (vijñāna pariṇāma, 變識):

As cited before, on the manifestations of consciousness, Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas say:

1b Through its evolving permutations (pariṇāmaḥ, 所變), there are three ways (tridhā, 三) that consciousness (vijñāna, 識) is able to manifest (pariṇāma isau, 能變) the hypothetical constructs of identity and purpose.

2a They are manifested through:

1. The different ripening seeds of the subconscious mind (vipāka, 異熟),
2. The deliberations and calculations of self-interest (manana ākhyā, 思量)
3. Combined with (ca, 及) the virtual framing of consciousness through the distinguishing of objects (vijñaptir viśayasya, 別境識)

1b 彼依識所變， 此能變唯三。 vijñāna pariṇāma isau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā

2a 謂異熟思量， 及了別境識。 vipāko manana ākhyāśca vijñaptir viśayasya ca

On this, The Discourse on Realizing There is Only the Virtual Nature of Consciousness says: Although there are countless characteristics found in the evolving permutations of consciousness, there are only three ways it is able to manifest identity and purpose:

1. *The different ripening seeds arising from the subconscious mind* (vipāka, 異熟). This is a reference to the many different potential natures that are ever ripening from the eighth projection of consciousness, the subconscious store of memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識).
2. *The consciousness that deliberates and calculates* (manana ākhyā, 思量). This is a reference to the seventh projection of consciousness, the thinking mind that is constantly deliberating and calculating everything in terms of self-interest (manas, 末那).

3. *The consciousness that virtually frames and distinguishes objects* (vijñaptir viṣayasya, 了境). This is a reference to the first six projections of consciousness (ṣaḍ vijñāna, 六識) - those of taste, smell, touch, hearing, vision and thought - that distinguish explicit sensory objects (viṣaya, 境) and mental images (nimitta, 相). The expression 'combined with' (ca, 及) here in this second stanza is a reference to these first six projections of consciousness being combined with the other two.

These three are all said to be evolving permutations of consciousness (vijñāna pariṇāma, 變識). Their ability to manifest consciousness has two mutually dependent aspects:

1. *Manifestation through its causes (seeds)* (hetu pariṇāma, 因能變) in the subconscious store of memory
2. *Manifestation through its effects (fruits)* (phala pariṇāma, 果能變) in the conscious mind

1. *Manifestation through its causes (seeds)* (hetu pariṇāma, 因能變):

This is a reference to the seeds of habitual forces arising from within the subconscious store of memory. These can be of two kinds:

- a. *Habitual forces that flow forth from natures of the same kind* (niṣyanda vāsanā, 等流習氣):
These include habitual forces (vāsanā, 習氣) arising and growing from within the store of subconscious memory (ālaya vijñāna, 藏識) that are conditioned or 'perfumed' (vāsa, 熏) by similar natures found in the seven evolving manifestations of the conscious mind (pravṛtti vijñāna, 轉識). They may be virtuous, evil or morally undefined.
- b. *Habitual forces that ripen from different natures* (vipāka vāsanā, 異熟習氣):
These include habitual forces arising and growing from within the store of subconscious memory that are only conditioned by the first six evolving projections of consciousness. They are afflicted and are either virtuous or evil.

2. *Manifestation through its effects (fruits)* (phala pariṇāma, 果能變):

This is a reference to the variety of mental images (vividha nimitta, 種種相) found in all eight projections of consciousness that arise and are manifested in the conscious mind through the power of the two kinds of habitual forces just described:

- a. *Habitual forces that flow forth from natures of the same kind* (niṣyanda vāsanā, 等流習氣):
Through conditions directly causing the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣), the (inner) existential nature and the (outer) mental images found in the eight different projections of consciousness reciprocally arise and influence each other. They are said to have 'fruits that flow forth from the same nature as their seeds' (niṣyanda phala, 等流果) because the manifested effects found in these eight always resemble their causes.
The seventh projection of consciousness, the deliberation and calculation of self-interest (manas, 末那), always arises through habitual forces that issue forth from a similar nature (niṣyanda vāsanā, 等流習氣) because, between it and the subconscious store of memory, there are always conditions that directly cause the arising of consciousness (hetu pratyaya, 因緣).
- b. *Habitual forces that ripen from different natures* (vipāka vāsanā, 異熟習氣):
Through conditions that prevail (adhipati pratyaya, 增上緣) over one another, there are the actions (karmas, 諸業) of thoughts, words and deeds occurring in the first six evolving projections of consciousness that impact the subconscious store of memory.
 1. They are said to 'the ripening of different natures' (vipāka, 異熟) here because they ripen from the subconscious mind into conscious fruits with different natures and different durations of existence that are consequences in accordance with the power of the actions that have induced them (ākṣepaka karma bala, 引業力).

2. In influencing the first six projections of consciousness, these consequences fulfill destinies that are the consequences of past actions (paripūraka karma, 滿業) (in the hells, in human existence, the heavens, etc.). Arising from the different ripening seeds of the subconscious, these are said to be *'their different rebirths in the conscious mind'* (vipākaja, 異熟生). They are distinguished from *'the different ripening of seeds'* (vipāka, 異熟) in that these rebirths in the conscious mind are subject to interruption.

The ripening of different seeds from the subconscious and their rebirth in the conscious mind described here are said to be *'different ripenings of fruit'* (vipāka phala, 異熟果) because the fruits that are manifested in the conscious mind can be of a different moral nature than their causes as seeds in the subconscious mind.

In this stanza the term *'different ripening seeds of the subconscious mind'* (vipāka, 異熟) is only a reference to the subconscious mind in which there exist attachments to a love of oneself (ātma sneha, 我愛) and the resultant seeds of corruption (saṃkleśa bīja, 雜染種). In being able to manifest the fruits of consciousness (phala pariṇāma vijñāna, 能變果識) they are said to be its *'different ripening seeds'* (vipāka, 異熟). However, as already explained, this does not account for all of the seeds that are found in the subconscious store of memory.

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***Vijñapti Matratā Siddhi*, 成唯識論**
Volume Two